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For me the coastal lowlands of Southeastern Mexico will always 
have a mystical appeal. Whether approached by road winding down from 
the altiplano or from the sea at Veracruz9 the endless green plain 
affords the same vista of boundless beauty, opportunity,, and challenge. 
Surely it is the promised land, and surely the gods watching over it 
dwell atop that snow-capped peak— Orizaba— visible every now and then 
above the clouds. No fools they; it’s cool up there.
It’s usually hot down below and was especially so 25 years ago 
when a group of North American students was ushered into the office 
°f the Vocal Ejecutivo of the Comisi6n del Papaloapan. Power failures 
were frequent in those days, but the absence of air-conditioning did 
nothing to dampen the enthusiasm of our host. No one who met Ing. Raul 
Sandoval Landizuri could not but feel he was in the presence of great­
ness, and through his words we were made to see fhe vision of Mexico’s 
tropics at long last developed. And what a vision it was; of disease 
eliminated, great rivers controlled, highways cutting through the 
jungle, and the jungle giving way to a modern agriculture capable of 
feeding the country’s rapidly growing population. If it was also 
somewhat naive, it was a naivete worthy of the aspirations of a great 
nation.
Thanks to Ing. Sandoval’s encouragement and tolerance, I was able 
to write my doctoral dissertation and publish a small book-L' on the 
formative years of the Papaloapan Project, Thereafter, my work took 
me to Africa and Asia, and if I thought at all about Mexico I suppose 
it was in the context of most governmentally-sponsored tropical 
development schemes failing to attain their objectives..
Thus my pleasure upon returning in early 1976 was all the greater. 
For the Lower Papaloapan Basin had been utterly transformed. No longer 
isolated, it had become the home of a booming agriculture. Where once 
had been mile after mile of untouched bush were now tidy orchards and 
planted pasture. Sugar— and new sugar mills— was everywhere. In place 
of thatched huts were neatly painted houses made of cinder block, the 
blue glow of a television emitting from each. On the Tinajas-Tuxtepec 
highway, one saw more traffic in 15 minutes than used to pass in 24 
hours. And Tuxtepec, once best described as a/'sea of mud,H had 
become a modern metropolis, obviously thriving.
1/ The Papaloapan Project; Agricultural Development in the 
Mexican Tropics (Stanford University Press, 1964).
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The changes extended to the Papaloapan Commission. When created 
in 1947 it was the first regional development agency in tropical 
Mexico. A decade later, its budget had been slashed and bureaucratic 
sclerosis was all too evident. But by 1976 dynamism again prevailed.
In the distinguished geographer# historian, and administrator,
Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo, the Commission had a Vocal Ejecutivo xrorthy of 
Ing. Sandovalfs dreams; and as its Vocal Secretario It was fortunate 
to have a man who had devoted his professional life to the Papaloapan 
Basin and its development. I first met Ing. Guillermo Hernandez Castro 
when, as Resident at the Los Naranjos zone, he was simultaneously 
grappling with the problems of Mazatec resettlement, an irrigation 
trial, and a scheme for agricultural intensification. All three pro­
jects ultimately failed, but he was not unduly concerned: developing
a new area is very, much a. matter of trial and error.
,sYou must see Uxpanapa," Ingi Hernandez;said, "There, in one of 
the most isolated corners of -the country, we are applying the lessons 
of Los Naranjos. Soon 15 thousand Chinantecs will be resettled and 
will immediately begin fanning on a commercial scale. Send one of 
your students to record what happens,"
This study is our response to that invitation.
The project of Uxpanapa has two principal goals. The first Is 
to help meet pressing national needs for food by Introducing intensive 
cropping into a large area of the rainy tropics. The second is to 
compensate a group of Indians who are being displaced by a flood- 
control reservoir and to facilitate their transformation Into modern 
farmers. A variety of pressures have forced the Papaloapan Commission 
to move very rapidly, and pursuit of these goals has not been well 
coordinated. There have been errors and the project has generated 
controversy. For clearing so large an area of virgin rain forest, the 
Commission has been accused of "ecocide;" and of "ethnocide11 for 
uprooting over 40 percent of the Chinantec people.
. Uxpanapa is still in its initial phases and it will be many years 
before these and other charges can be fully evaluated. Nevertheless, 
a detailed account of the project to date is demanded by the recent 
discovery of vast deposits of petroleum In the Southeast. The slow 
and careful development of the remaining land resources of its tropics 
is a luxury not to be allowed Mexico. The exploitation of the oil 
will require enormous investment and involve the government in new and 
little understood areas. Centralized planning and cooperative organi­
zation are frequently suggested as vehicles for minimizing the waste 
and injustice that attend rapid change. If we have succeeded in 
suggesting that tidy answers are few, the pitfalls many, and that 
creativity, and wisdom of the highest order are called for, we will 
rest content.
The study and the photographs accompanying it are very much Peter 
Ewell1s; my name as. junior author appears as a matter of courtesy. It
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reflects almost two-and-half year1s work, on his part, ten months of 
which were spent in the field„ His visits to Uxpanapa— and mine—  
were made possible by a generous grant to Cornell University from the 
Tinker Foundation and I record my appreciation to Miss Martha Muse 
and Dr. Erika Bruce, President and Program Director, respectively, of 
the Foundation, for the sympathetic way in which they responded to what 
must have seemed a series of odd requests. While at Cornell Mr. Ewell 
was supported by an assistantship and back-up services provided by the 
Department of Agricultural Economics. The maps and charts reflect the 
talent of Joseph Baldwin. Lillian Morse, my secretary, typed, kept 
track of the money, and remembered what we were doing. To all we are 
indebted.
But our greatest debt is to the many people involved at Uxpanapa—  
both employees of the Commission and private citizens— who welcomed 
Mr. Ewell as their parents did me: with tolerance, friendship, and a
very real desire to be helpful. We would particularly like to mention:
1* Comisidn del Papaloapan
Sta. Sara Flores 
Ing. Josd Rodriguez Vallejo 
Ing. Rogelio Banderas Valencia 
Sr. Mario Burguete S,
Ing. Humberto Merchand Rojas 
Ing. Josd Luis Casar Rodriguez 
Ing. Rdrico J„ Millan Cepeda 
Ing, Roberto Beltran and the e: 
office in Uxpanapa.
Ing. Miguel A. Lope Avila 
Ing. Alberto Guido Astorga 
Ing. Jesus Gamez Escarcega 
Ing. Jesus Sampers Toledo 
Ing. Rafael Rosales Marrufo 
Lie. Javier Villalobos 
Sr. Oscar del Angel 
staff of the agricultural
2. Banco de Credito Rural del Golfo
Lie. Victor Moye Arrivillega and the entire staff in Uxpanapa.
Ing. Santiago Lecou
3. The officials and members of the ejidos, in Ojitlan as well 
as Uxpanapa.
I close on a note of sadness. Just as Ing. Sandoval was killed 
in an airplane accident at the time I was finishing my thesis in 1956, 
so a helicopter crash at Uxpanapa in the closing days of 1978 took the 
lives of Ings. Tamayo and Hernandez. For all they did to help the 
people of the Southeast— and Mr, Ewell and my other students— I can 
only say thanks. They will be sorely missed. Their vision will live 
on.
Thomas T. Poleman
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Este estudio esta dedicado 
a la memoria del 
Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo 
y del
Ing. Guillermo Hernandez Castro, 
Quienes ofrendaron sus vidas 
al sueno de Uxpanapa.
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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS
Aseguradora Nacional Agricola y Ganadera— The National 
Crop and Cattle Insurance Company
Central de Campesinos Independientes--Union of Independent 
Campesinos, a small peasant union founded in the 1960s
Confederacion Nacional Campesina— National Confederation 
of Campesinos, the official peasant union and constituent 
element of the PRI party
Conaejo Nacional de Ciencia y Tecnologia— The National 
Science and Technology Council, the Mexican equivalent 
of the National Academy of Sciences
Compania Nacional de Subsistencias Populares— The National 
; Basic Foods Company. This organization both buys commodi- 
: ;'ties from farmers at official prices and operates a chain 
of outlets which sell basic foods at subsidized prices.
El Departamento de Asuntos Agrarios y Colonizacion— The 
Department of Agrarian Affairs and Colonization. This 
organization administered the agrarian reform process and 
created ejidal colonies in frontier areas. Under the 
Echeverria administration, it was given ministerial status 
as the Secretaria de la Reforma Agraria.
j’ldeicomiso Instituido en Relacion con la Agricultura— A 
specialized agency of the central Bank of Mexico, which 
finances long-term credit in the agricultural sector
Fondo Nacional de Fomento Ejidal— -The National Fund for 
Agricultural Development, which administered the common 
funds of ejidos and financed the establishment of indus­
tries in the reformed sector* Under the Lopez Portillo 
administration, the agency was reorganized as the Fidei- 
comiso de Fondos Comunes*
Instituto Nacional Indigenista— The National Indian 
Affairs Institute
Instituto Nacional de Investigaciones Agricolas— The 
National Agricultural Research Institute
Partido Autentico de la Revolucion Mexicans— The Authentic 
Party of the Mexican Revolution, a minor political party.
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PRI Partido Revolucionario Institutional— The Institutional 
Revolutionary Party, the single official party of the 
Mexican government.
PEMEX Petroleos Mexicanos-— The Mexican National Oil Company
PRONASE Productora Nacional de Semillas— The National Seed Pro- 
duction Company,
PROQUIVEMEX • Productos Quimicos Vegetales Mexicanos— The Mexican 
Vegetable Chemical Products Company, an agency set up 
to buy, process, and market barbasco— a tropical root 
crop from which steroids used in the production of 
birth control pills are derived.
SESA Servicios Ejidales, S.A.— -The E.iidal Services Company, 
a subsidiary of the official Rural Bank which provides 
custom machinery service to the ejidal sector.
SICA Sociedad Regional de Interes Colectivo Agricola— Regional 
Collective Agriculture Society, an institution created 
in the 1930s to coordinate mutual investments of collec- 
, tive ejidos in the irrigation districts in the North.
TABAMEX Tabacos Mexicanos— The Mexican Tobacco Company, which 
provides credit to growers and markets the product.
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CHAPTER I
MODERN AGRICULTURE IN THE RAIN FOREST
Uxpanapa, Veracruz, is a one thousand square mile area of tropical 
rain forest. The Mexican government is.opening it up to resettle over 
15,000 Chinantec Indians who will be flooded out by the construction of 
the Cerro de Oro dam in northern Oaxaca, 150 miles away to the northwest. 
Four of us were riding in the cab of a pick-up; the chief agronomist for 
the district, the manager of the local branch of the National Rural Credit 
Bank, an inspector from the National Crop Insurance Company, and myself.
The road was rutted from four months of almost continuous downpour. The 
rain had let up earlier in the morning, and the sun was pulling the mois­
ture up from the ground so strongly that we were all soaking wet.
The temporary access road had been pushed through the year before 
and had opened up a broad strip on either side to intensive activity.
The usable wood was cut and trucked out.' The remaining trees, many of 
which were over 100 feet tall, were pulled down with chains dragged be­
tween bulldozers, pushed into windrows, and burned. The land was cleared 
into a regular grid of 20 hectare fields, each one surrounded by a wind­
break. The trash was worked into the soil with heavy disk plows and the 
land was planted with rice and maize. 1976 was the first year that a 
full-scale attempt was made to make the area produce, and over 9,000 
hectares were planted.
It was early November, and. the rice harvest had been underway for 
a month. The earlier stages of the crop cycle had progressed with im­
pressive ease. The seed had been sown with tractors and from airplanes. 
Fertilizer, and insecticides and fungicides to control pests and diseases, 
had been applied by air on a regular schedule. The cost had been high, 
but the officials had been ebullient that so large an area was being 
brought under cultivation for the first time. ' If the zone could be made 
to produce, all their work would be justified and the details of costs 
and yields could be worked out on the basis of a real, positive experience.
The past few weeks had seen one frustration on top of another. Rice 
Blast, a fungus disease which is especially serious in upland rice, had 
damaged a significant portion of the crop. It had rained almost every day. 
The combine harvesters, designed for quite different conditions in the 
United States, were having difficulty and the program was behind schedule.
We pulled in behind two of the harvesters which were off on the 
shoulder. One was seriously disabled and partially dismantled. The 
mechanic from the subsidiary of the Bank which operates all of the ma­
chinery in the zone was up inside the maw of the other one, while five 
or six men looked on. We piled out to see what was the matter. The com­
bine had pulled a stick of wood in with the rice, which had been caught 
in the delicate machinery inside. This was a common problem. Rice is
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usually harvested by machine on leveled land under irrigation. The water 
is drained off before the harvest and the straw dries out. Gangs of com­
bines can work down the fields with little interference. Here in Uxpanapa 
the rice plants had put out large volumes of succulent vegetative growth 
under the influence of the applied nitrogen and that released by the re­
cent clearing. The continuous rain had soaked the soil and the plantsi 
The crop had grown very tall, and much of it had blown down. The com­
bines worked their way through.this mass of vegetation slowly and with 
difficulty. They separate the grain with a system of fans. If it was 
too wet it did not separate and the rice was blown out the back with,the 
trash. A stick left over from the recent clearing would shut down a ma­
chine for half a day or more.
The officials encouraged the workers to get moving again as soon as 
possible, and we got back into the truck. They were furious with the 
delay and angry with the machinery company. Of a total of 32 combines, 
only an average of 14 were in condition to work on any given day. The 
operators had received no special training and didn’t know how to eval­
uate a strange noise or other problem before the damage became serious.
We turned off onto a smaller track which led into a field where 
work was going on. Five machines were operating, three more were 
stopped for one reason or another, and nearly fifty Chinantec Indians 
were scattered around, watching. We got out and walked over. The 
agronomist called the group together and began to speak. He told them 
that everyone had expected that the harvest would go smoothly, that 
there would be enough machines, that the weather would clear up. This 
xtfas an especially rainy year throughout Veracruz. This land was being 
cultivated for the first time, and everyone was working hard to make 
sure that it would be a success. The Chinantecs, as equal members of 
the newly formed collective ejido,1/ or cooperative farm, must take re­
sponsibility. The government was doing everything that it could. It 
had opened up the area, built the roads, cleared the land, bought the 
seed, fertilizer, and other inputs. It had brought in the machines, 
but they couldn’t do everything. Now the people themselves must take 
responsibility and organize themselves to harvest as much grain as 
possible by hand. In Oaxaca everyone had always worked by hand, on a 
maximum of two or three hectares. Here each family had 20 hectares,
They had the opportunity to earn much more money than before and 
the responsibility to provide basic food grain for Mexico, which needed 
it so badly. One man obviously could not harvest 20 hectares of rice 
by himself, so other people were being brought in to help, other 
Chinantecs who would themselves be moving into Uxpanapa in the next few 
years. He realized that the fallen grain was difficult to cut with 
machetes, so he had brought sickles, which would make the work go faster. 
They would thresh by beating handfuls of the laden panicles against oil 
drums, letting the grain fall in. The-,plants had produced well, there 
were at least four tons per hectare in the field; it must be gathered.
1/ Spanish words are used frequently in this paper, and will be Italicized 
only when first mentioned.
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The president of,the ejido stepped forward. Like the others, he 
was dressed in cheap cotton pants and open white shirt over a T-shirt.
He spoke quietly and deliberately. He said that both the members of 
the ejido and the workers who had come in from outside were very dis­
satisfied with the situation. All of the combines together were only 
cutting about 6 tons per,day. On the few days the sun had shone for 
a few hours and the machines had been working, there had not been enough 
trucks to unload into, and more time had been lost* Hand cutting was 
intolerably slow. In their own land they planted rice in compact clumps 
in rows. At harvest time, the men could work rapidly down the rows in 
an easy rhythm, cutting the panicles off plants and beating off the 
grain. Here the rice had been thickly broadcast and much of it had 
lodged. It was slow work to gather up the wet straw, cut off the heads, 
and thresh. They were paid 40 centavos (about 10 U.S. cents) per kilo 
harvested. No matter how hard they worked, they could not make the 
legal minimum wage. They were a long way from home, living in half- 
completed houses and improvised dormitories, and the cost of food was 
very high. They,wanted to be paid a flat daily rate. The costs had 
been high through, the whole season, and nobody could see how this 
harvest was going to yield a profit for them. They had been promised 
that the new land would produce large profit under mechanization and 
that they would live better.
The Bank manager stood up on the back.of the truck. He had been 
working 16 hour days for months, organizing the flow. of.inputs, machinery 
and advance payments. He saw the President of the ejido, one of 27 in 
the zone which was operating with credit, almost every day. He reminded 
them that the advances which they received for their work was not a wage, 
it was part of the credit. When the time came to render accounts, all 
of this would be deducted from the income from the harvest. The crop was 
insured, the costs of production were covered so that they would not fall 
into debt, but they were not guaranteed a profit. Everybody would have 
to work together to realize the potential of Uxpanapa.: Of course there 
would be problems the first year. Of course the people had the right to 
expect enough to eat and something to send home to their families. He 
would raise the rate to 60 centavos per kilo. The sickles would speed 
up the work. He encouraged them to try hard and get as much rice up as 
possible before it began to sprout. The weather would improve, more 
machines would come, more trucks were on the way; things would get better
The officials walked around and chatted for a few moments, and 
demonstrated the use of the sickles. Then we got back into the truck to 
drive the twenty-five miles back to La Laguna, the headquarters camp.
All three men were very frustrated. They could not understand why the 
Indians wouldn’t take responsibility, why everything had to be done for 
them. They had been treated with every consideration since they had 
first been brought to see Uxpanapa by boat and helicopter three years 
before. The government had invested millions of pesos in roads, infra- .■? 
structure, clearing, and credit, so that a group who had lived in poverty 
could become members of a prosperous community. They could not expect ' 
a handful of technicians to do everything, and they wouldn’t even apply 
themselves to harvest their own rice on their own land.
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We dropped the bank manager and the insurance representative off 
at their office, a three-room, concrete-block structure on the edge of 
the muddy road. Five inoperable combines were lined up in front, and 
two mechanics were working Qh acrop-sptaying helicopter in the yard 
behind. About 20 campesinos were sitting on benches outside or 
leaning on the parked cars, waiting for the manager to approve some 
paper in the complex credit system. We went on to the agriculture 
office, which was equally busy.
In the early afternoon the agronomist, who was also charged with 
the formal organization of the ejidos, invited me to attend a meeting 
in one of the new towns. Eight of a projected 12 of these settlements 
were in various stages of construction at the time. Work was suspended 
during the year 1976 due to budgetary problems. Each one would combine 
the members of several ejidos, and would provide homes for approximately 
three hundred families. The houses were being built .by the settlers 
themselves with a 20,000 peso, or 1600 U.S. dollar,—  government subsidy. 
Water, sewage and electricity were to be provided to each home. A civic 
center would consist of an administration building, a meeting room, a 
school, a health clinic, and a post office. The town we visited was 
one of the most isolated, about 20 miles up a side road.
The first impression was startling, of order being imposed upon 
nature. The jungle had been pushed back in a ragged line, exposing 
red soil and white limestone rock. The area had been divided up into 
neat blocks, outlined by the concrete poles and wires of the Federal 
Electric Commission. Everything was in various stages of construction. 
The sidewalks had been completed before the drainage system was com­
plete or the streets were paved, so perfectly rectangular, deep, muddy 
puddles had formed.
Although the settlers were free to modify any one of four basic 
house designs in any way they wished, they were nearly identical. A 
concrete floor and six reinforced concrete posts formed the basic frame. 
The walls were built out of irregular, locally molded concrete blocks.
In many cases, the upper third of the walls were made of rough cut 
boards, set vertically. The roofs were corrugated asbestos sheets.
They were well Spaced, usually four to a block. The areas behind, 
which were planned for garden plots, were full of weeds, construction 
materials, fallen trees, and, in a few cases, poor stands of corn, 
sesame, and other crops. All of the buildings in the civic center 
were begun at once; the brick walls stood at odd angles at different 
heights, and nothing yet had been roofed.
2/ The Spanish word campesino for rural people corresponds roughly to 
the English word "peasant", but carries no value connotations.
The Mexican peso was fixed at an exchange rate of 12.50 per dollar 
during the planning stage of the project. In September 1976, the 
currency was allowed to float, and devalued by nearly one half. It 
had stabilized at 22.80 pesos per dollar by 1978. Unless otherwise 
noted, the dollar equivalents used throughout this study are calcu- 
iatlated at the earlier rate. The symbol ($) is used for the peso in 
Mexico. ■
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The meeting was to be held in a temporary gallery for the storage 
of cement and other supplies. There were about fifteen people standing 
around when we arrived. The agronomist greeted the President of the 
ejido, who sent two teenage boys to get a table arid some chairs from a 
nearby house. There were 112 legal members of this ejido, so 57 (50 
percent plus one) needed to be present if any legal business were to 
be carried out. The President spoke rapidly in Chinantec, and about 
half of the men went out to find other people. They wrapped their 
heads in brightly colored plastic sheets to protect themselves from 
the light rain.
When the simple unfinished table arrived, the agronomist and the 
President sat down and chatted about the crops while they waited. The 
rice planting had been seriously affected by blast. The agronomist 
assured him that it would probably recover. The maize was developing 
poorly and unevenly. This, the agronomist said, was really their fault 
for not having followed his instructions about fertilization. It is a 
common mistake of the campesinos to wait until the plants are about 
eight inches tall before applying nitrogen. In this climate, it is' 
important to put in the fertilizer at the time of planting to give 
the new shoots a good start. The President also complained that the 
truck which had been assigned to take the men out to the fields often 
arrived late, and they wasted many hours.
After.about 25 minutes, 51 people had gathered, including three 
widows who Had inherited ejidal rights. All of the others were away 
in the old ejido in Ojitlan, Oaxaca. This was a constant problem.
The presidential decree by which the area behind the dam had been 
expropriated specifically gave the campesinos the right to continue to 
cultivate their lands until they were actually flooded. The construction 
of the dam had been delayed, and the people were constantly moving back: 
and forth between the two areas. Hany of them regarded Uxpanapa as a 
somewhat irregular source of work and maintained their homes and families 
where they had always been. This made the daily organization of the 
labor force very uncertain, and greatly complicated the constant paper­
work which was necessary to meet the various legal requirements of the 
process. The Bank had been forced to send members of their inadequate 
staff to the old settlements, many of which are as much as a five hour 
walk from the nearest road, to get the necessary signatures for the 
credit contracts,
The agronomist looked through the pile.of papers which he had 
brought, and asked when they thought he would be able to get a quorum 
together. The President talked with the other members of the leader­
ship, and they decided that it should be possible on the following 
Thursday. The official said that he would be glad to come back, but! 
he had many obligations all over the zone and he would take the oppor­
tunity to explain the purpose of the meeting to save time the next 
week. He had been personally instructed by Ing. Jorge Tamayo, the 
Director of the Papaloapan Commission, which was in charge of the 
dam and the resettlement, to legally organize the collective ejidos
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of Uxpanapa into a regional association, or Union of Ejidos. As they 
all knew, each family was granted rights to 20 hectares of land in the 
new ejidos, but it would never be divided into individual parcels. 
Following the framework set down in the new Agrarian Reform Law, all 
of the resources would be managed cooperatively as. a single productive 
unit.
In comparison with the great majority of campesinos in Mexico, they 
were uniquely privileged. In compensation for the flooding of their 
homeland, the Chinantec people would receive a total of: 28 million pesos. 
The value of their personal immovable property was to be paid In cash. 
Many of them had already received this money; the documentation for the 
balance was being processed,in Mexico City and would come through in the 
course of the next year. The assessed value of their land and the com­
munal property of the old ejidos was put into a common fund. This
would be augmented by their share of the income from the,lumber which was
being cut and taken out.
The Union of Ejidos would receive this money and Invest it in an 
agro-industrial center, with the technical assistance of the appropriate 
government agencies. Anything which is good business should come under 
the control of the people. They needed a fleet of buses to provide 
transportation; it should belong to the campesinos. They needed tractors 
to work the land; they should belong to the campesinos. Why should they 
sell unhusked field rice at three pesos per kilo, when polished rice sold 
for $7.50? A rice mill should be built, and it should belong to the
campesinos. Already an outsider was finding it profitable to run a gas
station; the campesinos should build their own and keep these profits for 
themselves. The Union would be organized democratically, just like a 
larger, richer, and more powerful ejido. By uniting they would become 
one of the most powerful local organizations in the whole country. They 
would be able to secure large loans, and to exert political and economic 
power far beyond the capacity of an individual ejido, not to mention an 
individual person. Important officials from the capital would be coming 
to Uxpanapa in a few weeks to legally establish the Union. The majority 
of the members of each ejido must approve the transfer of funds, and 
elect the representatives.
Obviously somewhat awed by the forcefulness of this speech, the 
ejidatarios sat quietly for a few moments. Then a man of about 40 got 
up and began to speak very slowly, his Spanish accented with the short, 
breathy sounds of his own language. He said that many of the people 
didn’t much like the collective system. In Ojitlan each family had its 
own parcel, and took care of its own affairs. Here, some people were 
lazy and took advantage of those who worked hard. Also, if the ejido 
had all this money, why couldn’t they buy some of the things which they 
so urgently needed? The round trip back to his old home, where his . 
family still lived, cost him about three day’s pay. With all the rain, 
they often didn’t get that much work in a week. They often had to wait 
several days for the Bank’s tractors to arrive. Why couldn't they buy 
a truck for transportation, and some tractors to work?
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The agronomist spoke.up again* He said work responsibility was 
the greatest,, and really the, only problem of cooperative organization.
The campesinos of Mexico had gotten into bad habits. Factory workers 
must get to work on time. If they are late one day, they get warned.
If they are late again, they get their pay docked. If they are late a 
third time, put they go. , In the country, people have always taken things 
too slowly. They get to work, look around, work a little, take a rest in 
the shade, and go home when they feel like it. Mexico would never pro­
gress like this. They must assume the discipline of responsibility, and 
really put their backs to the wheel. ,
, As to the tractors arid trucks, these should belong to the Union. 
Suppose some fertilizer is needed. Should some merchant be allowed to 
make money, delivering it to our door? No, we should go to the factory 
in Minatitlan and buy it at the wholesale price. Should we send ten 
trucks down there and have each one pick up four or five sacks? No, 
the: Union should,take care of this. It should take orders, from all the 
ejidos and send .down a truck to, buy it all at once, perhaps in bulk which 
would be much cheaper. Should ten trucks drive up to Ojitlan each week­
end? Can we really afford1such luxury? No, the Union should buy a bus 
and organize a regular route; None of these services should be free; 
the Union should be run like a business. The Union must not go through 
its capital and have nothing to show in five years but some broken-down 
machinery and an empty bank account. Its operations should be run for 
profit, and the profits should belong to all of you. I have many things 
to attend to now. Discuss it among yourselves, talk to the ejidatarios 
who could not make this meeting* and be ready by next Thursday to sign 
the papers. You are free not to join, but I am sure that if you think 
about it, you will.
We shook hands with everyone and got back into the truck. On the 
way back to the.office, the agronomist told me that the process was 
bound to be slow and somewhat difficult, but that he was sure that it 
would work out well. He said that; these Indians were always suspicious 
of outsiders and new Ideas. He did not expect all the ejidos to join 
immediately, but as soon as they saw the real benefits received by those 
who did, they would all come in. It was important that all the capital 
be kept together rather than being distributed among the ejidos, where 
It could easily be frittered away.
In the late afternoon, I went out by myself to interview the 
President of one of the ejidos which had been settled about ten years 
before, when it was almost entirely virgin wilderness. It was a very 
different kind of town from the one' I had just visited. Its houses were 
built of. bamboo with very, steeply pitched thatched roofb. They were laid 
out in an irregular line on a bluff overlooking a river. A new wooden 
school was set up on a hill behind. Tropical towns are never neat; the 
paths are irregular and muddy, pigs run freely, and at first it is diffi­
cult to recognize gardens as such. On closer look, the tangled growth 
reveals a great variety of vegetables, fruits, and herbs. After some
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asking around, I located the President, whom X had met several days be­
fore at the Bank. He was a short man with closely cropped black hair and 
calm, intelligent eyes. - He seemed pleased that I had come, shooed away 
a crowd of curious, children, and asked his wife to bring some chairs 
outside. Within a few moments, three other men stopped by one by one, 
shook hands, and,sat down. They were obviously close friends, and joked 
and chatted among themselves.
I asked them how they had come together to settle in such an iso­
lated area. The President explained that most of the ejidatarios were 
Totonac Indians from the northern part of Veracruz, They had worked as 
day-laborers on farms and found occasional work in the town, loading 
trucks. Many years before, they had formed a group and applied to the 
agrarian authorities for land. The tenancy structure in their home area 
was very complex, and two separate petitions for an ejido had been end- ; 
lessly tied up in litigation and bureaucratic paperwork. In the late 
1960’s, they were offered the chance to move into the Uxpanapa area, 
which had recently been divided into ejidos. Six of them had taken the 
train to Jesus Carranza, a small port on the Coatzacoalcos River. From 
there, an official accompanied them in a launch as they spent a week 
exploring five possible sites in what was then an unbroken forest. They 
had chosen this area because of its location on a bluff overlooking'the 
river near a broad band of good, alluvial soil. They returned home to 
make the arrangements and moved down the following season.
I asked how many people had been part of the original group. The 
men consulted among themselves for a few moments before agreeing that 
42 families had originally signed the papers. There was much confusion 
at first. The government provided legal rights to the land and the 
cost of transportation, but very little else. In the first years each 
family cleared between four and six hectares of land by hand. This was 
about as much as they could use, because there was virtually no market 
for their products, due to the high cost of transportation. Merchants 
would occasionally come up the river in launches to barter oil, salt, 
kerosene, medicines, and other necessities for corn at 40 or 50 cen­
tavos per kilo, less than a quarter of the official support price. The 
people also gathered barbasco, a root found In the forest which is used 
for the production of birth control pills. They supplemented their 
diet with game. The first years were very hard. There were no schools, 
no doctors, and the river was impassable for two or three months of the 
year during the dry season. Many members of the original group had not 
been able to accept the hardships, and left after a few months. Other 
relatives and friends had replaced them; there had been a lot of coming 
and going.
X asked them how the arrival of the Papaloapan Commission had 
affected their lives. They looked at each other and seemed a little 
unsure how to answer. I said that, well,, you have a road now. The 
President said yes, that this was very important. Merchants now came 
in trucks to buy their harvests at much better prices. When somebody
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got sick they could get medicines; their lives were much more normal.
One of the other men said that the road was still over a kilometer from 
the town* He added that when the government had come to take out the 
timber prior to clearing the land, they had promised them 600,000 pesos 
and permanent gravelled access roads. In fact, they had never even been 
told how much the wood had sold for. The Commission was pressuring them 
to release the money to the Union of Ejidos for the benefit of the zone 
as a whole, but they wanted it to meet their own needs. They had been 
able to buy a truck and a tractor with some of these funds, but the roads 
were muddy tracks which had never been properly graded.
Little by little the conversation began to pick up, and we spent 
several hours discussing their experiences and the issues which were 
important to them. The President did most of the talking, but he would 
consult with the others and they would often spend some time arriving at 
an exact detail or figure. When the Commission came, the colonists were 
offered all of the same benefits which were being given to the Chinantecs: 
housing, electricity, medical care, schools, credit, and so forth. In 
return, they had to agree to become part of the integrated, centralized 
structure which was being set up. They had worked and suffered for the 
right to farm their own land in their own way, and a variety of conflicts 
with the government had arisen over the organization of their settlement, 
and more significantly, over the type of agriculture and the kind of 
credit arrangements which would really meet their needs.
As sdon as the project began, the Commission sent out surveyors to 
draw lines as the basis for their clearing and resettlement maps. In 
this ejido, as in several other cases, the results conflicted seriously 
with the documentation they had originally received. Areas which some 
members had laboriously cleared by hand were excluded from their property, 
and the Commission proceeded to clear with machines, and plant crops, on 
land which the ejidatarios believed was legally theirs. At the same time, 
a census was taken of the existing population. According to the settlers, 
members of the community who happened to be away the day the helicopter 
came were arbitrarily excluded. Each family was legally entitled to 20 
hectares, and several Chinantec families were settled into the vacancies. ' 
The original group would have preferred that these places be left open 
for their own children, and to allow for land which was too steep or 
rocky to plant.
The Commission had set up guard stations,.manned by a special 
police force and a small contingent of the army, to protect the newly 
opened area from invasion by landless campesinos before the resettlement 
program was completed. Identity cards had been issued; it was compli­
cated to get permission for friends and relatives to visit. One of the 
men wryly observed that it was easier to cross into the United States 
than into Uxpanapa.
The colonists were being asked to move into one of the new towns, 
which was being constructed about six kilometers away, to receive services
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such as housing, running water, and electricity. They were unwilling . 
to go; they liked their location on the river. They had invested tre­
mendous amounts of time and energy in clearing the land and planting 
their gardens, and did not want to live among strangers with a different 
language and different customs. The President commented that the Chin- 
antecs were dominated by their own traditional leaders or caciques, and 
that the unity which had kept the original group together in the early 
years was breaking down into petty conflicts. He was negotiating with 
the Commission to drop the 20,000 peso housing subsidy in return for 
electricity in their present location, but they were not sure if this 
idea would be accepted. One of the men said flatly that he would take 
his family out to live in the fields rather than move into the new town.
As farmers, they were very frustrated by their problems with the 
agricultural program of the Commission and the credit policies of the 
official Bank. In their first years in the area, they applied their 
experience from their home area to the problem of growing enough food. 
Each family cleared several scattered small plots. This allowed them 
to take advantage of different soil and drainage conditions to plant 
different varieties of maize, as well as rice and other crops, at dif­
ferent times of the year. Without the resources to use purchased inputs 
such as fertilizer, or any source of power except their own labor, they 
were able to survive.
The Commission cleared 450 hectares in the ejido with heavy machin­
ery, saving many years of heavy labor, but in three years the people had 
made no profit in these areas. Credit was tied to a whole series of com­
plex technical and bureaucratic procedures set for the region, which had 
not been adapted to the specific natural conditions or the needs of the 
settlers. New varieties and a highly mechanized system had not worked 
well. Costs had been very high, and the yields were lower than in the 
plots cultivated using traditional technology. Although the credit was 
received through a collective credit contract with the ejido as a whole, 
and the fields were prepared in large units with the Bank’s tractors, 
the leadership informally divided the land and the materials among the 
members. Many individuals were beginning to feel that they would do 
better entirely on their own. f
After a couple of hours of discussion, the President invited me put 
to look at the fields. We drove for about three kilometers along the 
main road, and then turned off into a track which led to a large field 
of maize. He was particularly anxious to show me the difference between 
the hybrid and native varieties. The hybrid stand was extraordinarily 
uneven —  the seed had not germinated at all in large patches —  and 
many of the plants were small, yellow, and sickly. The leaf covering of 
the ears was not complete at the tip, where moisture and insect larvae 
enter and damage the grain. The native varieties were much more resis­
tant to a variety of problems. They did best on soils which had been 
cleared by hand rather than by machine, but consistently outyielded the 
hybrids. We chatted for a few moments about the. crops, and I gave him a
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ride back to the headquarters camp, where he had some business with 
the Bank.
Uxpanapa is one of several large, integrated projects which the 
Mexican government has undertaken in the rainy tropics in recent years.
The construction of the Cerro de Oro dam and the need for resettlement 
is the specific reason to open up this area, but a growing national food 
deficit and rapid population growth are putting increasing pressure on 
the land and other resources in the Southeastern region of the country.
The Mexican tropics are relatively small, and do not present the large- 
scale challenges of the Amazon basin and other areas of the world. Eight­
een million hectares form less than ten percent of the coufttry, but in­
clude between eight and ten million hectares of sparsely populated, po­
tentially productive crop and pasture land, and enormous water and forest 
resources. In theory, a program of this kind allows the government to 
concentrate its investments, increase agricultural production through 
mechanization and supervised credit, provide basic services to the popu­
lation, and build the basic infrastructure for regional growth.
This plan has generated controversy in political and academic circles 
in Mexico. The Papaloapan Commission has been accused of systematically 
destroying an Indian culture, of destroying one of the last areas of trop­
ical rain forest in the country, and of devoting a disproportionate quantity 
of public funds to a project of limited impact and uncertain success based 
on inappropriate technology imported from other regions.
As of this writing (1978) the Uxpanapa project has been underway 
for less than five years. Within this short perspective, it is not 
possible to make a formal evaluation of the costs, benefits, and distri­
bution of benefits. Nevertheless, important and irreversible decisions 
have been made. A certain style of development —  a certain methodology —  
has evolved out of the priorities of the Mexican state, the growing 
crisis in the agricultural sector as a whole, previous experience in 
tropical colonization, and the particular institutions involved.
This study will explore the background of the government's policy 
and three very different modes of tropical agriculture. The first is 
the traditional system of the Chinantecs in their homeland, the second 
is the system used by the spontaneous colonists in Uxpanapa to survive 
in the wilderness, and the third is the mechanized, collective system 
of the project itself. Uxpanapa is a useful framework within which to 
examine the issues involved In introducing modern technology into the 
rainy tropics. The experience may help to define the most appropiiate 
strategy for the development of these regions, both in Mexico and in 
other parts of the world.
Plate 1-1
One of 12 new towns which are being built in Uxpanapa for the Chinantec Indians who are being 
displaced by the Cerro de Oro dam.
An official of the Papaloapan Commission tries to convince the members of an ejido to organize 
themselves collectively, so that the mechanized agricultural program can proceed smoothly.
Plate 1-2
Combines have not been able to harvest upland rice effectively under the rainy conditions in 
Uxpanapa. The chief agronomist tries to adjust the machine to cut lodged grain.
Even by hand, it is extremely slow and difficult work to harvest rice which has been sown broadcast 
and which has then lodged.
Plate 1-3
Above: The spontaneous set­
tlers cleared small plots in the 
tropical forest by hand to 
meet the needs of their 
families.
Right: The President of an 
ejido, one of about 50 small 
communities already estab­
lished in Uxpanapa before the 
resettlement program began 
in 1974.
CHAPTER II
MEXICO’S AGRICULTURAL CRISIS
The pressures on the Mexican government to increase production in 
the tropics are intensifying. On the national level, the total produc­
tion of basic foods has not been able to keep pace with the growth of 
population and total demand, and imports have been increasing steadily.
The level of living of the majority of the rural population is very low, 
promoting a massive migration to the cities, where Industry is concen­
trated but where Insufficient work is available. In 1978, it was esti­
mated that only about half of the work force In Mexico City was fully 
employed (84). The problems of the agricultural sector have reached 
crisis proportions in the past ten years, after three decades of remark­
able growth and 50 years after an agrarian revolution which laid the 
basis for one of the most comprehensive land reform programs in the 
world.
Beginnning in the 1940Ts, development policy shifted away from a 
broad strategy based on a viable peasant agriculture, to the concentration 
of capital and modern agricultural technology on a small fraction of the 
total farm land, favoring large, privately owned units in regions suitable 
for irrigation. This approach more than adequately served the interests 
of an elite whose considerable fortunes were tied to the rapid industrial­
ization of Mexico. Between 1940 and 1965, agricultural production in­
creased at an average rate of over five percent per year while GNP rose 
by over six percent, figures well above the 3.1 percent rate of population 
growth and among the very highest in the world at that time.
This performance was made possible in part by massive public invest­
ments in infrastructure, and In part by the development of efficient 
technological packages which include high-yielding varieties of wheat 
and other crops, mechanization, fertilizers, pest control, and other 
modern inputs. The "Green Revolution" provided food to the urban areas 
at relatively low cost during a period of rapid industrial expansion. 
Nevertheless, it both masked and contributed to increasingly serious 
distortions in the allocation of resources, both between regions and 
between sectors of the rural population. The growth rate dropped off 
rapidly after 1965; in both 1976 and 1977 agricultural output declined 
by about one percent per year. Mexico Is importing an increasing pro­
portion of the basic food grains needed to feed its people. These trends 
are illustrated in Charts 1 and 2. Government policy has been actively 
seeking out alternatives, Including a greater attention to the peasants 
who work very close to or below the subsistence level —  who constitute 
the overwhelming majority of all farmers —  and to under-exploited regions 
such as the tropical Southeast.
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CHART 1. MEXICO: PRODUCTION OF MAIZE, WHEAT AND BEANS
AND GROWTH OF POPULATION, 1925-1977
(logarithmic vertical scale)
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Source: Thomas T. Poleman," Food, Population, and Employment:
Some Implications for Mexico's Development" (Cornell Agricultural 
Economics Staff Paper No. 78-19, Ithaca, N.Y., 1978), p.8.
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Geography; High and Dry
Mexico is dominated by the great chain of mountains which runs, with 
a few interruptions, from Alaska to the tip of South America. The country 
is divided into sharply contrasted zones; hot coastal plains, sharply 
rising escarpments, and interior plateaux. The land is further broken 
down by the irregular topography into hundreds of ecologically distinct 
sub-zones (Map 1). Two-thirds of the total area is on slopes greater 
than ten percent; over one-quarter is on agriculturally useless slopes 
greater than 25 percent. High altitudes produce a temperate climate 
in much of the country, but over three-quarters of the potentially arable 
land is arid and only a few zones are suitable for irrigation. Out of a 
total area about a quarter that of the United States, about 15 percent is 
potentially arable and about nine percent is actually cropped. This 
amounts to 17 million hectares —  a little bit more than that cultivated 
in the State of Iowa —  on which to support a rapidly growing population 
of 65 million (98; 194, p. 28; 217, p. 130).
There is no natural breadbasket —  no large, fertile area appropriate 
for the intensive rainfed cultivation of grain crops analogous to the 
Midwest of the United States or to the plains of central Europe. Since 
before the Spanish conquest, the Mexican people have' been concentrated 
in the dry, temperate highland basins around the cities in the center 
of the country. Over half of the population and over half of the cropped 
latid are found in this zone, which receives less than ten percent of the 
total rainfall (217, p. 139). Generation after generation of subdivision 
has resulted in very small farms averaging between one and five hectares, 
xsrhich are cultivated using traditional methods based on hand and animal 
labor.
The southern highlands, where the Indian peoples are concentrated, 
are the poorest areas in Mexico. The rainy tropical lowland strips 
along both southern coasts were disease-ridden, sparsely populated, and 
almost entirely undeveloped until a generation ago. Recent projects 
have not yet established intensive production in these areas; they are 
dedicated primarily to extensive and inefficient cattle ranches, sugar 
cane plantations,and primitive subsistence agriculture based on slash- 
and-burn techniques. The porous limestone soils of the Yucatan penin­
sula, which was long isolated from the rest of the country, have little 
potential for intensive agriculture apart from the production of the 
traditional henequen and sisal fibers, which face an uncertain world 
market.
The Importance of Irrigation
Irrigation has been the key to highly productive agriculture since 
pre-Columbian times. The most remarkable increases in output in the
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post-war period were concentrated in the north, particularly in the 
states of Sinaloa and Sonora, where the government invested heavily in 
building dams on the short rivers to water the arid valleys along the 
west coast. In the years between 1940 and 1970, from 10 to 20 percent 
of the Federal budget was directed to the agricultural sector. Between 
80 and 95 percent of this was invested in the physical construction of 
irrigation systems (219, pp. 131-136). Mechanization, credit, research, 
extension, and other services have been concentrated in these oases. An 
intensive program of research sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation 
developed varieties of wheat which are capable of very high yields when 
grown using a carefully controlled package of water application, ferti­
lization, and other practices. The yields of other crops have increased 
significantly.
Capital-intensive, technically sophisticated irrigated agriculture 
In Federally administered districts generates more than a third of the 
value of the commercial farm output in the country, although it occupies 
less than ten percent of the total cropland (61; 217, p. 139). (See 
Chart 3). The modern sector, which only accounts for about seven per­
cent of all Mexican farms, is concentrated in the irrigation districts 
in the North (172, Chart 3-1). These farmers specialize in relatively 
high-value crops, most of which are directed to a small, high-income 
domestic market or are exported. There has been a dramatic trend away 
from basic food crops in the irrigation districts In the past 15 years 
(187, Chart 21). The best dam sites have already been developed and the 
cost of bringing new land under irrigation has risen to over 3,000 dollars 
per hectare (198). Between 1970 and 1976, the government developed 
600,000 hectares in smaller, lower cost projects, but their impact was 
neutralized by organizational problems and the abandonment of marginal 
land in rain-fed areas (12). Rapid increases in production through 
irrigation can no longer be relied upon to meet the nation's growing 
need for food in the years to come.
Agrarian Reform
Land reform has been one of the principal elements of the agri­
cultural policy of every presidential administration since the Revo­
lution. Over 90 million hectares had been granted to nearly three 
million beneficiaries by 1976. Nevertheless, as Chart 4 illustrates, 
the basic productive resources are very poorly distributed. More than 
85 percent of the farmers in the country are unable to support their 
families on theif small plots using the technology which is available 
to them (167, p. 953). A study made by the Bank of Mexico in 1968 con­
cluded that 52 percent of the landholders made less than 3,500 pesos, or 
280 dollars per year, from the sale of crops. Although small farmers 
produce some of their own food,the average family in this group sold over 
half of their production. Of the nation's farmers, 95 percent made less 
than 9,300 pesos, or 740 dollars per year (172, Chart III-l). The agri­
cultural sector Is polarized into extremes in many variations of rich vs.
CHART 3. MEXICO: LAND USE AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION, 1976
R. Fernandez y Fernandez, "El Problema de los Alimentos y 
la Tenencia de la Tierra," Colegio de Postgraduados, Chapingo, Mexico, 
1978.
CHART 4. MEXICO: DISTRIBUTION OF CULTIVATED AND IRRIGATED LAND
AND VALUE OF OUTPUT BY TYPE OF-HOLDING, 1960
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Source: Thomas T. Poleman, "Food, Population, and Employment: 
Some Implications for Mexico's Development" (Cornell Agricultural 
Economics Staff Paper No. 78-19, Ithaca, N.Y., 1978), p. 9.
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poor: irrigated vs. rain-fed production, north vs. south, large vs. small, 
modern vs. traditional technology, and private vs. community land owner­
ship. Capitalist development inevitably concentrates resources in its 
early stages, but in few countries have the benefits of growth been so 
poorly distributed. How is this possible under a stable democratic gov­
ernment formed after a successful revolution in which two million campe- 
sinos died under the banner of ‘'land and liberty"?
The Land-Holding Villages
Over 90 percent of the farmers in the country are in the traditional 
sector, which has been on the margins of the national economy since the 
Spanish conquest. The invaders opened up new areas to meet the needs of 
their own food economy, but they left the native communities to feed them­
selves much as they had always done on the basis of communal land owner­
ship. The people became racially mixed, but agriculture continued to re­
volve around the village (218, Chapter IV). A great variety of systems 
based on hand and animal power developed over many generations of exper­
ience to take advantage of the local ecological conditions and the re­
sources which were available. Both the Spanish landowners and the Church 
were content with a share of the product, and did not try to change the 
basic structure of these communities.
In the 1860*s, President Juarez promulgated the Reform Laws, which 
tried to break away from the semi-feudal, locally oriented structure of 
rural Mexico by requiring the Individual ownership of land. He hoped 
that this would release entrepreneurial spirit in the new family farmers 
and form the basis for progress on the model of Europe and the United 
States. The abrogation of the ancient rights, instead of strengthening 
the position of the poor, provided an opportunity for the elite favored 
by his successor, Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911), to buy or despoil the campe- 
sinos of their land and enlarge their estates, or haciendas, to enormous 
proportions in many parts of the country. At the same time, the con­
struction of the railroads, the Improvement of communications, and the 
effects of industrialization on the need for exports created conditions 
which favored the development of capitalist enterprises in agriculture. 
Large areas were brought under irrigation. The intensive cultivation of 
sugar cane, cotton, and other commercial crops required a large landless 
labor force* By 1910, over 90 percent of the rural population in what 
was still a predominantly agricultural country owned no land at all.
The Revolution and the E.lidos
The Revolution was fought primarily by the campesinos, who wanted 
to destroy the power of the exploitative landlords and get their land 
back. Zapata and the other agrarian leaders formulated increasingly 
specific programs for rural development. U  Although their promise was
1/ The agrarian aspects of the Revolution have been studied exhaustively. 
See especially Duran (51), Silva Herzog (188), Simpson (189), Warman 
(208), and Womack (221).
- 2 1 -
neve r fulfilled, they did determine the institutional structure of the 
post-revolutionary society.
The most basic and universal demand —  the restitution of the lands . 
which had been taken from the rural communities in an inalienable form 
of tenure —  was met through the formation of ejldos, This word, which 
had referred to the pastures, woodlots, and other common property of a 
village, was now used to denote a specific form of tenure defined by 
the Constitution of 1917 and subsequent laws. Every rural community was 
given the right to petition to the Federal government for land within a 
seven kilometer radius of the principal settlement. If the request was 
accepted, all males over 16 who met certain requirements formed an ejido. 
They were given life-time usufruct rights to the land they needed. By 
law, ejidal rights cannot be bought, sold or rented, but they can be 
passed on to one*s heirs. In most areas, each family was granted an 
individual parcel. In theory, a legal minimum size was set for each eco­
logical zone to insure that every family would have adequate resources.
In fact, however, there has not been enough good land to go around, and 
most plots are too small to support the needs of a family, , The members, 
or ejidatarios, meet formally at regular intervals to inake the decisions 
which affect the group, and elect a President and other officials to 
represent their interests.
In its simplest form, this institution does provide a democratic 
framework for the equitable access of the rural population to the land.
A maximum size restriction was placed on private farmers, and the haci­
endas were broken up and redistributed. The question remained, however, 
as to how the newly created reformed sector was to be organized to par­
ticipate in a process of agricultural development. This problem was 
not really faced until the late i930*s, when President Cardenas (1936- 
1940) made rural development one of the cornerstones of a policy of 
active government participation in the economy.
He greatly accelerated the agrarian reform process, redistributing 
nearly three times as much land In his six year term as his predecessors 
had In the previous twenty. Between the census years 1930 and 1940, the 
proportion of the total arable land in ejidos increased from 13 to 48 
percent, and the number of landless campesinos dropped from 68 to 36 per­
cent of the rural work force (80, p. 4; 167, p« 501). A special bank was 
created to provide working capital and technical assistance to the new 
ejidos. Irrigation systems, roads, schools, health clinics, and other 
public works were undertaken in rural areas at an unprecedented rate. He 
supported the political organization of the campesinos, founded the CNC 
(the National Confederation of Campesinos), and made it one of the three 
constituent elements of the ruling party.
In response to a general strike by well-organized workers, Cardenas , 
included a type of farm in the land reform which had previously been ex­
empt; the large, irrigated, vertically integrated operations producing 
high-value commercial crops such as cotton. The beneficiaries were not
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local villagers, but the landless laborers who had worked -for wages. 
Collective ejidos were organized as production, cooperatives to, maintain 
and improve upon the economies of scale of the original operations.
Some of the most productive agricultural areas in the country were very 
rapidly reorganized in this way, and a.variety of institutions and 
organizations were set up td assist them.; , In 1940, for the first and 
only time, the reformed sector as a whole both produced more than half 
of the value of national agricultural Output and was more productive on 
a per-hectare basis than the private farmers (167, p;'501).. The over­
whelming majority of the ejidatarios in the country cultivated their 
newly acquired family plots using traditional technology, but first steps 
were being made to provide them with capital, technical assistance, and 
other services.
Post-war Policies
The process of redistribution of productive resources and real 
wealth in the countryside was reversed during the Second World War. 
Industrial production was stimulated to serve both domestic and foreign 
markets whose previous sources of supply had been cut off. The need to 
restructure the economy to take advantage of this opportunity coincided 
with the interests of the new urban middle class which had benefited from 
the elimination of the old elite during the Revolution. At the same 
time, it was widely believed that industrialization was more or less syn- 
onomous with development, and that private enterprise was intrinsically 
more productive than broadly based, cooperative ventures. President 
Avila Camacho (1941-1946) stated in his inaugural address that the future 
of Mexico would be based on "the vital energy of private initiative” and 
that his government would protect private agricultural properties. Agri­
culture was to become "the foundation of industrial greatness ” (quoted 
in 80, p, 6).
Concentrated industrialization in the cities proceeded very rapidly. 
The compound annual growth rate in manufacturing jumped from 4.6 percent 
in the 1930’s to eight percent in the 1940’s, and stayed above 7 percent 
for the next decade. Profit rate's were extremely high because of the 
almost unlimited supply of cheap labor from rural areas, tightly con­
trolled labor unions, and very low effective tax rates (169, p. 166). 
Nearly 16 percent of the rural workers left the countryside to work in 
the cities or In the United States during the war (80, p. 9). This rapid 
change produced high rates of inflation and disrupted the established 
patterns of food production and distribution. By the end of the war, 
Mexico was importing between 15 and 20 percent of its basic food grains 
(157, p. 8). Continued industrial expansion depended on cheap food to 
keep wages down to maintain profits and savings, and on the conservation 
of foreign exchange to import machinery and raw materials. The response 
of the government was to concentrate resources in the development of 
highly productive agriculture on private farms in a limited number of 
irrigated oases. This strategy permitted Mexico to meet growing domestic
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demand and to maintain export earnings from agriculture for nearly 
thirty years.
Nevertheless, the redistribution of land through agrarian reform 
continued on a smaller scale, primarily for political reasons (Table 1). 
The stability of Mexican one-party democracy depends upon the ability 
of the government to respond to discontent in any local area before it 
can become an organized challenge. The capitalist development strategy 
of rapid industrialization depends upon the concentration of resources, 
services, and income in the cities. This contradiction was met in the 
1950’s and 1960’s by giving the rural people their most basic demand — • 
land —  in small parcels in increasingly isolated and unproductive areas. 
Capital and agricultural resources such as credit, tractors, and improved 
techniques were concentrated where the return was the greatest and the 
fastest (191, p. 250). Most basic food crops such as maize and beans 
continued to be produced in rain-fed areas, which were repeatedly sub­
divided into tiny plots, or minifundia, which were too small to absorb 
modern technology or to support a family using traditional methods.
The agrarian reform has kept the rural people, x^ ho now constitute 
about 40 percent of the work force and yet account for only ten percent 
of GNP, from making demands which the socioeconomic structure cannot meet 
(72, p. 30). The ejidatarios are entirely dependent upon the government. 
Legal titles, credit, schools, roads, electricity, and other servicesvare 
in short supply and can only be obtained through an endless series of 
petitions, visits to Mexico City, and negotiations with the tightly con­
trolled political organizations which officially represent the campesinos. 
These mechanisms give the ejidatarios a stake in the system, even though 
it has not been able to involve them in the process of agricultural and 
social development that Zapata and Cardenas envisioned.
The Decline of the Collective Ejidos
With a few exceptions, the collective ejidos which were set up in 
the 1930’s in the modern, irrigated sector have not been able to compete 
with the private farmers and have disintegrated+2J The cooperative man­
agement of farm enterprises is a complex challenge, especially in a highly 
competitive environment, and requires discipline, able leadership, and 
comprehensive support. The Cardenas administration set up a series of 
institutions including the Ejidal Bank, financial cooperatives (SICAS), 
and Unions of Ejidos to help the collectives to combine the advantages 
of large-scale operations with the equitable distribution of the benefits 
(71). The slogan of the time was "Haciendas without Bosses." In spite 
of a series of organizational problems, including a very high man:land 
ratio and the right of the old landowners to keep the best land and the 
core of the farm installations for themselves, production increased sig­
nificantly in the first years.
2/ For detailed studies of the history of these cooperatives, see
Eckstein (54), Hewitt (80), Restrepo and Eckstein (165) Glantz (64)9 
and Simpson (189).
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TABLE 1. MEXICO: REDISTRIBUTION OF LAND TO EJIDOS, 1915-1976
Land Distributed Ejidatarios
Period Administration Area Percent Arable Benefited
(millions of 
hectares)
(thousands)
1915-34 7.5 - 946
1935-40 Cardenas 20.0 26 776
1941-46 Avila Camacho 6.0 19 123
1947-52 Aleman ■ 5 A 21 109
1953-58 Ruiz Cortines 5.7 26 226
1959-64 Lopez Mateos 9.0 19 284
1965-70 Diaz Ordaz 18.1 9 322
1971-76 Epheverria 16.2 - -
TOTAL 91.0 2,786*
^Through 1970.
Source: Inocencio Higuera Ciapara, "Alimentos, Poblacion, y
Empleo," (Cornell Agricultural Economics Staff Paper No. 77-1, Ithaca, 
N.Y., 1977), p. 6.
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In the 1940's government policy turned very sharply against the 
cooperatives; organizers were even murdered by agents tacitly supported 
by President Aleman (80, p, .194) ■*-' The institutional system was no longer 
committed to helping the collective ejidos and became an inflexible, in­
efficient bureaucracy which prevented them from competing successfully 
with the private sector at a time when enormous profits were being made 
in irrigated agriculture. Ejidatarios do not own their land and cannot 
put it up as collateral. This made them captive clients of the Ejidal 
Bank, which shared the technical management of the farms with the elected 
leadership. The Bank bought seed, fertilizer and other inputs in bulk 
and delivered them to the fields. Tractors from central machinery stations 
did the field work on a contract basis. At the end of the season, the 
Bank took possession of the harvest, sold it, deducted all the costs, and 
divided the residual among the ejidatarios in proportion to the number of 
days they had worked. Inefficiency and corruption led to the supply of 
Inappropriate and expensive inputs at the wrong time, poor technical co­
ordination, long delays in liquidation, and mounting debts.
In the 1950's and 1960*s, high-yielding varieties were introduced 
into the irrigation districts. The new seeds required an increasingly 
sophisticated and expensive package of practices to achieve profitable 
yields. The private farmers, who enjoyed powerful political connections, 
organized credit unions and received government subsidies to buy machin­
ery and other inputs at low cost. They were in good communication with 
the experiment stations which were constantly modifying the practices 
required to make the new technology profitable. Responding to exactly 
the same kind of spiral which has led to the enlargement of farms in 
developed countries such as the United States, they quickly became over­
capitalized and began to buy or rent more land so they could improve 
the return to their machinery and irrigation equipment.
The inflexibility of the ejidos and their support structure pre­
vented them from taking advantage of the same services. The ejidatarios 
were under heavy official pressure to dissolve the cooperatives and work 
their plots individually. Frustrated by the Inefficiency of the Bank, 
high debts, and low incomes compared to the prosperity around them, many , 
did so. A newly independent ejidatario found himself with fifteen to 
twenty hectares of excellent land, a share of the machinery of the old 
collective —  a tractor without a plow, for example —  and very little .. 
working capital. He would rent his parcel to a neighboring private 
farmer or rich ejidatario. This is illegal under the Agrarian Reform 
Law, so he received considerably less than the full marginal value of 
his land to his "tenant" as rent. He probably did not work at all, and 
would borrow from his "tenant" to meet his consumption needs, thus com­
mitting himself to renting out his parcel again the next year.
, As this process became more widespread, it pushed up the profita­
bility of the favored sector and accelerated the decline of the ejidos.
By the mid-1960's, it was estimated that 80 percent of the ejidatarios 
in the Yaqui valley in Sonora had given up control of their land (80, ,
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p. 21). A similar situation is found in the other irrigation districts 
in the North. It is not surprising that these regions have been the 
focus of campesino unrest in recent years, even though the general level 
of living is by far the highest in rural Mexico;
The Traditional Sector
The competitive position of the traditional farmers in rain-fed 
areas was unfavorable to begin with, and has deteriorated rapidly. This 
sector includes both ej idatarios working plots of steadily decreasing 
size and private farmers, most of whom are also minifundistas with very 
limited resources. Government policy has kept food prices down to con­
trol the urban cost of living and to encourage industrialization. The 
price paid to farmers for maize declined 33 percent relative to the gen­
eral price index between 1963 and 1972 (61, p. 6).
The small farmers have not been able to increase their productivity 
fast enough to stay ahead., both because they cannot afford capital im­
provements, and because they need a significant proportion of their lim­
ited output to feed their families. Research and extension have been 
concentrated in the irrigation districts, and neither new crop varieties 
nor new systems appropriate for small holdings under highly variable natu­
ral conditions have been developed. Since 1966, marginal lands in rain- 
fed areas have been pulled out of production at a rate of .4 percent per 
year (61, p. 7).
Maize, which provides over 40 percent of both the calories and the 
protein in the average Mexican diet, is planted on between 50 and 60 per­
cent of the total national cropland, over 90 percent of it under rain-fed 
conditions. It has been the basic staple in Meso-America since it was 
first domesticated over 7,000 years ago. Most of it is grown on farms of 
a few hectares, and is raised using traditional technology. Hundreds of 
varieties have been selected over the centuries which are adapted to very 
specific local conditions. The increased availability of hybrid seed, 
fertilizers, and other inputs increased the national average yield from 700 
to 1300 kilograms per hectare (from 11 to 20 bushels per acre) between 
1950 and 1968 (217, p. 129). Further progress is limited by several 
factors. The individual campesino*s resources are limited; extension, 
credit and other services are inadequate; the parcels are too small to 
absorb modern inputs; and the tremendous variation in ecological condit­
ions prevents the wide-spread adoption of improved varieties or more pro­
ductive cultural methods. Other basic crops grown under these conditions 
face these same limitations.
Until 1975, when the system was reorganized, official credit programs 
were scattered among several Institutions following very different lending 
criteria. Credit was often granted as a form of subsidy or political re­
ward; In 1962 it was estimated that 35*percent of the'clients of the Ejidal
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Bank were totally Incapable of repaying their loans. Between 1947 and 
1973, the Institution accumulated 4.7 billion pesos in bad debts, more 
than three times its total portfolio in the latter year (1_, p. 35). The 
banks responded tor this problem by limiting credit to small groups which 
they organized to pool their risks. This process, added to many other 
factors, has led to the development of favored groups within each ejido 
and rural community who dominate the local economies.
These patterns have been reinforced by the introduction of roads, 
electrical power, and other infrastructure into rural areas. As pre­
viously isolated communities come, into direct communication with the 
national market economy, the traditional, localized systems of food 
production and distribution break down.. The best soils are increasingly 
dedicated to relatively high-value crops, rather than to maize and other 
basic foods for local consumption. A campesino who used to grow enough 
maize to feed his family, and a little more maize to sell or barter for 
other basic commodities, now grows more valuable crops on his very lim­
ited surplus land to meet his increasing need for cash (16, p. 21). This 
surplus production has come under the control of the local or regional 
elite, either directly or through the merchants who control private credit 
and marketing services (192, pp. 20-21). 3/
Faced with a very unfavorable price structure, the small campesino 
does not have enough land or other resources to take advantage of the 
changing patterns of regional relative advantage by introducing modern 
cultural methods and specializing entirely in more valuable crops. He 
continues to grow at least some of his own food, but must seek off-farm 
employment to supplement his income. Work is scarce: 60 percent of the 
rural labor force was underemployed according to the 1970 census (109).
The average productivity of labor in agriculture has been declining since 
1970 (183, p. 8).
Population Growth and the Structure of Demand
Mexican agriculture has not been able to produce enough food, es­
pecially basic grains such as maize and beans, to meet domestic demand 
since the late 1960*5. The population of the country, which was 20 mil­
lion in 1940, more than tripled to about 65 million by the end of 1977.
If this rate continues, there will be 140 million Mexicans by the end of 
the century. Until a decade ago, both GNP and agricultural production 
were able to stay ahead of population growth. The daily per capita avail­
ability of calories increased significantly between 1945 and 1968; from 
2,000 to 2,800, and protein consumption went up from 55 to 80 grams (81, 
Table 10). These average figures do not reflect the extremely unequal 
distribution of income and purchasing power among the population or the 
'very different kinds of foods consumed by rich and poor people. These 
factors must be kept in mind when looking at the nature of Mexico's pro­
duction crisis; the problem is much more complex than a simple race
3/ The mechanisms of this process are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter IV,
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between population and food production. !
Almost all countries experience a surge !in population at a stage in 
their development which is usually explained'in terms of the ’’demographic 
transition." In an agrarian society, a very high birth rate is balanced 
by a very high death rate, especially among infants and young children.
One of the first results of the process of modernization is the improve­
ment of medical and public health services, which rapidly bring down the 
death rate by controlling epidemic and endemic diseases. The birth rate, 
which is dependent on cultural tradition and on the need for children in 
rural areas to work on the farm and contribute to family income,' comes 
down.much more slowly. The population rises until urbanization, educa­
tion, prosperity, and institutions such as social security eliminate the 
rationale for large families for the majority of the people (157; p. .2),
The developed countries of Europe and North America went through 
the initial phases of this transition beginning in the 19th Century. It 
coincided with the tremendous increase in demand for unskilled labor 
brought about by the Industrial Revolution. The terrible conditions of 
the urban poor during this period are well known. At different rates 
according to social class, race, and region, population has stabilized 
as the level of living has risen. Mechanization and increased producti­
vity have permitted the agricultural sector to meet the rising demand 
for food in the urban areas.
Mexico, along with most of the Third World, did not begin to exper­
ience a population surge until the 1940’s, but when it came, it hit very 
hard. The annual birth rate of 44 per thousand is very high compared to 
37 in Brazil, 34 in India, and 14.4 in the United States. The death 
rate has fallen to 9 per thousand, which puts the annual growth rate at 
3.5 percent. Half of the people are under 16 years old and have not yet 
begun to have children. This means that even if average family size 
drops to the replacement rate, 2.3 children, by the year 2000, the popu­
lation will not stabilize for another hundred years (72, p. 4). Birth 
control programs are difficult to implement in a country where 40 percent 
of the people live in rural areas, where large families are still a real 
asset, and in a Catholic culture which stresses fertility.
Rapid population growth has not corresponded to a period of rapidly 
expanding opportunities. On the contrary, industrial development has 
been highly concentrated and relatively capital-intensive. Even if the 
economy returns to the post-war growth rate of six or seven percent, at 
most 30 percent of the people coming into the labor force each year are 
likely to find full-time, permanent jobs in this sector (72, p. 7). It 
has been estimated that four of the six million people who were unemployed 
or underemployed in 1970 were in agriculture (157, p. 16). Unless jobs 
can be created much more rapidly than ever before, poverty Is almost cer­
tain to increase.
Mexico already has one of the most unequal income distributions in
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the world. The poor, who have the least opportunities both in agri­
culture and in the cities, are increasing most rapidly while their 
share of the national income declines. The changes between 1950 and 
1969, when the population increased by over 60 percent, are outlined 
in Table 2.
According to the 1970 census, 72 percent of the families in Mexico 
made less than 1,000 pesos per month, or about 1,000 dollars per year 
at the exchange rate in that year. This figure is approximately the 
average per capita share of GNP. There has never been a reliable and 
comprehensive food consumption survey. Drawn from data based on very 
limited samples, Chart 5 illustrates the general relationship between 
income group and the consumption of certain basic foods. It suggests 
that the great majority of the Mexicans ate less well in 1968 than in 
1963. Inflation and rising population have almost certainly meant fur­
ther deterioration over the past decade. The extent of actual malnu­
trition depends on how this concept is defined and measured. Estimates 
of the proportion of the population which cannot afford an adequate diet 
range from 28 to 40 percent (72, p. 16; £1, p. 42). Clinical symptoms 
of inadequate food intake among school children ranged from 10 percent 
in urban areas to 32 percent in the countryside in the early 1960*s 
(82, Table 4).
Poor people subsist on the same basic diet which Mexicans have 
eaten for thousands of years: maize in the form of flat cakes called 
tortillas, beans, and chile —  supplemented with an occasional piece 
of meat and other items. As one moves up the income scale, preferred 
foods such as wheat bread, meat, milk and other elements of the middle 
class diet In the developed countries are substituted for the basic 
staples. Chart 5 indicates that in 1968 the richest group in the dis­
tribution consumed approximately 10 times as much meat, 12 times as much 
milk, 7 times as many fruits and vegetables, and 3 times as much wheat 
as the poorest; but only half as many beans and a third as much maize 
(81, pp, 31-32). In response to the greater buying power of the small, 
high-income portion of the population, the modern agricultural sector is 
placing more emphasis on high-value foods and animal feed crops than on 
maize and beans. At the same time, the government has kept the prices 
of these latter items down to control inflationary pressures, discourag­
ing the use of marginal lands in rain-fed areas.
Mexico is being forced to import many kinds of agricultural pro­
ducts, but the greatest pressure is on these basic grains. Any signifi­
cant redistribution of income in favor of the poorest half of the popu­
lation, as was carried out in Chile during the presidency of Allende, 
would mean that poor people would use the additional money to buy more 
food. Unless the economic structure as a whole were entirely reorganized 
to meet the basic needs of the people, this would put impossible pressure 
on the systems of production and distribution, resulting in uncontrollable 
inflation and greatly increased food imports (16, pp. 22-23).
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TABLE 2. MEXICO: DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME, 1950-1969
(percent of total by income group)
Income Group 1950 1958 1963 1969
Lowest 20 percent 6.1 5.0 4.2 4.0
30 percent below the median 13.0 11.7 11.5 11.0
30.percent above the median 21.1 20.4 21.7 21.0
15 percent below top 5 percent 19.8 24.3 : 24.3 28.0
Top 5 percent 40.0 38.6 38.3 36.0
Top 20 percent 59.8 62.9 62.6 64.0
Gini coefficient .50 .53 .55 .58
Source: Cynthia Hewitt de Alcantara, "Ensayo Sobre la Satisfaccion
de Necesidades Basicas del Pueblo Mexicano entre 1940 y 1970" (Centro 
de Estudios Sociologicos, El Colegio de Mexico, Mexico, 1977). Data 
from ILO study made in 1974.
Chart 5. MEXICO: MONTHLY PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION OF SELECTED FOODS IN 
‘ KILOGRAMS, BY FAMILY INCOME GROUP, 1963 AND 1968
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New Government Programs
The government, following the logic of capitalist development and 
strong pressures of political expediency, for many years put most of its 
resources into the modern irrigated areas where the natural and social 
conditions were the most malleable, where the return on invested capital 
was the greatest and the fastest, and where most of the direct benefits 
accrued to a favored few. By the early 1970*8, it was faced with dim­
inishing returns, increasing food imports, and a research, extension, 
and support structure which was totally inadequate to meet the needs of 
over 90 percent of the farmers.
A great variety of new programs were set up during the Echeverria 
administration (1970-1976) to grapple with the production crisis and to 
distribute services and income more fairly between the regions of the 
country and the sectors of the rural population. Special emphasis was 
given to the traditional areas, particularly to the ejidos. The agri­
cultural portion of the budget was increased by over 700 percent, the 
credit system was reorganized, and new laws were passed to provide uni­
form standards. Scores of new agencies were created to deal with spec­
ific problems. The extension service was enlarged. The collective ejido 
was reintroduced as a way to reorganize fractionalized plots into large 
enough units to allow mechanization. Farm prices of basic foods were 
raised, and the costs of fertilizer and other inputs were subsidized. 
Financing was provided for rural storage facilities, small-scale indus­
tries, livestock improvement, and a wide variety of other programs.
During the same period, the Mexican economy as a whole went into a seri­
ous decline. The short-term effects of these programs are difficult to 
measure, but the broad crisis in the agricultural sector continued to 
worsen.
The structural problems of the densely populated central highlands 
are deeply rooted, and cannot be modified easily. The attempt to col­
lectivize the ejidos in these areas was virtually a total failure, pri­
marily because it ran into the opposition of the local elites. Improved 
management could increase production in the irrigation districts, but it 
is difficult to create incentives for small, marginal improvements among 
people who are accustomed to very large profits and who have many alter­
nate investment opportunities. Given the existing political and social 
structure, Mexico is running out of easily exploitable resources. As it 
moves to develop the more complex natural environment in the Southeast, 
it is attempting to find a new approach to satisfy the basic needs of 
its people.
CHAPTER III
THE TROPICAL SOUTHEAST
The Southeast, as it is usually defined, includes the states of 
Veracruz, Tabasco, part of Campeche, and the Gulf slopes of Oaxaca and 
Chiapas (Maps 2 and 3). The region is sharply divided between the trop­
ical coastal plain and the highlands, where the highest peaks reach 5,000 
meters. The rainy tropics lie below 150 meters (500 feet), in a band of 
varying width between the mountains and the sea, and include an estimated 
eight to ten million hectares of land with under-utilized agricultural 
potential (198), Nevertheless, the Southeast as a whole is by no means 
an undeveloped wilderness. Two of the most important pre-Columbian cul­
tures —  the Olmecs and the Mayas —  flourished along the coast as early 
as 800 B.C. Cortes first stepped ashore on the American mainland at 
Veracruz, and personally established the first sugar cane plantation.
The region now produces about half of the sugar and a third of the cattle 
in Mexico. It has been the center of the national petroleum Industry 
since the early part of this century. Recent discoveries of vast re­
serves, between 50 and 300 billion barrels, place the area in the fore­
front of future development plans,Approximately 15 percent of the „/ 
Mexican population lives there, over half of them on the coastal plain.—
1/ Estimates of Mexico’s potential oil wealth have been escalating rapidly. 
In early 1978, the Oil and Gas Journal put the country's proved reserves 
at 14 billion barrels. This term refers to the amount of crude oil 
which can be pumped economically at current prices from fields xohich 
have been accurately explored. This compares to 18.2 billion in Vene­
zuela, 29.5 billion in the United States, and 150 billion In Saudi 
Arabia. In November of the same year, the C.I.A. put the proved re­
serves at 50 billion. Since 1973 PEMEX, the national oil company, has 
been exploring intensively, and has discovered several important new 
fields. In his State of the Union address in September 1978, Presi­
dent Lopez Portillo announced that the potential reserves —  a term 
which includes some guesswork —  were 200 billion barrels. A few 
months later, the Director of PEMEX pushed this figure up to 300 
billion, which means that Mexico may be the world's richest source of 
petroleum (146a).
2/ Nine million people, or 19 percent of the national population, were 
counted in the Plan Nacional HIdraulico's regions VII, VIII, and IX 
in 1970. This area is somewhat larger than the Southeast as defined 
in this study.
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Both population density and economic growth have been limited for 
centuries by the nature of the tropical environment. Epidemic diseases 
imported from Europe and Africa in the 16th Century decimated the native 
population, and discouraged settlement by Europeans (43, 63). The abun­
dant, seasonally variable rainfall has produced periodic flooding, and 
has leached the nutrients out of the soil. Communications were poor and 
unreliable until very recently. Commercial agriculture has consisted of 
extensive and inefficient cane operations, cattle ranches, and a few 
specialized plantations. Host of the rural people have lived in isolated 
communities, practicing traditional agriculture based on slash-and-burn 
techniques.
Post-War Development Programs
The potential of the Southeast has been recognized for many years.
In 1941, President Avila Camacho called for a "March to the Sea" to 
develop the coastal areas and relieve congestion in the central highlands. 
Disease control, roads, reclamation, and drainage would allow the organi­
zation of "a new type of tropical agriculture —  which cannot be based 
on minifundia" (quoted in 156, p. 28). In 1947, the Papaloapan Commission 
was established to control one of the major river systems, build roads, 
and coordinate a broad range of services. The Grijalva Commission was 
created in 1949, but did not actually begin to function until the late 
1950*s. The planners involved in the early stages of these projects 
shared a broad vision of agricultural and social development.
In the 1950's and 1960's, a variety of public works programs, organ­
ized by these Federal Commissions and by PEMEX, had a significant impact 
on the region. Flood control, hydroelectric power, road construction, 
the expansion of urban centers, and sanitation received priority. The 
frontier was pushed back, many thousands of hectares of forest were 
cleared, and people moved in. Communities which had been isolated for 
centuries were broughtinto much closer communication with the national 
economy and culture. The elimination of malaria and other diseases 
brought down the death rate, and the population began to grow rapidly. 
Private investments in specialized crops such as pineapple and cocoa paid 
off well in certain areas (183).
Agricultural output increased as new areas were brought under culti­
vation. Nevertheless, investments in efficient, highly productive sys­
tems were not made, because both public and private capital yielded a 
better return in other parts of the country. Very little serious soil 
or agronomic research was undertaken, Several promising agricultural 
and credit programs in the Papaloapan basin were discontinued for lack 
of funds (156, Chapter 7). A relatively small pilot program In the 
Chontalpa region of Tabasco remained in the planning stage for nearly 
10 years, although it had been funded by international agencies (J5, 
pp. 150-152). Sugar cane, the most important commercial crop, expanded 
only very slowly and the mills were allowed to deteriorate. Colonization
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programs were undertaken, but the new settlements were not provided with 
vital services and did not prosper. Various perennial crops such as nat­
ural rubber were introduced, but basic technical and marketing problems 
were never solved. Visitors to the region in the late 1960’s were struck 
by the deterioration of the physical constructions and the general list­
lessness of the programs (208, pp. 36-38).
New Priorities in the 1970’s
When the national agricultural crisis became acute in the early 
1970fs, the Southeast provided an opportunity to make an end run around 
the problems of the existing productive structure, by taking advantage 
of unused potential capacity. By expanding the infrastructure which 
already existed, the government hoped to meet a variety of goals. The 
most important of these was to increase production of basic foods and 
other commodities which were either being imported in increasing quant­
ities , or were being produced at relatively high cost in the irrigation 
districts. It was also hoped that regional development would increase 
rural employment, narrow the disparity between the highly developed met­
ropolitan centers and the backwards hinterlands, create markets for manu­
factured goods, and stem the tide of migration to the cities.
Intensive agriculture had not developed in the Southeast in four 
hundred years, in part because the population density was too low to 
support elaborate systems such as the paddy rice complex of Southeast 
Asia, and in part because national needs were met more cheaply in other 
areas. An attempt to alter the agro-ecological and social systems which 
have developed over a long period of time, ;in response to the natural 
conditions of a complex environment, is a very challenging task (90).
Southeastern Agriculture
Slash-and-Burn Agriculture
Most of the cleared land in the Southeast is used for cattle 
ranches and sugar cane plantations. Most of the rural people, both in 
the traditional communities and along the forest frontier, practice some 
form of slash-and-burn agriculture. The oldest and by far the most wide­
spread farming system in the entire tropical world, it is also called 
shifting cultivation, swidden, and a variety of other names. Temporary 
clearings are made in the forest, crops are grown for a few years, and 
the plots are allowed to grow back to fallow. According to the broadest 
definition, 360 million hectares, or approximately one-third of the cul­
tivated soils in the world, are managed in this way. Even in Southeast 
Asia, which supports the highest rural population density anywhere, 30 
percent of the farmland is cleared on a temporary basis. This system
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provides food for 250 million people where good soils, fertilizers, and 
accessible markets are not available (73, Chapter 4; 182, Chapter 10).
A great variety of slash-arid-bum systems from all parts of the world 
have been documented in detail (42). The practice has been widely criti­
cized for destroying the forest cover, as a cause of erosion, and as an 
inefficient use of land and labor. On the other hand, it is one of the 
few systems by which man can live on highly leached, infertile soils, and 
is based on detailed empirical knowledge. It has been a widespread prac­
tice in many parts of Mexico for thousands of years (210).
Each family selects a plot of forest, cuts down or girdles the trees, 
burns it over to clear it, and plants corn, beans, chile, and other seeds 
directly through the refuse and ashes with a long planting stick called an 
espeque. Burning volatilizes some of the nitrogen, carbon, and sulphur in 
the vegetation, but it has little direct effect on the soil organic matter. 
The ash provides considerable quantities of phosphorus, which is often in 
short supply in tropical soils.
Once the forest cover is removed, the soil is exposed directly to 
the sun and the rain. The soil temperature rises during the day, which 
increases the level of microbial activity and speeds the decomposition 
of the organic matter. The traditional farmers take care to leave a thick 
layer of mulch and establish a crop canopy within a few weeks, so the 
effect is not serious. Rapid planting with appropriate crops controls 
run-off and erosion, which is also limited by the abundant debris in the 
form of trunks, stumps, and ashes during the crucial period before the 
crop canopy forms.
There are very few weeds for the first year after clearing because 
the kinds of low-growing plants which like open sun cannot survive on the 
dark forest floor. By the second season, tough,fast-growing plants in­
vade the plot and begin to out-compete both the crops and the farmers* 
efforts to remove them. Crop-specific pests and diseases are not a seri­
ous problem at first, because the density of any particular species in a 
natural tropical system is very low. As soon as a single field of one 
or a few crops is planted, their predators begin to concentrate as-well. 
Since there is no winter season to break the cycle, pest populations 
build up very rapidly. The adverse effects of cultivation on soil struc­
ture are minimized by the practice of minimum tillage. When the labor 
involved in maintaining the plot is greater than that required to open a 
new one, the family moves on.
Various practices are used to maximize the utility of a particular 
clearing. In the first year, low-growing plants with a high nutrient 
requirement such as grains are planted. These are followed by taller, 
hardier crops such as cassava. Still taller species are then put in, 
both to mimic the natural succession of regrox^th . and to shade out the 
weeds. Multiple cropping systems of various kinds spread out the labor 
requirements through the year, reduce the need for weeding, reduce the
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danger of erosion, and slow the build-up of pests and diseases (8).
The length of the fallow period depends both on the’ fertility of 
the soil and on the population pressure on the land. When a field is 
abandoned, it is quickly over-run with grasses and vines. Within a few 
years, soft-wooded, fast growing shrubs and trees take over and shade 
out the plants on the ground. This begins the secondary forest succes­
sion, which would require over one hundred years to reach the climax —  
a hardwood rain forest. This almost never happens, because after a peri­
od of years the grassy species are dead and the cultivators come back to 
clear the plot again. They often cut the trees 50 to 100 centimeters above 
the ground (79, pp. 24-25). If the roots are not damaged, the trunks 
will sprout, the secondary trees will re-establish themselves more quickly, 
and the fallow^period can be reduced.
Most established communities are located on rivers. The recent 
alluvial deposits near the banks provide enough nutrients to be culti­
vated continuously. The fallow period gradually Increases with the 
distance from the river.
As the Southeast has been opened up by roads and commerce, and as 
population has increased, the balance inherent in all well-managed slash- 
and-burn systems has broken down. Fallow periods have been reduced and 
fertilizers have not been available, which has led to erosion and a de­
cline in average yields over large areas. The stable equilibrium of a 
traditional system is very different from the practices employed by re­
cent immigrants who follow new roads into virgin areas. Agriculture be­
comes a short intermediate stage between logging and cattle-raising. 
Slash-and-burn is-a logical response to the tropical environment, but 
it cannot support more than a dispersed population or produce surplus 
food in any quantity. - ■ ■ * - ■
Experimental attempts have been made to increase the regenerative 
efficiency of the fallow period and to substitute trees with economic 
value for the natural secondary growth. Strip farming and elaborate 
rotations have been developed (74,180,182). These kinds of systems 
have not been widely accepted, partly because slash-and-burn farmers 
are almost by definition poorly educated and on the margins of society.
At the same time, development agencies are under great pressure to in­
crease production rapidly, and have little patience with elaborate and 
complex systems of agro-silviculture.
The Olmecs and Mayas
This most basic system of tropical agriculture is usually associated 
with dispersed populations living in isolated areas, who produce little 
more than enough for their own subsistence. It is, therefore, one of the 
puzzles of Mexican pre-history that two of the earliest and most impor­
tant indigenous cultures —  the Olmecs and .the Mayas —  developed in the
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rainy tropics. Most early civilizations -- in the Middle-East, China,
Peru, and the highlands of Mexico itself —  centered around irrigated 
valleys in temperate regions. It is not easy to trace the transition 
from hunting and gathering bands to the formation of settled populations 
capable of art, science, and the' other attributes of an advanced culture. 
Fossil remains of domesticated corn have been dated as early as 3,500 B„C. 
(175, p, 977). The Olraecs were living on the estuaries of several large 
rivers on the Gulf coast of what are now the States of Veracruz and 
Tabasco by 800 B.C. They did not build stone temple complexes, and little 
is known of their culture and daily life. They produced sculpture of ex­
traordinary sophistication, from monumental heads to delicate jade figures. 
The influence of their distinctive style, based on a jaguar motif, is 
found all over Meso-America. , I
The sudden appearance of what was obviously an advanced people in a 
hot, rainy, and generally inhospitable climate has led some people to be­
lieve that the Oimecs were immigrants from Africa or some other part of 
the world. (175, p. 478), Most; scholars, however, believe that an agri­
culture based on maize, beans, and a great variety of other crops deve­
loped simultaneously over many parts of Middle America, and that "the 
Olmec culture may have had a little bit more sun than the other cultural 
seedlings and so shot up more quickly" (199, p. 51).
The achievement of the Mayas is even more extraordinaryi. Lowland 
sites on the coast of Guatemala date back to 1300 B;C. (41). Between 
300 and 900 A.D., a major civilization in the rain.forest of southeastern 
Mexico and central Guatemala reached intellectual and artistic heights 
which no other in the New World, and few in the Old, could match. The 
population in what is now virtually empty jungle reached several million. 
The remains of Tikal* -Palenque, and scores of other religious centers 
display a high level of artistic skill. These people developed hiero­
glyphic writing, a literature, a numerical system which included the con­
cept of zero, and an accurate calendar based on careful astronomical ob­
servations (40, 199)
Many attempts have been made to reconstruct the agricultural systems 
of the Mayas from the practices of their contemporary descendants, archeo­
logical remains, and the few ancient manuscripts which have survived.
All available evidence indicates a very detailed knowledge of the soils, 
climatic patterns, and vegetation. Through an effective central organi­
zation, they were able to develop in harmony with the complexity Of the 
tropics and produce a larger surplus than that which this and similar 
areas are capable of today. Only priests and other specialists lived in 
the urban centersj the majority of the people lived on the land. Irri­
gation, terracing, and drainage were used in some areas, but slash-and- 
burn was the predominant system. Each family was able to produce a small 
surplus and donate several months of their labor each year to the con­
struction and maintenance of the cities. Silviculture —  the replacement 
of the naturally occurring trees with more valuable species —  was part 
of the rotation system. The calendar may have been developed in response
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to the need to predict the first rains and other key moments of the 
year in a difficult and variable climate. The Mayas put an extraordi­
nary emphasis on the concept of time; every day in the elaborate calendar 
cycle had a unique name and was worshipped almost as a god.
The Mayas have excited interest.ever since their great temple com­
plexes were rediscovered in the early 19th Century. Many theories have 
been advanced to explain why the Classic centers were abandoned to the 
jungle around 900 A.D. One of the most persistent hypotheses has been ' 
that the culture suffered an ecological collapse; population growth ex­
ceeded the carrying capacity of the naturally infertile soils and the 
available technology. This is very neat, but is based as much on specu­
lation as on concrete evidence. Recent studies have demonstrated that 
both the history and the technology of these people was much more com­
plicated; wars, political strife and other factors contributed to their 
decline.
One important lesson can be learned from the fact that the Mayas 
were able to build a major civilization in the jungle. Modern devel­
opment programs tend to replace the complexity of the tropical forest 
with uniform stands of plantation crops, pastures, or trees. The frag­
mentary remains of this ancient people demonstrate that the intensive 
use of the multiple resources of the tropical ecological system can pro­
duce a significant surplus and can be sustained over long periods of 
time (17; 50; 40; 103).
By the year 1000, the center of pre-Hispanic civilization had moved 
to the temperate central highlands around Oaxaca and Mexico City. When 
Cortes arrived in 1519, the tropical Southeast still supported a fairly 
large population in scattered centers along the coast and up the rivers. 
In addition to slash-and-burn, the various groups practiced permanent 
agriculture and produced a substantial surplus, Records of tribute paid 
to the Aztec empire include cotton, cocoa, rubber, and a great variety 
of other crops and natural products (174; 175, p. 479).
Diseases imported from Europe caused an extraordinary mortality 
all over the continent in the first generation after the conquest, but 
the effect was especially serious in the rainy tropics. By the 1570*s, 
large areas were almost entirely depopulated (63, pp. 22-26). From a 
greatly reduced base, the traditional agricultural communities grew very 
slowly over the succeeding centuries.
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The History of Commercial Agriculture
Except for cotton and cocoa, most of the crops produced by the 
Indians declined in importance after the conquest. For the next 350 
years, the Southeast was too sparsely populated, too isolated, and too 
unhealthy to produce more than a very few commodities. In 1525, Cortes 
planted sugar cane and set up the first simple mill in Santiago Tuxtla, 
a volcanic area with good soils and a relatively healthy climate. Afri­
can slaves were brought over to replace the natives and small mills were 
set up in several areas. Without the population base to support the semi- 
feudal colonial system of agriculture, livestock was one of the few alter­
natives open to the Spanish landowners. Cattle were quickly introduced, 
and by 1600 occupied most of the open land (156, pp. 72-73). As long as 
the rivers provided the only transportation, settlement was limited to 
their margins. The vast expanses of unexploited land on every side pro­
vided no incentive to intensify production. The one large city was Vera­
cruz, the only licensed port on the Gulf coast, through which all trade 
with Europe passed. Extensive and inefficient sugar and livestock enter­
prises have dominated the agricultural economy of the Southeast down to 
the present day.
After independence, in the late 19th and early 20th Centuries, the 
construction of railroads and the expansion of export markets stimulated 
new investments in the region. The blockade on the Confederacy during 
the American Civil War encouraged the production of cotton. New factories 
were built and an industrial center grew rapidly around the city of Cor­
doba. The plantations prospered until the crop was displaced to the lower 
cost irrigated areas in the North, which were relatively free of the Boll 
Weevil. Coffee, tobacco, cocoa, and coconut plantations were expanded.
New products such as mangos were introduced. Sugar cane grew rapidly in 
importance and new mills were built, although yields were lower than in 
Morelos and other irrigated areas. Improved cattle and pastures were 
introduced (175, p. 492).
The unrestrained free enterprise liberalism which led to the rapid 
extension of the control of the haciendas over most of the agricultural 
land in Mexico during the presidency of Porfirio Diaz (1876-1911), faced 
special conditions in the tropics. The low population density limited 
the development of capitalist enterprises. Workers were brought in from 
other areas, some by the promise of high wages and others by force. Dis­
eases and brutal working conditions were common. Crops such as sugar cane 
and tobacco with high labor requirements displaced the traditional farmers 
from the best land and threw the local food supply system out of balance. 
The hacienda stores became the only source of food, clothing, credit, and 
other necessities (156, p. 61; 202, p, 71).
Large areas remained empty. In the late 1800’s a series of laws 
were passed to encourage the colonization of unoccupied public lands,
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including large tracts in the tropics, by foreign and Mexican nationals. 
Private companies were contracted to survey and distribute the land to 
settlers, in return for one-third of the area. The result was a tremen­
dous wave of speculation by the members of the ruling elite. Between 
1881 and 1889, companies under the control of only 29 persons acquired 
27.5 million hectares, 13 percent of the total area of Mexico. Many 
Indian and other traditional communities lost their land through this 
manoeuvre (188, p. 116). Only very limited areas of the tropics were 
actually colonized. Many of the concessions were turned over to American 
companies, who took the mahogany, cedar, and other valuable wood out of 
the forests. The Standard Fruit Company set up large banana plantations 
in Oaxaca, Veracruz, and Tabasco, and Mexico was one of the world's 
largest producers in the 1920's. Serious outbreaks of Panama disease were 
too expensive to control and the Americans pulled out ahead of the appli­
cation of the land reform laws in the late 1930's and. early 1940's.
Revolution and Land Reform
The major events of the revolutionary period (1910-1920) were 
concentrated in the central and northern states. Nevertheless, the 
workers in the industrial cities of the tropics and on the railroads 
became important centers of trade union organization, Peasant leaders 
such as Vidal Tenorio led bands of campesinos to fight. The military 
situation was never very clear; towns and rail centers changed hands 
numerous times, and a great deal of blood was shed. The plantation 
owners, however, were able to continue and even expand their operations.
In the succeeding decades, especially during Cardenas' adminis­
tration, many large private holdings were distributed to the campesinos 
as ejidos. Most of the haciendas in the tropics had been formed within 
the previous 50 years. In areas which had long been occupied by homoge­
neous Indian communities, such as the tropical portions of the state 
of Oaxaca, the lands were returned to their historical owners. Many 
ejidos, however, were formed of diverse groups of campesinos who had 
moved into the region only recently. By 1940, between 12 and 20 percent 
of the total area of the tropics had been divided into ejidos, about 30 
percent of which was arable crop land (218, p. 598). Most of the ejidos 
were located in the river valleys. Free from the obligation to work under 
very unfavorable conditions, the ejidatarios dedicated themselves to the 
production of basic foods on family plots using traditional slash-and- 
burn methods.
Many private cattlemen were able to exempt their holdings from 
expropriation by various legal manoeuvres, and continue to manage ex­
tensive enterprises to this day. Most of them own businesses in the 
towns or in other parts of the country, where the return on invested 
capital is greater than from their tropical holdings. The Land Reform 
Law ties the maximum size of a cattle ranch to the number of animals it 
can support. This means that If the pastures were improved or other
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steps were taken to intensify production part of the land could become 
eligible for expropriation.
Public lands in frontier areas were sold as private property until 
1962. A new law was then passed which allotted the distribution of virgin 
territories to campesinqs who had petitioned for ejidos in areas where 
land was not available (11, pp. 17-19). These "New Ejidos" put the dev­
elopment of large tracts in isolated regions directly under the responsi­
bility of the Federal government. In many cases, few or no services were 
provided to the ejidatarios, who were not able to take possession of their 
grants and lost their rights after two years. The invasion of lands as 
they were opened up by new roads became an increasingly serious problem. 
Widespread insecurity and conflicts prevented orderly development (186).
Beginning in the early 1970*sy the government began to organize 
ejidos into integrated, capital-intensive projects, both to relieve the 
pressure on the land and to Increase production. The most important of 
these which preceded Uxpanapa was the Plan Chontalpa in Tabasco 06; 33; 
107)« Uxpanapa is one of the last areas of virgin tropical rain forest 
which remain In Mexico. The Chinantec Indians who are being resettled 
are a traditional people who have been farming In the rainy tropics for 
over 1,000 years. If viable systems of intensive, mechanized agriculture 
can be developed, the model will be used to bring what is essentially 
Mexico’s last frontier into the national economy.
Plate 111-1
“The Wrestler” , an Olmec statue found on the banks of the Uxpanapa river downstream from the 
project area. This highly developed culture flourished in the tropical lowlands as early as 800 
B.C. National Museum of Anthropology, Mexico City.
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CHAPTER IV
THE CHINANTECS IN THEIR HOMELAND
The Chinantec Indians live In the rain forest, on the steep slopes 
and in the narrow valleys which plunge down the north-eastern side of the 
Sierra de Juarez, part of the mountain chain which forms one flank of 
the state of Oaxaca., The warm, moist rains which blow across the plain 
from the Gulf of Mexico through the summer are forced upward by this 
ridge, and the rainfall increases rapidly as one ascends. Within an air 
distance of forth or fifty kilometers, the average annual rainfall rises 
from 1,500 mm. on the sea-level flat lands to over 4,000 mm. on the 
upper slopes, where the ridges reach about 3,000 meters (126). This tre­
mendous quantity of water drains back down through the forest in a series 
of torrential streams and rivers to feed the Papaloapan, Mexico's, second 
largest river in terms of volume.
The varied and broken topography of Oaxaca has led to the formation 
and survival to the present day of over 15 linguistically and culturally 
distinct peoples, including the Zapotecs and the Mixtecs, the builders 
of Monte Alban and Mitla (39). The Chinantecs, separated from outsiders 
and among themselves by the rugged terrain, never built stone temple com­
plexes or developed the arts and sciences of their more famous neighbors. 
They do, however, represent an example of a culture which has adapted to 
the humid tropical environment, which 20th Century technology finds hard 
to balance.
A Traditional Society in Oaxaca
According to the most recent census, there are about 54,000 
Chinantecs, over a quarter of whom speak only their own language, a 
member of the Otomi-Zapotecan group. The broad outlines of their his­
tory can be traced from the early Aztec and Spanish chronicles, through 
ethnographic notes taken by anthropologists since the 1930's, to the 
detailed censuses and studies made in the past five years to facilitate 
their Indemnification and resettlement. One of the most fertile and 
populous areas in their domain will be flooded by the Cerro de Oro dam, 
and 37 percent of the Chinantec people will be moved, the majority of 
them to Uxpanapa. Although the climate is roughly similar in the two 
areas, much more is involved than a simple shift in location.
It has been 500 years since the Chinantecs were conquered by the 
Aztecs, and over 400 since plagues introduced from Europe radically 
changed their balance with their world. Especially in recent years, 
they have responded to many outside pressures as well as to the climate,
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soils, and vegetation of their natural environment. Nevertheless, many 
elements in the agricultural systems which they use have changed very 
little. As farmers on a small scale, they know every detail of their 
environment very well. Centuries of empirical experience have allowed 
them not only to support themselves, but to adapt new crops and new tech­
niques with a high degree of efficiency.
The people are not hungry, but they are poor. They do produce a 
surplus for the urban market, but they receive only a small fraction of 
its value. Improvement of communications in the area, increased demand 
for consumer goods from the outside, population growth, and other forces 
have put the traditional system under stress. A very explicit goal of 
the Uxpanapa project is to radically change the society and the production 
systems of the Chinantecs; to take a group of "backward Indians" and turn 
them into productive citizens of modern Mexico. Although this particular 
program is a result of the construction of the dam and the need for re­
settlement, the government has undertaken a number of broadly similar 
projects in other areas of the tropical Southeast. The issues involved 
in the transformation of small-scale agriculture based on family labor to 
large-scale mechanized systems organized through highly capitalized co­
operative enterprises, can be understood in part in terms of the history 
of the people.
The Ancient Chinantla
Early Archeological Remains
Archeologists have concentrated their efforts on more spectacular 
remains in other parts of the country, but over fifteen major sites have 
been identified in the Chinantla, as the Chinantec area is called (47).
The earliest finds are pieces of pottery related to the Olmec culture of 
Tres Zapotes, which flourished on the coastal plain between 500 and 200 
B.C. Later sites have been tied in with the influence of the Zapotec 
and Mixtec cultures. The pottery and copper and gold artifacts are iden­
tified with the basic chronology which has been laid out at Monte Alban. 
For hundreds of years, the people have lived in the kinds of houses built 
of sticks and thatched with palm which they still use today. Ancient pop­
ulation centers cannot be reconstructed accurately. Large sites with 
leveled terraces, walls, and simple tombs have been tentatively correlated 
with descriptions by Aztec and early Spanish chroniclers. There are seve­
ral contenders for the site of the ancient Chinantec capital of Chinantla 
in the valley of. the Valle National River. The traditional date for its 
founding is 1110 (56, p. 75). The remains of Tlacuache are still clearly 
recognizable in the town of Paso Limon near Ojitlan.
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The Aztec Conquest
The history of the region begins with its conquest in 1455-56 by 
the Aztec Emperor Montezuma Iluicamina as part of his campaign against 
the Mixtecs (207, p.‘ 67). He set up a garrison in Tuchteptl, the modern 
city of Tuxtepec, which means "hill of the rabbit." Records of at least 
two armed revolts in the second half of the 15th Century demonstrate that 
the extraction of a considerable surplus in the form of tribute“was much 
resented, and explains why the Chinantecs were so willing to take up arms 
with Cortes when he arrived. The names "Chinantla" and "Chinantec" are 
derived from the Nahuatl word "chinamitl", which means "an enclosed space" 
(21, p, 9). Some commentators have suggested a connection with the 
"chinampas" or floating gardens of Xochimilco, but this seems less likely 
(198).
The Tuxtepec garrison, on the Southeastern frontier of the empire, 
exacted tribute from the Mazatecs, Cuieatecs, and Popolucas as well as 
from the Chinantecs. Records exist of the goods which were shipped from 
two Chinantec towns. They included £old necklaces, gold encrusted shields, 
quetzal feathers, cotton cloth, rubber balls, vanilla^ corn, beans, chile 
peppers, and especially cocoa in great quantity, which was so valued that 
the beans were used as a medium of exchange (21, Chapter X). The Aztecs 
drafted local men into their army; the Chinantla battalion was said to 
number 100,000 men.
The Spanish Conquest
While a guest of Montezuma in Tenochtitlan, Cortes sent a party of 
men to the Chinantla to look for gold, which was panned from the rivers 
above Tuxtepec. Three Spanish soldiers liked the area so much that they 
deserted to set up a peanut farm,,.. The search for gold was inconclusive, 
but Cortes was,impressed by the reports of the Chinantec soldiers, es­
pecially by their long spears, which were "better than anything we have 
in Castille" (48, vol. 2, p. 37). He sent Hernando de Barrientos to get 
some for his army. Bernal de Castillo described the scene as 2,000 
Chinantecs entered: the Spanish camp (48, vol. 2, p. 60):
[The Chinantecs] entered the city in great order, 
two by two. They carried long, thick spears with 
,points that cut like razors. ... Each Indian
carried a shield, and their banners were embroidered 
with feathers,, and drummers and trumpeters played.
An archer walked between each pair of lancers, and 
they were all whistling and shouting, saying "Long 
live the King! Long live the King our lord and 
Hernando Cortes in his royal name!"
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Cortes was very pleased by this performance, generously gave them beads, 
and sent them home where they remained loyal to him in the subsequent wars.
Three days after the "noche triste," when Cortes1 army was driven 
out of Tenochtitlan, the Aztecs in Tuxtepec fell on the Spanish garrison 
and killed them all: 72 Spanish men, 6 Castillian ladies, and over a 
thousand Tlaxcalan troops. In 1521 Gonzalo de Sandoval took the town 
back and burned the Aztec general alive. Spanish control was quickly 
extended over the whole region (48). Cortes claimed the Chinantla for 
himself, but It was not included in the Marquesado del Valle, his enormous 
fiefdom which was composed of scattered holdings in Oaxaca, the Isthmus 
of Tehuantepec, Santiago Tuxtla, and elsewhere. Various encomiendas, or 
rights to tribute from the Indians, were granted to the Conquistadores 
(63, p, 302).
In the 1570*s, a general census was ordered, and reports were sent 
back to Spain from all over the Colony. Two of these from the Chinantec 
area have survived, the Relacion de Chinantla and the Relacion de Usila, 
both of which are dated 1579. A Relacion de Ojitlan was written, but it 
has not been uncovered.
In the form of answers to a standard questionnaire, these accounts 
provide brief information on the natural environment, the pre-Columbian 
and contemporary social organization, the tribute exacted, the crops 
grow, and some notes on the culture, Before 1519, the Chinantecs were 
divided into a number of villages, each of which was the center for a 
number of smaller villages. Each settlement has its own leader, or 
cacique, who was subservient to the chief in the town of Chinantla.
These chiefs received tribute both in the form of various commodities 
and as a certain number of days of work each year. The Aztecs took 
their share of the tribute to Tuxtepec, tcrhere there was a regional court. 
Traveling officials applied the laws and settled the local disputes.
Aztec culture was extended through ceremonial occasions several times a 
year, which included fasting and human sacrifice.
The relaciones list a great variety of agricultural products, 
including most of the foods which are common in the area to this day: 
corn, beans, chile, zapote, sweet potatoes, cassava, pineapples, grapes, 
fish, deer, rabbits, armadillos, and a large number of wild plants and 
medicinal herbs. Cotton and cocoa were grown on extensive plantations 
along the banks of the river below Usila, which presumably extended down 
towards Ojitlan. A large number of dye plants, including indigo, were 
collected.
The people lived in villages on promontories, to save the best land 
for agriculture. Houses were built of sticks and thatch, as today. The 
temples were In the form of high towers "reached by one hundred steps," 
and the idols of a very large pantheon were kept in caves.
1/ The two Relaciones are translated into English (21, Chapter X).
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The natives of all America suffered an extraordinary mortality 
from diseases which were imported from Europe in the first generation 
after the conquest. Estimating the population of Mexico at the moment 
of contact is a lively source of scholarly dispute; figures range from 
three to twenty-five million (43; 63). There is no question that epi­
demics of smallpox, typhus, measles, yellow fever and malaria, coupled 
with forced labor in the mines, killed the overwhelming majority of the 
people. The figures given in the relaciones are catastrophic; of the
16.000 families reported in Usila in 1520, 400 survived in 1579. In all 
of the Chinantla, where the army alone had numbered 100,000, less than
3.000 tributaries were counted (63, p. 303). The numbers may be open to 
doubt, but the basis of the native economy was utterly destroyed. The 
population which was necessary to keep large areas cleared and under cul­
tivation was gone, the jungle rapidly encroached and the survivors grouped 
together in scattered villages and eked out a subsistence with the kind
of individual slash-and-burn agriculture which is typical of more primi­
tive tropical cultures. The colonial economy depended on an,organized 
native population which was capable of generating a surplus, which the 
:Chinantecs were clearly no longer able to provide.
Some attempts were made to congregate the survivors into central 
towns; the people of the Santo Domingo valley were ordered into Ojitlan 
in 1571 by the Viceroy. Nevertheless, economiendas were not profitable 
and there were no mines. The Spanish generally shied away from tropical 
areas, and the narrow valleys and steep slopes were not suitable for the 
economic crops and the agricultural technology of the time. The Chinantla 
slipped into a backwater where it remained for 300 years. In 1743, only 
97 subjects were listed in the town of Chinantla* The area, was admin­
istered from the distant highland town of Teutila, in the Cuicatec Indian 
zone (63, p. 300).
The missionizing functions of the church were carried out by two 
groups, the Dominicans and the "secular1’ priests, who did not belong to 
any order. The Dominicans established centers in Teutila and Villa Alta, 
jurisdictions which included parts of, the Chinantla. By 1570, there were 
secular priests living in Chinantla and Usila. The missionaries had 
great difficulty with the language; one became so frustrated that he 
ordered his flock to speak only Nahuatl, the Aztec language, which did 
not work out very well. Although the people were converted to Christi­
anity, social services such as education were minimal. Saints and images, 
particularly the black Christ of Otatitlan, are much venerated to this 
day, and elements of the ancient religion have survived (21; .63).
The Traditional Society -
The.cultural hegemony of the Chinantecs has slowly broken down 
over the centuries. The people spread out into small villages, each 
of which depended on the productivity of the soil in the immediate
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surrounding territory. Slash-and-burn systems put very definite limita­
tions on the number of people a given area can support. As families 
worked plots further and further from the central village, it became 
easier to set up small settlements near the fields than to walk all the 
way home every night. In some cases these peripheral settlements grew 
larger and more important than the original village. Many of the records 
which survive from the Colonial period are legal documents of various 
kinds, and many of these are judications of the territorial disputes be­
tween groups which arose from this kind of movement. A number of stylized 
maps, or lienzos, have survived, on the basis of which the broad outlines 
of the history of this period have been traced (38; 56).
Ethnologists have divided the Chinantla into four geographically 
distinct zones, each with its own dialect and customs. Since ancient 
times, the largest population groups have been concentrated in the two 
lowland valleys where the narrow bands of good alluvial soils allow in­
tensive cultivation; the Valle Nacional and the Santo Domingo-Usila.
These two groups, called the Chinantla Grande and the Chinantla Pichinche 
respectively, are traditional rivals. Over the centuries, a third group 
has moved out into the forests to the southeast of the Cajones River.
They have hacked out migratory settlements near the margins of several 
smaller rivers. The fourth group, which has the smallest population of 
all, lives In the dry highlands in the rain shadow of the Sierra de 
Juarez centered around the town of Yolox. They are Chinantecs by linguis­
tic affiliation, but their culture is more closely associated with that of 
their neighbors, the Zapotecs (212, pp. 523-552).
Social customs vary considerably between these regions, and many 
of them survive only as remnants of their former significance. The 
culture has tended to reinforce the independence of each small local 
community. The town of Ojitlan is divided into five distinct neighbor­
hoods, or barrios. Until the 1930ss, when the land was divided into 
ejidos, these lines extended to the boundaries of the territory, di­
viding land and rural settlements into sections like a pie. Each barrio 
was endogomous, meaning that people were not supposed to marry outside 
the group, and had its own ruling elders. A council of these men would 
meet periodically to discuss matters which, affected the community as a 
whole. The elders played a religious role as curanderos, or healers.
Other offices merged with those of the church, which acted as a focus 
for the community. When cooperation was necessary between individuals 
of different groups, an acuerdo, or special relationship, would be estab­
lished. For special work, such as land clearing or house construction, 
a convite would be organized; Unmarried men served as topiles, which com­
bined the roles of attending to the needs of the leaders and acting as a 
kind of police force, collecting taxes and maintaining order. Every 
Saturday, all of the men in the community were called upon to participate 
in a tequio, or fatiga, a community work project to maintain the paths 
and bridges and do other necessary tasks (161; 214).
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One of the most interesting handicrafts was the construction of 
suspension bridges out of vines, which were used to cross even very wide 
rivers. Tools, beautiful hand-woven embroidered clothing, dugout canoes, 
nets, hammocks, arid other basic necessities were made in each community. 
Unlike many of the Oaxacan peoples, the Chinantecs never developed a sys­
tem of markets. Itinerant traders, most of whom were Zapotec Indians 
until quite recently, followed regular routes to trade goods from outside 
for produce. A high degree of cohesiveness and cooperation was maintained 
at the local level, but the Chinantla has not been a political, social, or 
economic unit for a long time (161, 212, 214, 215, 216).
Modem History
Spanish laws protecting the rights of Indian communities were 
effective in isolated areas. The Chinantecs were not affected by the 
mainstream of Mexican history until the late 19th Century, when Presi­
dent Porfirio Diaz encouraged foreign and Mexican interests to set up 
haciendas and develop the tropics. A native of Oaxaca, he launched the 
revolt against Lerdo de Tejada which began his career as a dictator with 
the Plan of Tuxtepec, which was proclaimed in 1876.
A railroad linking Mexico City and Veracruz was built in the 1870’s. 
Spanish and German tobacco planters, many of whom were refugees from the 
Cuban revolution, set up plantations on the fertile flat lands in Valle 
Nacional and to a lesser extent in Ojitlan. Workers were imported from 
other parts of the country in large numbers. Valle Nacional became 
infamous as a penal colony, where prisoners were worked to death by 
barbarous living conditions and disease. John Turner, an American who 
visited the area in 1910 and wrote a famous account of the horrors he 
encountered, said that the Indians lived in the hills above the planta­
tions, but does not discuss the effect on their own economy (202, Chapter
4).
Although the town of Ojitlan changed hands several times during 
the revolutionary period, the area was relatively peaceful compared to 
the violence elsewhere. An American banana company, Standard Fruit, set 
up operations in both valleys in the early 1920*s, although the bulk of 
their plantations were further out on the plain. Several of the older 
Chinantecs interviewed in the course of this study worked as peons for 
the Americans. The banana economy was destroyed in the 1930's by uncon­
trollable outbreaks of Panama disease, and the foreigners pulled out as 
the Agrarian Reform distributed the lands. The company suspended its 
Mexican operations entirely in 1941. The tobacco planters also moved 
out in the 19305s and 1940's and that activity has declined in importance, 
although high quality leaf for cigars is still grown on a small scale.
Many of the Spaniards, Cubans, Germans, and mestizos who had worked on 
the plantations and haciendas stayed on in the area to become merchants 
and cattle ranchers.
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During the administration of Lazaro Cardenas, 90 percent of the land 
in the municipio of Ojitlan was divided into over 50 ejidos on the basis 
of the population which was living there at the time. Each settlement 
received a grant which gave each household an average of between five and 
fifteen hectares, depending on location and quality. Although most of 
the ejidos have never been legally divided into parcels, the land has 
been broken up into plots which have tended to stay in the same families 
in the two generations since their foundation. Although wealthy and pow­
erful ejidatarios have been able to acquire the use of several parcels, 
illegal rental or sale to outsiders seems to have been minimal, A few 
ejidos were enlarged when there was still land available, but in general 
a rapidly rising population has been tied to a fixed and rigidly struc­
tured land base. The private property in the area consists of a few 
cattle ranches and a number of very small farms, or minifundia. The 
larger properties have acquired an economic importance out of proportion 
to their size and number.
Improved services have become available in the district in the 30 
years since the Papaloapan Commission was established. An all-weather 
road from Ojitlan to Tuxtepec, the district marketing center, which had 
previously been accessible only by river or on foot, was opened in 1954. 
Schools, health clinics, electricity, and other services have been intro­
duced, although they have been concentrated in the town of Ojitlan. Over 
this period, the relatively isolated Chinantecs have been brought into a 
much closer inter-relationship with the dominant culture and economy.
In the 1930*s, 71 percent of the Chinantecs could not speak Spanish 
and most of them were illiterate (21). The population was not large in 
relation to the cultivated area and the variety of crops which were grown. 
The traditional values of the culture stressed community self-sufficiency. 
Needs from the outside were limited to the relatively few goods which 
could not be produced locally and which were not prohibitively expensive, 
given the high cost of transportation. '
In the past forty years, the population of the three municipioS
which will be affected by the construction of the Cerro de Oro dam has
grown as follottfs (27, Chart N-2)
Average
Municipio 1940 1950 1960 1970 Annual
.Growth
San Lucas Ojitlan 9,921 11,944 14,619 19,576 3.2%
Jalapa de Diaz 5,422 5,939 7,774 9,768 2.7%
San Felipe Usila 4,464 4,987 5,794 7,570 2.3%
According to the National Indian Institute (INI), the proportion of the 
Chinantecs who do not speak Spanish had dropped to 26 percent by 1970. 
Progress in education has been much slower: 30 percent of the population 
in, the town of Ojitlan and 70 percent of the rural residents were still 
illiterate when the most recent census was takgn (95).
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Traditional Agriculture
The Chinantecs of the Santo Domingo Valley— are faced with a 
very limited supply of good land, a highly variable and difficult cli­
mate, and a chronic shortage of capital. They grow a variety of crops —  
grains, beans, oilseeds, vegetables, and many kinds of trees —  and 
gather products which are found wild in the forest. The basic productive 
unit is not the farm or the individual, but the family. The members of 
each household grow a combination of commercial and subsistence crops, 
work in other peoples* fields, make handicrafts for sale, and attempt to 
meet the needs of direct subsistence, necessary purchases, repayment of 
debts, and whatever small surplus they can accumulate. Intensive con­
tinuous cropping using fertilizer and other chemical inputs, short-fallow 
rotational systems, and extensive slash-and-burn are all used, often by 
the same family at the same time. The choice of crops and systems depends 
on the quality of the soils available and the kinds of resources which 
the family owns, can borrow, or can rent. These choices are based on a 
detailed knowledge of the natural conditions and are limited by an eco­
nomic and social structure which is heavily weighted against the great 
majority of them.
2/
Geography, Climate, and Soils
The Santo Domingo is a major affluent of the Papaloapan. Including 
it own tributaries, of which the Rio Salado and the Rio Grande are the 
most important, it drains a basin of over 14,000 square kilometers. The 
Usila, or Santa Rosa River joins it 30 kilometers above Tuxtepec. The 
lower valley of these two rivers, nearly 20,000 hectares of which will 
be flooded by the Cerro de Oro dam, supports over a third of the entire 
Chinantec population. Host of the area is in the municipio of Ojitlan; 
smaller portions fall under the jurisdiction of Usila, Chiltepec, Jalapa 
de Diaz, and Valle Nacional. Young valleys on a geological scale, they 
have cut through Pleistocene and various sedimentary rocks. The land 
can be divided into four general zones, as shown in Hap 4.
In some places the rivers run through gorges; where they do not, 
narrow strips of good alluvial soils have been laid down (I). The land 
rises, first to a relatively fertile plain (II), then to a peneplain 
made up of coarser materials (III), and finally to the steep hills 
above (IV). The width of the arable portion varies between two and ten 
kilometers, and the area as a whole lies between 20 and 70 meters above 
sea level.
2J The folloitfing sections on the agricultural, economic, and social
systems of the Chinantecs are based on interviews and on the following 
sources: Attolini (9), Barabas and Bartolome (13), Bravo, Tamayo, and 
Jimenez (23), Carrion, Cruz, and Ortiz (27), Escanero (55), Guerere (76), 
Lucero and Avila (95; 96), Martinez (102), COPLASA (123), Estudios y 
Proyectos (131), and Rendon (163).
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The mean annual temperature is 25° C.; monthly means vary between 21° 
and 30° £* Average annual rainfall is 3,500 millimeters, 90 percent of 
which falls between the months of June and December. According to the 
Koeppen system, the climate is classified as Af, or humid tropical with 
a limited dry season (131). As in most areas of the tropics, both the 
total annual precipitation and its distribution through the year are 
highly variable; rainfall in any one year may vary as much as 1500 milli­
meters from the mean. Crop varieties with only modest yield potential 
under ideal conditions are chosen because they are capable of surviving 
these fluctuations.
The natural vegetation has been drastically altered over the cen­
turies of human habitation. On steep slopes and in other-wise inaccessible 
areas, virgin rain forest of tall, evergreen hardwoods can still be found. 
The other areas which are not under cultivation in any given year are 
composed of a variety of secondary associations, depending on age, soil 
conditions, and other factors. The people have been forced by the neces­
sity of supporting a relatively large population on highly variable soils 
to take careful note of qualitative changes over very short distances.
An indigenous classification system divides the valleys into seven broad 
categories (Table 3).
An individual campesino knows his parcel in much greater detail; 
he can easily point to as many as eight or ten significant qualitative 
differences in an area of two or three hectares. A comprehensive scien­
tific soil survey has never been made of the valley. As the Chinantec 
classification suggests, the soils vary widely in their characteristics.
A recent study in an eiido just outside of the area identified two sub­
groups of latcsols, gley soils, lithosois, and recent alluvium (76). The 
results of a land capability and use study made in 1972 on the basis of 
aerial photographs are included in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. It is obvious 
by any measure that very little arable land is available. An average 
family tills one to three hectares of good soil, plus another five or 
six in less favored areas. A Chinantec who has managed to acquire con­
trol over 20 or 30 hectares is a rich man.
Cropping Systems
The six principal crops, whose relative importance is illustrated 
in Chart 6, are grown in the various micro-ecological niches of the 
valleys with a complex combination of systems. Everybody grows maize 
and beans, the staple foods, on whatever land they have available. Com­
mercial crops, especially rice and tobacco, which require significant 
investments in labor and purchased inputs, are grown on the best soils. 
The climate and rainfall distribution permit year-round cultivation. 
There are two principal cycles: the summer rainy season, or temporal, 
and the dry season, or tonalmil, which depends on the residual moisture 
in the soil supplemented by the relatively scarce rainfall. The first
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TABLE 3. QJITLAN: CHINANTEC SOILS CLASSIFICATION
I. Huo Teh Hoist Soil
Alluvial soils along the rivers, suitable for two crops a year.
II. Huo Cuah Hard Soil
Well-drained soils on the plains, used for rainy season crops.
III. Huo Seh Sandy Soil
Well-drained soils on the peneplains and lower slopes, used for 
rainy season crops and root crops such as cassava.
IV. Huo Neh Yellow Soil
Poorly drained soils at the base of hills and around springs. 
Used for early maize crops and some rice.
V. Huo Yin Red Soil
Lateritic soils found on higher land. Used for pastures, 
summer corn, and heavily mulched backyard gardens.
VI. Huo Hah Black Soil
Thinner soils on steep slopes, mostly in forest. Used for 
tobacco seedling nurseries and for slash-and-burn cultivation.
VII. Huo Hmeh Forest Soil
On very steep slopes. Used for wood, barbasco, and other 
natural forest products.
Source: Alvaro Lucero and Simon David Avia, "Proyecto Cerro de
Oro," manuscript, Mexico, 1974.
CHART 6. OJITLAN: RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF PRINCIPAL CROPS
Escanero Gonzalez, "Reacomodo de Campesinos Afectados por la Construcci6n 
de la Presa Cerro de Oro en Uxpanapa, Veracruz " (Tesis Profesional, 
Facultad de Ingenieria, UNAM, Mexico, 1977).
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is limited to areas which are not too wet, the second to the much smaller 
area of soils with a high water-holding capacity.
The timing of agricultural activities to the weather is of course a 
major preoccupation of farmers everywhere. The pre-Columbian calendar 
of 18 months of 20 days plus an extra ,fmonth‘,' of five days survived until 
recently in many parts of the Chinantla (Appendix Table 3) apparently 
because of its usefulness in coordinating the cropping cycles (211, 213). 
There are two especially crucial moments in the year: the beginning of the
rainy season, on which depends the timing of the spring planting, and 
the beginning of the dry season, on which depends the time available for 
getting the summer crop off, preparing the soil, and replanting. No two 
years are ever alike, but Chart 7 outlines the distribution of tasks 
through the year. It is important to note that there are very few weeks 
when there is nothing to do.
Almost all of the Chinantecs have different plots in different eco­
logical zones, and they have developed different systems to take advantage 
of their special characteristics. The alluvial bands along the rivers 
are continuously cropped. Although It was reported as recently as the 
1930's that traction animals were unknown in the Chinantla (21, p.43), 
steel moldbord, wooden, and small disk plows drawn by oxen are now com­
monly used in these areas. Tillage improves the structure of the heavy 
soils and speeds up the turn-around time to permit year-round cultivation. 
The land is plowed twice, once in the spring and again in the fall when 
a week or more of sun has made the soil dry enough to work. The seed­
bed is leveled by dragging a log over it. In some cases the land is 
furrowed. These areas are generally planted with rice in Hay or June 
and with maize, tobacco, or chile in the fall and winter.
The higher lands corresponding to zones II, III, and IV in Map 4, 
are not tilled, but are cultivated using slash-and-burn techniques. The 
areas on the upper slopes are left in fallow for at least four years. A 
plot is marked out a few months before planting. Its size depends on 
the labor which will be available through the season; two and a half 
hectares is the most an average family can handle. Most of the trees 
are cut down, and a border is sometimes cleared to prevent the fire from 
escaping. The plot is burned over during the dry season. Summer maize 
is the most usual crop. On steep slopes, the man walks down the hill, 
pushing his espeque into the ground, dropping a few seeds into the pre­
vious hole, and covering them with his foot, all in one easy and continu­
ous motion. It would be awkward to work sideways along the contour. 
Planting in vertical rows also facilitates drainage , but leads to erosion 
when an entire hillside is in production at the same time.
The rolling plains in the intermediate zone of the valley are left 
in short fallow, or barbecho, for one to four years. The length of the 
fallow period has been considerably reduced in recent years. The ejida- 
tarios know that this prejudices yields and leads to erosion, but it is 
unavoidable, because of the pressures on the land. The succulent
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secondary vegetation, or acahual, is cleared with.a machete and is either 
left on the field as a thick,layer of mulch or is burned.
The technology varies, little from ejido to ejido, and is typical 
of southeastern Mexico as a whole. Mechanization of any kind is limited 
to a handful of private farms. Only about a quarter of the members of 
any ejido own teams of oxen and the equipment which goes with them; those 
who do hire out members of the family to do custom work on other parcels. 
Chemical inputs have been introduced, but their use varies widely between 
ejidos and individual campesinos. They are used very selectively in all 
cases. According to the local people, a "good” soil is one which pro­
duces high yields without fertilizer. In less favored areas, or where 
adequate fallowing is not possible, fertilizer is necessary, although 
most ejidatarios believe that it damages the land. In a small plot, it 
is,possible to watch the stand carefully and. fertilize individual plants 
which are visibly suffering.
. Herbicides are used more widely, especially to reduce the fallow 
period in untilled areas. The invasion of grassy weeds, particularly 
Simsia amplexicaulis, often; forces the abandonment of a plot before the 
absolute decline in soil fertility becomes apparent (131). In the last 
few years, inflation and the availability of relatively highly paid work 
in Uxpanapa has driven up the cost of labor. Some people have been using 
herbicides instead of paying peons to weed. Insecticides are used on 
tobacco, which is grown with government credit, and to some extent on rice.
The constant high humidity and inadequate facilities make storage 
pests a very serious problem. Many families are forced to sell maize at 
low prices before it spoils, and the i turn around and buy enough to eat 
on credit against the next year’s harvest.
As would be expected in an area of variable soil conditions and 
very small units of production, the details of the management systems 
afe not uniform. Families vary in their size; in their access to land, 
credit, oxen, labor, and other inputs; and in their adaptability, energy, 
and skill.
Crops for Home Consumption
Maize is the principal food staple n  the area, as in all of Meso- 
America. Two crops a year are grown under a wide range of conditions. 
Yields vary between .2 and three tons per hectare., and average between 
1.5 and two. There are several native varieties for both the winter and 
the summer seasons. Hybrids are used by groups which receive credit from 
the official bank, but the ejidatarios prefer the native types, both be­
cause they can select and save their own seed, and because the yields arc 
more reliable. Appendix Table 4 outlines the general cash and labor 
requirements for the crop. The actual costs vary considerably depending 
o/t the fertility of the soil and the amount of labor pcov5ded by the 
farmers' families.
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Black beans and a few other varieties are grown on a small scale 
by most families. The seed is sometimes planted in the maize fields in 
Augiist or September. This practice, economizes land by allowing the two 
cycles to overlap, and saves time and labor. Some campesinos do not find 
this relaying convenient and sow beans in monoculture later in the Fall.
The yields vary from almost nothing to about two tons per hectare.
A variety of vegetables, fruits, and other useful plants are grown 
on a small scale, primarily in backyard gardens. Small quantities of 
cassava, sweet potatoes, mangos, bananas, oranges, coconuts, and other 
products are sold, especially by people who live relatively close to 
the main road. There is no organized system to reach distant markets, 
and local prices at harvest time drop to a point where it is not worth­
while to transport them very far. A study by a botanist in an ejido 
near Tuxtepec identified nearly ninety edible plants in the garden around 
a house, eighteen trees used as a source of wood, six species used to 
make furniture and tools, and fifty-five wild and domesticated plants for 
medicinal purposes (102). Game has become scarce in the past twenty years, 
but deer, armadillos, and other wild animals provide an occasional source 
of meat. Every household keeps pigs, chickens, turkeys, and other do­
mestic species which eat residue and surplus, Many of the villages arc 
built on high land on inferior soils, and the free-running animals pro­
vide the fertility for the gar-isos -
Commercial Crops
As the region as a whole developed in the 1950’s and 1960's, the 
production of commercial crops became increasingly important. By the 
1970's, nearly half of the cultivated area was dedicated to four crops 
grown primarily for sale, of which the most important is upland rice 
(Chart 6). This grain is grown under a variety of systems in other 
parts of Oaxaca and Veracruz; in these valleys its culture is confined 
exclusively to the tilled alluvial soils along the rivers. It is planted 
in May or June by espeque in clumps. Hardy, tall varieties such as Lira 
and Morada Criollo are the most common. When IR-8, the first of the 
"Green Revolution" dwarf varieties, was marketed locally under the name 
"Philippine Miracle" a few campesii.os tried it, but it proved susceptible 
to disease and difficult to harvest.
The fields are cultivated once or twice with a single ox which is 
trained not to trample the plants. An additional hand-weeding is often 
necessary. Fertilizer is used sparingly on individual clumps to produce 
an even stand. Insecticides and rat poison are applied if the pests are 
serious and if the resources are available. The grain is harvested by 
machete and threshed in the field by beating the panicles against a bar- 
boo frame or against the edge of a metal tub. A large family may be 
able to handle most of the work up to the harvest itself; help is uni­
versally hired to gather the grain, a job which requires about 15 man- 
days per hectare and which must be accomplished rapidly.
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Yields vary between one and three tons per hectare. The harvest is 
usually sold in advance to secure the credit; the merchant arranges for 
mules or a truck to pick it up at the field,, An outline of the stages 
of production is given in Appendix Table 5.
The cultivation of tobacco requires a great deal of time and labor 
and highly specialized skills. The crop was introduced into the area in 
the last century by foreign capitalists. Credit and marketing are now 
administered by TABAMEX, a Federal agency. The leaves are harvested in 
the Spring, cured in the sun, and dried in special sheds. They are graded 
into different classes, each with its own price. If the curing and selec­
tion are not up to standard, the campesinos receive the lowest possible 
price for the whole crop, which inevitably means a loss. The production 
of high-quality leaf requires 27 separate hand operations, and a much 
higher investment in purchased inputs than any of the other crops which 
are grown iri the area.
Sesame grows quickly and requires relatively little investment or 
care. It is usually hroadraat in the maize fields in August, to save 
time and IaW j. . It is not fertilized or weeded and is harvested along 
with tne grain. Yields average between 300 and 800 kilograms per hectare.
Several varieties of chile peppers are produced as a cash crop. The 
labor requirements are very high —  as much as 40 man-days per hectare 
for the harvest alone —  so most families plant less than a hectare.
Yields are as high as eight tons per hectare, but the market is subject 
to wide price fluctuations. Chile can be very profitable, but it is risky.
Coffee is grown on the upper slopes. It is not the ideal elevation, 
and the Chinantecs have not been able to provide the careful husbandry 
needed to insure high yields. The price has been unfavorable for long 
periods. It is a marginal resource which provides a little extra income.
In many ejidos, a few individuals control most of the plantations, the 
others own a few dozen bushes each. Although it is the only perennial 
crop which is systematically exploited on any scale, the plantations are 
over-shaded, inadequately weeded, and only occasionally pruned. Yields 
vary from less than one to four kilos of dried coffee per bush,
Barbasco (Dioscorea composita) is a wild yam which grows in the 
forest. Steroids extracted from the tuber are used in the production 
of birth control pills. Before this use was discovered, the Chinantecs 
put the extract into streams to poison the fish. Until a few years ago, 
private brokers for the American laboratories paid low and unstable prices. 
In the early 1970*s, PROQUIVEMEX, a government agency, took over buying 
and distribution. Sales to the Americans were embargoed in 1976 and a 
higher price was negotiated. Specific buying seasons have been estab­
lished to limit supply and conserve the resource.
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The Impact of Modernization
In the two decades since the road was built into Ojitlan in the 
early 1950's, the economic and social structure of the Chinantecs has 
been strongly affected by the national market and culture* A generation 
ago, the people grew cotton, spun thread, and wove beautiful embroidered 
clothing. The displacement of cotton by more profitable crops now re­
quires the purchase of manufactured thread. The native huiplles are now 
so expensive to produce that few women can afford to wear them; they are. 
sold back to the merchants who make a large profit on them in the tourist 
markets in Oaxaca and Mexico City. The people produced a beverage called 
popo out of cocoa and maize; its production for festivals was tradition­
ally the province of a special group which thereby asserted its position 
and status in society* This continues on a minor scale, but the major 
organizing force behind the festivals is nox? the local distributors of 
the national beer companies. They provide tents, tables, chairs, musi­
cians, and of course beer, which must be purchased, which requires cash, 
which is obtained as credit.
Many examples of the substitution or introduction of goods from 
the outside could be given. The only way in which the Chinantecs have 
been able to carry the credit load imposed by these purchases has been 
to substitute commercial crops such as rice for subsistence crops such 
as maize. They have combined their ancient technology with new elements 
which are appropriate to their scale of production. Oxen, plows, ferti­
lizers, and other inputs have been introduced.
According to census figures, the area under cultivation in the 
municipio of Ojitlan more than tripled between 1960 and 1970 (163,
Chart 6-3). Crop reporting systems improved during this period, so 
part of the increase is simply due to a more comprehensive count. Never­
theless, both the area and especially the proportion of each harvest 
which is marketed have increased significantly since the road was built.
The best land is now dedicated to a limited number of crops for 
sale, which require hired labor and other purchased inputs to produce. 
Maize and beans have been displaced to the more delicate and inferior 
soils on the slopes. Increased intensity in these areas has required 
the reduction of the fallow periods; the campesinos must buy inputs to 
fight weeds and to maintain fertility. These forces, combined with the 
Increase in population, are pushing the agricultural use of the area 
beyond its ecological limits, resulting in erosion and a general decline 
in fertility.
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Gente de Razon and Paisanos
The economic system in the area, like that in many of the Indian 
communities of Oaxaca, is based on a highly unequal social structure de­
fined by racial distinctions. It has been called a caste, rather than 
a simple class system (3). The ancient town of Ojitlan is located on a 
hill overlooking the Santo Domingo River, and will survive on a peninsula 
when the Cerro de Oro dam is completed. Its population in 1970 was a 
little over 3,000, 17 percent of the municipio. The church, the munici­
pal offices, and the school enclose the main square at the top of town. 
The single main street is lined with small stores.
Roads out to a few of the ejidos are passable by trucks except In 
the very wettest times of the year, but most of the settlements are ac­
cessible only on foot or by river. Only five of the over 50 villages in 
the municipio have a population of over 500. In recent years, schools, 
electricity, and other services have been provided in some of the ejidos 
by the Papaloapan Commission, but most of the modern improvements have 
been located in the town. Except for small stores with a limited stock 
of basic necessities, soft drinks, and beer, commerce is concentrated in 
Ojitlan.
The merchants are Spanish-speaking mestizos, many of whom are mem­
bers of families who worked on the haciendas in the first part of the 
century. In a terminology which dates back to the early years of the 
colony, they are called gente de razon, or "people of reason." The 
Indians, over.20 percent of whom still speak only their own language, 
are called paisanos, an implicitly pejorative term.
Informal Credit
It has been the local merchants —  the gente de razon —  who have 
benefited most from the Increased production of commercial crops. A study 
by the Bank of Mexico indicated that the average per capita income of the 
campesinos in the municipio declined during the I960*s, and that the in­
come of the people in the service sector increased (cited in 163, Graph 
6-3).
The merchants control the economy of the area in a number of ways 
of which the most important is credit. They enter into life-long rela­
tionships with a client group of Chinantec families. They know everybody 
intimately, and often act as godparents for the children. This sets up 
a close personal tie known as ccirpadrazco. They provide credit for goods 
of many kinds: seeds, fertilizers, food, clothing, liquor; and cash for 
emergency needs such as illness, unexpected trips, and weddings. They 
take on almost all of the short-term commercial risks. They provide the 
inputs and the cash to pay the labor, they send their mules or trucks out 
to the fields to pick up the harvest, and they take responsibility for 
transportation, storage, and marketing.
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In return, the Chinantecs are obligated to turn over a large share 
of the harvest to cover their debts, and to provide political support to 
the merchant or his faction. To sell elsewhere would not only be an af­
front to an old friend, it would invite retaliation by force. Few people 
get hurt for stepping out of line; the rules of the system are well un­
derstood by everyone and are more subtly enforced. The ejidatarios do 
not hold title to their land and cannot put it up as collateral; if they 
could they would have lost it long ago.
As long as the value of production in the area exceeds the costs 
of the inputs plus whatever is consumed, there is no way that the mer­
chants as a group can fail to make money in the long run, whatever may 
happen in a particular case or year. The private lenders charge usurous 
rates and acquire life-long control over their clients, but their credit 
is available as needed in small quantities for a broad spectrum of re­
quirements, including consumption.
Much of the surplus value of the increased agricultural production 
has been transferred, not only out of the hands of the Chinantecs, but 
out of Ojitlan. A detailed study of this process has never been made, 
and there are very few reliable statistics. The rice mills in Cordoba 
have used the region as a source of supply for years by financing loans 
through the merchants, who are also backed by wholesalers and other out­
side interests. Tuxtepec, the regional center, has benefited from the 
development of the surrounding area and grew very rapidly In the late 
1960's and early 1970‘s. Cattle ranches on the coastal plain have ex­
panded and have become Increasingly capitalized. The merchants have had 
many investment opportunities outside of the municipio. As in all of 
rural Mexico, the benefits of growth have been very unequally distributed
The Social Structure of the Rural Communities
The capital which has remained in the area in the form of cattle, 
oxen, farm implements, improved housing, and so forth has been increas­
ingly concentrated within the Indian communities themselves. The Chin­
antecs who live in the town of Ojitlan and work in commerce or for the 
government have benefited the most. Houses built of concrete block 
just like those of the gente de razon, televisions, and other consumer 
goods are the marks of their status. The people in the countryside can 
be roughly divided into the following five groups:
a) The mestizo ranchers
b) The rich and powerful ejidatarios who have been able to acquire 
control over relatively large areas of land and cattle
c) The ejidatarios with parcels .who also own oxen and other tools 
which they rent out
d) The ejidatrios with parcels who depend on their land and labor
e) The landless who work for a daily wage.
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The interchanges of capital and labor follow complex patterns 
which I do not pretend to have fully unraveled. In the forty years 
since the ejidos were formed, the size of the individual parcels has 
decreased and the number of people without direct access to land has 
increased. Although the Chinantecs universally emphasize the fact and 
importance of individual land "ownership," only a few families actually 
do all the work on their own parcels themselves. Families are closely 
tied together by kinship and compadrazgo. Tasks such as planting and 
harvesting, which require large numbers of people, are usually under­
taken in groups. Two traditional systems of formal cooperation have 
survived to some extent. The first is more inclusive; a group will 
pool their resources and work together throughout the season, although 
the ultimate responsibility of each family for its own plot is main- . 
tained. The second is a work exchange system, in which one family will 
help another in its busy time and expect reciprocation.
These systems are slowly being replaced by cash; helpers will be 
paid by the day rather than being asked to wait for the favor to be re­
turned or the harvest to be distributed. This increases the cash costs 
of production and reinforces the social differences which are based on 
economic distinctions. Grown sons of ejidatarios and other landless men 
often have secure sources of employment through long-term understandings.
The process of crop intensification on small units has diffused the 
problem of the less well connected campesinos who do not have direct ac­
cess to land. There has usually been enough work for them to survive on 
a low standard of living. They do not work for a single plantation.or a 
common boss, so they have never formed into a cohesive group or class. 
Every village has its poor. About half of the population is under 15 
years old, so the problem of the landless would have become more serious 
in another ten years or so.
Since oxen are only used for three or four weeks a year on any one 
parcel, there is neither reason nor enough pasture for everyone to own 
a team. About a quarter of the families keep these animals, which im­
plies relative wealth and status. Relatives and compadres get to use 
them at the. most opportune times and at the best rates. This group shades 
up into the much smaller class of rich ejidatarios, who wield political 
power as well. Through their connections in the community and with the 
dominant mestizo clique,they have been able to acquire land and cattle. 
Herds of cattle and coffee plantations, even if they are not well man­
aged or especially profitable, are concentrated in the hands of this 
group. These families have traditionally controlled the elected offices 
of the ejidos, and, as a group, the municipal chapter of the National 
Confederation of Campesinos (CMC) as well. This has given them access 
to the ruling political party (PRI) and to programs of the government, 
which they have distributed as patronage.
Sixteen percent of the zone which will be flooded is privately 
owned, some of it by minifundistas with less than ten hectares, but pri­
marily by mestizo ranchers (131). Some of them are descendants of the
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employees of the old haciendas; others came into the area during the 
Revolution. They form a community apart» separated from the Indians by 
keenly felt class and racial barriers,- .They have their own formal assoc­
iation, and have much,more in common with their counterparts in Tuxtepec 
than with their neighbors. Although their ranches are tiny by Mexican 
standards, they cause resentment by raising cattle on the kinds of high 
quality soils which the Chinantecs use for intensive crop production.
There are no figures which show how much ejidal land they rent illegally, 
but this does happen, to some extent. They are an important political 
force in the Municipior
' The Future in Uxpanapa
Although the Papaloapan Commission and other agencies have provided 
some services to the ejidos, the Chinantecs have not received their fair 
share of the benefits of regional development. The complex socio-economic 
structure in which they live has evolved over a long period of time. 
Pieceineal government programs have not been able to give the people an 
alternative basis on which to develop their resources for their own ben­
efit. The official banks have provided agricultural credit to a few 
small groups, but their complex and inefficient procedures have not been 
able to provide a viable alternative to the paternalistic efficiency of 
the private lenders. In the late-1960's, the Ejidal Bank tried to re- 
introdiice bananas into the area on a commercial scale to increase the 
income of the ejidatarios. Technical and marketing problems were never 
solved, the project collapsed, and the participants were left with a 
debt of over four million pesos (23, p. 81).
In Uxpanapa, the Papaloapan Commission is attempting to build an 
entirely new economic and social system from scratch. The Chinantecs 
are being organized into production cooperatives large enough to use 
agricultural machinery and other inputs efficiently. It is hoped that 
this structure will allow them to overcome the restrictions imposed by 
the limited resources arid exploitative economic system of their home­
land. The Chinantecs have been farming in the rainy tropics for over 
a thousand years. It remains to be seen how they will be able to apply 
this experience on a larger scale in Uxpanapa.
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Plate IV-2
Ojitlan, seat of the municipio of the same name and commercial center of the area to be flooded by 
the Cerro de Oro dam.
A woman weaves a traditional cotton Huipil or loose blouse. Most 
Chinatecs have adopted western dress, and these items are now 
produced primarily for the tourist trade.
Right: The leader of a rural 
ejido.
Plate IV-3
Below: The home of a pros­
perous ejidatario.
Plate IV-4
Rivers and footpaths are still the principal means 
of communication. The construction of a road 
from the regional center of Tuxtepec to Ojitlan in 
the early 1950’s has opened up the area to 
increasing contact with the national culture and 
market economy.
Plate IV-5
The best alluvial soils along the banks of the rivers are used to grow cash crops for sale, 
principally rice in the summer season and tobacco in the fall and winter. The top picture shows 
the abrupt transition between the rice fields and the steeper slopes above, which are cultivated 
using slash-and-burn methods. The lower picture shows a tobacco seedling nursery.
Plate IV-6
Although each family farms an Individual plot which averages between one and five hectares, 
groups of relatives and friends cooperate for land preparation, planting, and harvesting. The 
minority with the resources to support a team of oxen rent them out to their neighbors.
Plate IV-7
CHAPTER V
THE CERRO DE ORO DAM: FLOOD CONTROL AND RESETTLEMENT
The Papaloapan River System
The Cerro de Oro dam is but one element in a broadly conceived 
program of regional development in the basin of the Papaloapan River, 
which with an average annual flow of 44 billion cubic meters, is the 
second largest in the country in terms of volume. It drains a water­
shed of 46,500 square kilometers, or nearly 18,000 square miles. This 
area is about evenly divided between the lowland plains in the state of 
Veracruz and the highlands in the states of Oaxaca and Puebla.
The lower basin has been subject to occasional flooding for cen­
turies. The capacity of the rivers to handle the run-off from the 
mountains began to deteriorate rapidly about fifty years ago. Population 
growth and rapid deforestation on the upper slopes accelerated the pace 
of the system’s natural life cycle and made the floods more severe. De­
velopment in the lowlands meant that the economic losses were constantly 
increasing. According to a technical study made in 1943 (quoted in 179,
p. 101):
. . . before 1921, floods were infrequent, and only lasted 
three or four days.. The agricultural lands benefited from 
the deposit of alluvial materials. Since then, both the 
frequency and duration of flooding have increased steadily.
This has caused enormous losses to agriculture, and with 
time this fertile region may be rendered sterile by the 
leaching of the soil.
An especially disastrous flood in 1944, which covered 470 thousand 
hectares and caused millions of pesos worth of damage, brought national 
attention to the problem. The Papaloapan Commission, modeled on the 
Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States, was established in 
1947 as a semi-autonomous Federal authority under the Ministry of 
Hydraulic Resources. Its mission was to bring the river system under 
control, to coordinate the construction of roads and other infrastructure 
with a broad range of government services, and to bring the potential 
riches of the entire region into the national economy.
-69-
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Erosion and Silt
Most of the precipitation in the Papaloapan basin.is the result 
of orographic factbts, as illustrated in Chart 8. The prevailing trade 
winds blow over thousands of miles of tropical ocean before reaching 
Mexico. This warm, moist air sweeps across the coastal plain in the 
summer, and is abruptly forced upward by the Sierra de Juarez, cooling 
as it rises. Most of the seasonal rain falls in a strip thirty to fifty 
miles wide along the windward slope, where both Ojitlan and Uxpanapa are 
located. As the air descends the leeward side of the principal ridge, 
it warms up and retains the remaining moisture. The transition between 
the tropical forest and the arid rain shadow is extraordinarily abrupt.
The Indians who live in the arid highlands are very poor, and have 
received very little benefit from the government since the Revolution. 
They have deforested large areas to survive. Less water is held by the 
exposed soil, run-off has increased, and erosion has become a very seri­
ous problem. The rivers carry the silt in suspension through swift­
flowing gorges until they join the Papaloapan on the plain, where the 
water slows down and the river spreads out into leisurely, meandering 
curves. Sediment builds up, reducing the volume of water which the bed 
can hold before it overflows its banks and spreads out over the flat 
lands on,both sides. Other factors which influence the severity of a 
flood include the rainfall patterns in both the upland and lowland areas, 
the degree of saturation of the soil, and the flow of each of the major 
tributaries (179). The annual average contribution of the principal 
rivers is illustrated in Chart 9.
The Flood Control System
The keystone of the flood control program of the Papaloapan Com­
mission is the construction of two large dams on important tributaries 
in the foothills just above the plain, at Cerro de Oro and Temazcal, 
Oaxaca. They will form a single reservoir of over 700 square kilometers 
with a maximum storage capacity of over 13 billion cubic meters —  one 
of the largest artificial lakes in Latin America. Supplementary projects 
include several more modest dams on smaller streams, cuts to straighten 
meandering curves, and levees to increase the capacity of the main river.
Although the Cerro de Oro dam was considered by government engineers 
to be the single most important element in the system, the Temazcal site 
was less expensive to develop and that dam was built first, in the early 
1950's. It controls the Tonto River, which drains 4,000 square kilometers 
on the rainy windward slope and contributed 21 percent of the water but 
only a negligible proportion of the silt to the total system. A hydro­
electric plant with a capacity of 155,000 kilowatts was built and tied 
into a grid which serves both the industrial center of Cordoba and the 
Central Highlands. The Papaloapan was partially controlled and the
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construction of many new roads and other public works has led to signi­
ficant development on the coastal plain in Veracruz (156, 183).
The Cerro de Oro dam was not built for over thirty years, in part 
because national investment priorities favored other regions, especially 
in the Northwest, and in part because of. strong resistance to the project 
in the state of Oaxaca. It is designed to control the Santo Domingo 
River, which drains 14,000 square kilometers including large areas of 
semi-arid, over-cultivated hillsides on the leeward slope of the princi­
pal ridge. This river contributes 13 percent of the water, but 63 percent 
of the silt to the total system. Siltation is rapidly reducing the vol­
ume of water which the main bed can accomodate. In 1944, the capacity 
of the Papaloapan below Tuxtepec was 5,000 cubic meters per second. By 
1972, in spite of the Temazcal dam, the levees, and other works, this 
figure had been reduced to 3,500 (23, p. 25). Floods In 1958 and 1969 
increased the pressure for the completion of the system. A year in 
which a hurricane or other factor produces unusually heavy rainfall was 
likely to see another severe flood, which would cause serious damage to 
the developed areas of the coastal plain.
The Cerro de Oro Dam
It was decided in 1972 to build the dam at Cerro de Oro and regu­
late the levels of its reservoir and that of the Temazcal by means of a 
connecting dike (142). The existing generating plant at Temazcal will 
be enlarged to a total generating capacity of over half a million kilo­
watts (5). Combined with the construction of more levees and an exten­
sive drainage system, the project will protect an area of 210,000 hec­
tares from almost all danger of flooding. The probable useful life of 
the system is somewhat controversial. The Cerro da Oro reservoir will 
have a silt-holding capacity of 568 million cubic meters. If erosion in 
the watershed follows the patterns which have been established in recent 
decades, it will serve its functions for less than sixty years (132).
More optimistic studies conclude the reforestation and other projects 
upriver will insure Its usefulness for considerably longer (23, p. 42).
The Commission*s existence is based on the concept that the entire water­
shed should be developed as a single natural unit. In its first 30 years, 
however, the great majority of both public and private investments were 
made in the lowland plain, where the returns were much higher than in 
the mountainous highlands. Between 1952 and 1976, only 50 million pesos 
were spent on soil conservation prelects, about half in the upper basin 
(128).
The fundamental purpose of the dam was to protect the investments 
which had already been made in the lower basin from the increasing prob­
ability of serious flooding. Nevertheless, it was necessary to include 
a broader spectrum of benefits in the project to gather enough political 
support for its construction. It was first proposed to create an irri­
gation district immediately downs r. ream and relocate the Chinantecs there
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(23, 122). This would have required the enforcement of the statutory 
limit on individual land ownership,‘>tthlch was - not well received by the 
local ranchers. When the.technical studies were completed, it was con- 
eluded that seasonal irrigation would not be co^t-effective.
In the early 1970■s, the national agricultural crisis meant that 
all expensive projects in rural Mexico were justified by significant pro­
jected increases in agricultural production. It was: finally decided to 
reorganize the area which will be freed from the danger of flooding as- 
a Federal Drainage District. This; is a new administrative unit which 
theoretically gives the Federal government the same kind of control over 
resource use which it has long exercised over publicly irrigated land.
The present structure of land ownership in the district, almost all of 
which is in Veracruzj is shown in Chart 10. Drainage and a variety of 
support programs are designed to increase the production of sugar cane 
and cattle, the predominant enterprises. Special extension and rural 
development programs will attempt to improve the precarious situation of 
the small farmers and ejidatarios (132). Soil conservation programs, 
roads, electricity, and other infrastructure will be built in the upper 
basin to encourage.economic development and to reduce erosion (142).
Construction began in 1974, was interrupted in 1976, and began 
again in 1977. The dam should be completed sometime in the early 1980*3. 
It will be 1,662 meters long, 59.9 meters high, 431 meters wide at 
the bottom, and 10 meters wide at the crown.. It will consist of a core 
of compacted earth secured with rock and gravel. Seismic activity has 
fractured the bedrock; concrete is being injected under pressure to se­
cure the base. The process, called grouting, has proved more complicated 
than was anticipated. Three tunnels are being built to divert the water 
during construction and to serve as spillways for the completed system. 
The dam will flood 19,000 hectares of cne of the most fertile areas of 
the Chinantecs' homeland. The Commission has been negotiating with the 
World Bank for loans to cover between 30 and 40 percent of the capital 
cost, which was estimated at 7 billion pesos, or 30 million dollars, in 
1977. It is an expensive project with a limited useful life which will 
eliminate the danger of flooding in the short run. It will affect both . 
the natural and the social environment in ways which will be very:diffi­
cult to predict or control.
The Resettlement Program of th Temazcal Dam
The Cerro de Oro project requires the relocation of 20,000 Chinantec 
Indians. The program has been strongly affected by the experience of the 
Temazcal, or President Aleman, dam, which flooded 51,000 hectares in the 
valley of the Tonto River and also displaced 20,000 people, most of whom 
were Mazatec Indians. It was the first major government activity in the -r 
area, and the Indians were much more isolated than the Chinantecs are to-, 
day. The majority of them did not speak Spanish. The bulldozers which
Chart 10. THE FUTURE PAPALOAPAN DRAINAGE DISTRICT: PRINCIPAL CROPS BY 
AREA AND STRUCTURE OF LAND TENURE, 1976
Source: Mexico, Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulicos, Subsecretaria 
de Planeacion, "Estudio Sobre el Proyecto para el Control del Rio 
Papaloapan" (mimeo, 1976), Tables 1:4-2,2:5-2.
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came to build the dam were the first pieces of machinery that the ma­
jority of them had ever seen (19, pp. 15-22; 207, pp. 133-135).
The record of government-directed colonization programs in fron­
tier areas, both in Mexico and in other parts of the tropical world, is 
quite poor. If new communities are to survive and prosper on the basis 
of viable agricultural enterprises, certain basic infrastructure such as 
roads, cleared land, and housing must be provided (18, 92). On the other 
hand, it is very easy to fall into the trap of excessive paternalism by 
attempting to exercise too much control over the lives of the settlers, 
without giving them a personal stake in the project (156, pp. 127-128).
It is especially difficult to strike the right balance when dealing with 
Indian people with quite different values than those of the planners.
Today, in tJxpanapa, the government is attempting to use the resettle­
ment program as the basis for a major agricultural development project 
set up to meet national goals. In the early 1950's, the policy environ­
ment was quite different, and the goals were much more modest. The Com­
mission was obliged to compensate the Uazatecs with land in other 
areas. The administration of the relocation process itself was delegated 
to the anthropologists of the National Indian Institute (INI). The pro­
gram vjas designed to minimize the adverse effects of the forced move 
and to help the people adjust their traditional cultural patterns to 
their new conditions, and more generally to the modern world. On balance, 
the effects on the Indians were unfavorable, and the project created a 
precedent which the Chinantecs were very unwilling to follow. On the 
other hand, it gave the Papaloapan Commission detailed experience which 
they have tried to apply to the plan for Uxpanapa.
Although the planning and construction of the Temazcal dam took 
nearly five years, the resettlement program was poorly coordinated, was 
beset with a variety of budgetary and other problems, and was dragged 
out over nearly a decade. Three thousand families, a little over half 
of the original population of the lakebed, were moved into new areas 
under the auspices of the Papaloapan Commission. The rest took care of 
themselves, either by moving up into the mountains or by leaving the 
region. Alfonso Villa Rojas, an anthropologist who was in charge of the 
first stage of the process, was frustrated by the complexity of the task 
and the limited resources which were made available to him (207, p. 37):
One should not be surprised by the discrepancy which one 
almost always finds between the magnificent solidity of 
the physical constructions [of the Papaloapan Commission] 
and the fragility or the total destruction of the social 
organism which they are trying to benefit.
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The Organization of the Move
INI was given less than a year before the dam was completed to 
inform the people of the program, enlist their cooperation, assess the 
value of their property, choose resettlement zones, clear land in the 
new areas, and provide housing and other basic infrastructure,. They 
had to overcome the organized resistance of the mestizo ranchers and 
merchants, and of the Mazatec caciques whose power depended on the 
status quo. During the election campaign of 1952, both national and 
local politicians complicated the issue even further by promising that 
the dam would not, or could not, be built. The Tonto River was the 
axis of the Mazatecs1 world, and many of them simply did not believe 
that any human agency could stop its flow.
Compensation for the value of the property which was flooded was 
very unequally distributed, Ejidatarios were eligible for indemnifi­
cation for their homes, coffee plantations, fruit trees, and other 
immovable personal effects. Private owners were to be paid for their 
land and property. The Commission set a specific budget before the 
evaluations were made. The agrarian authorities set unit prices which 
they felt would adequately cover the losses, but there was not enough 
money to cover the total. The mestizos and the well-connected Mazatecs 
were able to compete successfully for what was available. The cost of 
transportation, the new houses, and other services In the resettlement 
zones was deducted from each account, so that only a few wealthy fami­
lies actually received a cash balance. The process was slow —  by 1964, 
only about three quarters of the total had been paid (36).
The government committed Itself to provide the affected population 
with parcels of land equivalent to what they had lost, or between 10 and 
15 hectares per family. It was originally intended to resettle the peo­
ple in the.area below the dam, which was to be served by an extensive 
irrigation system. A presidential decree was actually issued which ex­
propriated 52,000 hectares for this purpose. Unfortunately, the first 
news of the project precipitated a speculation boom in this land, which 
had previously been isolated and nearly worthless. Investors from out­
side, including some employees of the Commission itself, bought up large 
areas and lobbied successfully against its donation to the Mazatec people. 
Land prices rose all over the lower basin in expectation of the economic 
benefits of the dam and other new public works (19, p, 18).
With a limited budget, the Commission pieced together the necessary 
area. It could not relocate the population as a whole, or even the in­
dividual communities, in one place. It did acquire two portions of the 
original grant: an area in the immediate area of Temazcal, and the ex­
hacienda of Los Naranjos. The State of Oaxaca, anxious not to lose so 
many of its citizens, donated the ex-hacienda of La Joya in an undeveloped 
area near Tuxtepec. To make up the balance, the Commission bought two 
haciendas in an isolated frontier area to the south —  Nuevo Ixcatlan 
(Yogopy) and Cihualtepec (Map 3).
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The project had suddenly become much more complicated than had been 
anticipatedi Instead of being able to use the dam as a focus for a pro­
gram of integrated development, the Commission had to promise to clear 
land, build roads, and provide other basic services in widely scattered 
areas far from the center of its activities. Experience in the develop­
ment of virgin tropical areas was very limited. Rapid surveys were under­
taken from the air, but there was no basis on which to evaluate the re­
sults. Some of the Mazatecs were taken to visit the new zones, but only 
the small areas with relatively good soils near the rivers, which had al­
ready been settled, were accessible. Although the ^©sources were poor, 
the officials of INI did the best they could with what was callable 
(202, p. 137):
!
The extreme scarcity of good agricultural land in the Repub­
lic as a whole led us to think that if the zones ... were at 
least above the national average there was no reason to re­
ject them. To hold out for first class soils appropriate 
for mechanization would have been overly ambitious and utopian.
The Mazatecs, who had been suspicious from the first about the in­
tentions of the outsiders, found their worst fears confirmed. Their an­
cestral land and goods were being expropriated without proper compensation, 
the integrity of their commpnities was being destroyed, and their people 
were being scattered into hostile jungle areas among a mestizo population 
wnich exploited and looked down on them. They turned to their traditions 
for weapons with which to fight back.
In 1954, the dam engineers closed the gates of the completed dam to 
test the system. As the water rose over the fields, the elders and re­
ligious leaders held ceremonies, asking the spirits to sweep away the 
ugly wall which threatened their lands. The next day, their test com­
pleted, the engineers opened the gates and the flood subsided.
By working very hard against an impossible timetable, INI was able 
to move 860 families into the nearest of the zones before the reservoir 
began to fill. Nevertheless, large numbers of people were still in the 
lakebed, in part because the new areas had not been prepared, and in part 
because they had refused to leave. They retreated onto the hills, which 
quickly became islands. The churches were packed with Mazatecs holding 
candles, imploring the saints for aid. The Commission sent out teams in 
launches to rescue the refugees (19, pp. 26-27):
An old Maz-itec owned a series of three'huts running up the side 
of a hill. T-Jhen the water reached che first cabin, he moved his 
animals and belongings into the second and refused any kind of 
help. A few days later, when the water reached the second cabin, 
he moved up into the third, declaring that he would stay there 
“even if the water comes up to my neck.'8 The anthropologists re­
spected his decision, but the next morning, when the launches 
were passing: nearby,they saw the stubborn old man making signals
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wit h a cloth. They approached, and he accepted his rescue. 
"It wasnf t the water that drove me out, but the snakes. My 
son was bitten this morning and is in a bad way. There is 
no way we can get to the culebrero."
The New Communities—'2/
The five resettlement zones were widely scattered and encountered 
distinct problems. A rapid survey of their history will illustrate the 
range of the Papaloapan Commission’s experience with tropical colonization.
Temazcal —  A Social Experiment
Of the new colonies, only the area immediately downstream of the 
dam was fully planned and at least partially established before the flood. 
Nine new villages were built to accommodate 860 families, both Mazatec 
ejidatarios and mestizos. Although no systematic attempt was made to 
change or improve the traditional agricultural technology, it was hoped 
that the paved access road and closer contact with the outside would stim­
ulate development. The Indians were given the same kind of housing and 
services as the gente de razon in separate neighborhoods. Although this 
segregationist policy seems a little naive now, the belief that if people 
could live like equals they would begin to behave like equals was common 
in rural development theory in the 1950’s. After a short period of dis­
orientation, the merchants and caciques quickly re-established their eco­
nomic and political dominance. Some of the Mazatecs have joined cooper­
ative fishing ventures. Although an expected influx of tourists never 
materialized, the general prosperity of the Tierra Blanca region has 
meant that the people who remain live at least as well as the average 
smallholder in the area.
Los Naranjos —  Excessive Paternalism
Los Naranjos, which was intended as a pilot project for a 160,000 
hectare irrigation district which proved impractical, was divided up into 
colonies by the Commission in 1953. In two of these, Oaxaca and Nuevo 
San Jose, a few smallholders from the lakebed were granted ten-hectare 
plots of land. Irrigation water was supplied to a small area for two 
years, but this aspect of the program was abandoned as too costly. Credit 
was provided on a closely supervised basis for the rain-fed production of 
various crops, particularly rice. The costs of an extensive infrastructure
1/ A culebrero is a traditional medicine man who specializes in snake 
bites.
2/ This section is based on interviews and on the following sources: 
Avila (10), Ballesteros (11), Benitez (19), Cisneros (36), McMahon 
(100) , Nelson (146), Poleman (156), and Villa Rojas (207).
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were charged to the campesinos. ' Except for one colony which was allowed 
to work independently, the settlers were forced to accept a high degree 
of control from the Commission's technicians. Machinery was provided on 
a custom basis, and field supervisors directed every step of cultivation. 
There had never been any kind of experimentation in this kind of agricul­
ture in this climate, and there were a series of expensive failures. The 
project itself was not set up as an experiment from which to learn, and 
the colonists had to accept all of the risks.
In 1957, when the Commission's budget for agricultural operations 
was reduced, the colonists received orders to pay the total value of the 
land, the infrastructure, and the past losses within four years. No bank 
was prepared to refinance under these conditions, and many of the people 
were forced to leave.
La Joya —  Insufficient Infrastructure
In 1954, there were already over a thousand families living in the 
La Joya region, occupying most of the good land. When the gates of the 
dam were closed, the water rose more rapidly than had been anticipated, 
and it was necessary to move in 450 families before adequate preparations 
were made. A road was built from Tuxtepec. When the land was cleared, 
it was discovered that the quality of the soil had been seriously over­
estimated. The people were in an acute state of shock; they had been 
hurriedly moved from their ancestral lands into an area which they did 
not like. They felt that they had been deceived about Its quality, and 
that they were not receiving the treatment which they deserved. The 
Commission tried to introduce perennial crops including coffee, natural 
rubber, citrus fruit, and mangos. The settlers did not have the land to 
grow enough maize to feed their families. They were unwilling to give 
over any of it to crops which would only bear in a far off and uncertain 
future. This lack of confidence was compounded when an experimental 
rubber planting died of disease. People from different areas were re­
settled together; they separated into mutually antagonistic groups.
When their budget was reduced in 1960, the Commission and INI aban­
doned all but the most essential services. They stopped maintaining the 
road, which was completely Impassable within.a few months. River trans­
portation was slow and expensive; the people were reduced even further 
to a level of basic subsistence. One of the groups had a stong leader 
who was supported by INI. Without any kind of government assistance, he 
organized the migration of over 30 percent of the colonists to Cihualte- 
pec. The others stayed on, feeling hopelessly abandoned in the.jungle. 
The road was re-opened in the late 1960's, a new sugar mill brought land 
into cultivation, and La Joya finally began to participate in the devel­
opment of the region.
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Nuevo Ixcatlan and Cihaultepec —  The Colonists Lose Their Land
The last of the new communities were located in a heavily forested 
area in the valleys of the Lalana and Trinidad Rivers. American companies 
had taken out precious timber at the beginning of the century, but settle­
ment was limited to narrow bands along the rivers. Twelve thousand Maza- 
tec, Mixe, and Chinantec Indians were relocated in the area between 1954 
and 1967. Most of them came from the upper end of the lakebed. The res­
ervoir took several years to fill, so the move was organized under less 
pressure than in the other cases. The natural environment and the social 
issues involved are quite closely analagous to those which are being faced 
in Uxpanapa today. The experience provides a good example of the kinds 
of problems which the Papaloapan Commission is trying to avoid through 
centralized management and collective organization.
The forest was cleared by the Commission and four sawmills were set 
up to commercialize the timber. Neither the technical control nor the 
markets were available for its efficient utilization; approximately 75 
percent of the potentially valuable wood was wasted. The people were 
paid a daily wage to build their own houses, which provided an income 
until the first harvest.
The land was divided into ten-hectare parcels. Except in small 
areas of alluvial soils, the decline in fertility was very rapid; average 
yields decreased by 50 to 60 percent by the third year after clearing.
From then on, only three to four hectares were planted in each parcel 
and the rest was left in fallow. This was barely sufficient to grow 
enough to eat1. During the same period and in the same zone, colonies 
organized by the agrarian authorities (DAAC) were granted 50 hectares 
per family. Private cattle ranches had to be at least 500 hectares to 
attract buyers. The Commission was obliged to give the Indians an area 
equivalent to what they had lost, but it was unreasonable to expect that 
they would be able to overcome their traditional poverty on such a meager 
resource base.
In recognition of the obvious advantages of a.high-value crop with 
high labor requirements, a credit program for tobacco was introduced.
It requires constant care, specially designed drying sheds, and careful 
timing. The Mazatecs had never grown it before, and the technical assis­
tance was poorly coordinated. There were serious problems with pests.
The Commission promised to build a drying shed, but never finished it.
The leaves did not dry well, the Indians did not know how to separate 
the harvest into different grades, andk the buyers paid the lowest possible 
price for the whole crop.
The Commission also provided credit for rice, which the people had 
grown in tbsir homeland. Vital inputs arrived late, payments were de­
layed, and debts built up. When the colonists tried to sell the crop to 
the local merchants to meet pressing needs, the resident administrator 
blockaded the road to embargo the grain until the credit balance was 
paid. Several other officially-sponsored agricultural programs ran into 
similar problems.
-82-
The mestizo merchants and ranchers quickly re-established the domi­
nant position in the local economy which they had enjoyed in the lakebed.
The anthropologists from INI undertook a number of programs which attemp­
ted to break down racially based roles and systems of exploitation. They 
believed that the problems were built into the culture itself, and pro­
moted changes in the way the Indians lived as the basis for their liber­
ation. Bilingual Mazatec "promotersor "change agents," were trained 
to serve as a bridge between the traditional ways and the modern insti­
tutions. Rather than attempt to transform the culture in one jump, they 
tried to introduce key elements into the indigenous lifestyle, which they 
hoped would lead logically to a new world view and new patterns of behaviorc
The unsuccessful result of one such program is the first thing a 
visitor notices as he enters one of these towns. At one end of each lot 
is a thatched house; at the other is a concrete frame overgrown with weeds 
and vines. The Mazatecs have built their houses according to the same 
basic design for centuries. The anthropologists felt that the floors of 
compacted earth were unsanitary. They also believed that having a dozen 
members of an extended family living in one room led to promiscuity and 
prevented the children from defining themselves as individuals with pro­
ductive roles. As the colonists arrived, INI built skeletons for improved 
housing which consisted of a concrete floor and six posts. They hoped 
that the people would go on from there and modify their traditional pat­
terns to accommodate these and other modern elements.
The Indians ignored the idea, built their houses in the traditional 
manner, and used the concrete platforms to dry maize and barbasco. Inter­
pretations of this phenomenon vary, and pose the question of what aspects 
of the people’s lives were the legitimate concern of the government. The 
mestizos laugh about how the paisanos prefer to live like pigs. The an­
thropologists have discovered that the Mazatecs bury their babies’ umbili­
cal cords in the floor, and feel that some religious value Is involved.
The promoters are acutely embarrassed by the "backwardness" of their peo­
ple. The Indians themselves say that the concrete is cold to sleep on, 
and is actually more difficult to keep clean than well-compacted dirt, 
which is swept and sprinkled every day. In any case, the government spent 
a fair sum of money following an Intellectual concept rather than respect­
ing the priorities of the Mazatecs themselves.
INI set up a store In Nuevo Ixcatlan to sell agricultural inputs, 
foodstuffs, and other necessities at prices below those charged by the 
private merchants, but it could not compete with the private stores. INI 
tried to enforce prohibition, and did not sell beer. The private mer­
chants kept large stocks of liquor under the counter and were always 
willing to make some loans to their compadres until the next harvest.
The official store depended on a cash flow of freely disposable income 
which was simply not there. By purchasing the crops in advance, the mes­
tizos were able to control an economy which operated almost entirely on 
credit. The store belonged to "the government" which had torn the set­
tlers out of their homeland and turned them into strangers in a
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difficult environment. Their experience with official programs was 
overwhelmingly unfavorable,and they felt patronized by the interest in 
’’improving" their culture. Few people paid their bills and the store 
went bankrupt.
As the area developed, cattle operations on a fairly large scale 
were increasingly capitalized and became more profitable. At the same 
time, the fertility of the soil in the ten-hectare grants fell below the 
point where they could support a family. Unless it was fertilized in­
tensively, pasture was the only economic use of the land. The Mazatec 
families did not have the resources to buy either cattle or the inputs 
necessary to maintain crop yields. They began to rent or sell their 
parcels to the ranchers, who were often the same merchants to whom they 
owed money. The ranchers owned large tracts of uncleared land which 
they turned around and rented to the colonists. The campesinos would 
clear plots, plant their crops, and reap the benefits of the first flush 
of fertility. After a few years, these areas would in turn be planted 
with pasture. The cycle continued as long as suitable and accessible 
land was available.
This sequence — - the clearing of virgin forest, the cultivation of 
crops for a few years to take advantage of residual fertility, and the 
establishment of permanent pasture has been repeated countless times
throughout the tropical world. It is the path of least resistance, and 
has undermined the goal of the project, which was to provide the people 
displaced by the dam with a permanent source of income on land of their 
own.
The municipal President of Cihualtepec estimated in 1977 that over 
70 percent of the original colonists had no land at all. Their alter­
natives were so limited that very few of them had left. They survived by 
taking jobs as day laborers on the ranches when there was work, and by 
eking very small yields out of subsistence plots. The government tried 
to organize a collective credit system in the 1970’s, but the basis for 
a program of this kind had already been eroded away. Only five small 
groups in peripheral areas had been organized by 1977. The gente de 
razon had acquired control over almost all of the profit-generating re­
sources in the area: the land, the cattle, the transportation system, 
credit, and marketing.
The government’s investment in roads and other infrastructure was 
successful in opening a frontier area to economic activity. Between 1954 
and the late 1960’s, the population rose from 3,000 to 18,000 and the area 
in production rose from 25,000 to 150,000 hectares. The major paved road 
from Tuxpepec to Palomares, which runs through both zones and was com­
pleted in 1976, will certainly encourage increasing economic activity in 
the future. It could be argued that ranching is really the most appropri­
ate use for the land in this ecological zone, but the social purpose of 
the project has failed.
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The Anti-Cerro de Pro Movement
Unlike the Mazatecs 25 years before, the Chinantecs of the Ojitlan 
area were very aware of the impact which the construction of the Cerro 
de Oro dam would be likely to have on their lives. The Temazcal reser­
voir is clearly visible from the main square of the town. Ixcatlan, 
which survived the previous project as a lakeside town with a greatly 
reduced economic base, has been in many ways a sister community for cen­
turies. The two peoples do not understand each other's language and sel­
dom inter-marry, although they have lived very closely together. Some 
Chinantecs were affected by the previous project, and some Mazatecs are 
being affected by this one. The story of the resettlement projects was 
well known.
The Regional Conflict
The Cerro de Oro project is an integral part of the flood control 
plan which was first formulated in 1948. Since then, almost every one 
of the Papaloapan Commission's administrators has made new studies and 
sought in vain to get national support for its construction. When the 
process was re-initiated in 1972, a coalition of interests which opposed 
the dam had every reason to believe that an organized response tfould again 
lead to its indefinite postponement.
Opposition to the project had been a key point in every local election 
campaign for almost a generation. We have seen that considerable, though 
poorly distributed, development had taken place during this period. The 
groups which had benefited from the process wielded economic and politi­
cal power, and were allied with their counterparts in Tuxtepec and Oaxaca. 
The Chinantecs had no interest in being forced into a new situation over 
which they would have no control. Their experience with the government 
consisted of a long series of unfulfilled promises and projects which had 
only benefited a minority.
The line between the states of Oaxaca and Veracruz marks the transi­
tion between the foothills of the mountains and the coastal plain along 
much of its length. Both Temazcal and Cerro de Oro are less than 20 kilo­
meters from the boundary. The first dam was designed to prevent flooding 
in the lowlands and most of the Commission's subsequent investments were 
made in Veracruz. Oaxaca is a poor, mountainous state where the Indian 
cultures predominate. One of the few areas which has produced a signifi­
cant agricultural surplus is the small tropical lowland zone around Tux­
tepec, where the prosperous mestizo ranchers share strong family ties and 
are an important political force. The Federal government proposed to flood 
another fertile valley in Oaxaca to protect the coastal plain. Although 
there would be some local benefits, this sacrifice would fundamentally 
favor the same interests across the state line which had profited from the 
Temazcal project.
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The three groups —  the Indians who feared that they would suffer 
the same fate as the Mazatecs, the commercial elite whose income and 
position depended on the status quo, and the land-owning elite who feared 
that their interests would be sacrificed to benefit another region —  
formed a powerful coalition. President Echevarria visited Tlacotalpan 
and Tuxtepec in March 1972 as part of his concentration on the impover­
ished South during the "Year of Juarez.*’ When he announced that the dam 
would finally be built, he was faced with organized and broadly based 
opposition, which is unusual in Mexico and was played up in the Mexico 
City press. The National Confederation of Campesinos (CNC) organized 
an anti-dam committee, supported by such diverse groups as the Cattle 
Associations, the Association of Private Landholders, the Cane Growers 
Association of the local sugar mill, the Chamber of Commerce, and the 
Lion’s Club (95).
The New Emphasis on Oaxaca
The former governor of Oaxaca and Minister of Education, Victor 
Bravo, is a member of Tuxtepec's land-owning and commercial elite. Jorge 
Tamayo, a distinguished Oaxacan geographer, was soon named head of the 
Papaloapan Commission and the Tuxtepec Paper Factory, the area’s most 
important industry. Echeverria appointed both of them to a Special Study 
Commission, which recommended that Federal investment priorities in the 
Papaloapan Basin be reoriented towards the Oaxacan portion to break down 
the local objections to the project (23). The executive decree which 
authorized the construction of the Cerro de Oro dam included programs 
for new roads, electricity, water systems, schools, hospitals, church 
renovations, and forestry and agricultural projects in the upper basin, 
including the area to be flooded (Appendix A). A large delegation of 
Chinantecs was invited to the presidential palace in Mexico City, where 
Echeverria personally assured them that they would be paid generous in­
demnification, and that they would receive free land and comprehensive 
services in whatever area they themselves chose for their resettlement. 
The whole effort was an expensive, but effective, solution to the poli­
tical problem. It was also consistent with the general policies of 
Echeverria*s administration, which was attempting to decentralize Federal 
investments and to promote a more equitable distribution of income, par­
ticularly in depressed rural areas such as Oaxaca.
Political and Emotional Turmoil
As the dam project came closer and closer to becoming a reality, 
the people of the Santo Domingo Valley went through a period of severe 
political and emotional turmoil. The political and economic structure 
was called Into doubt, and a culture which had developed in the area 
over a millenium underwent a serious shock. The local chapters of the 
official national party (PRI) and the National Confederation of Campesinos
- 8 6 -
(CNC) had backed the wrong horse. The}7 had long enjoyed unopposed power, 
and had rotated the various offices among the members of a small elite.
In the municipal elections of 1972, they were faced with a strong oppo­
sition running on a pro-dam platform under the auspices of a minor party 
(PARM). This group consisted both of people who believed that they x^ ould 
get a better deal by supporting the new policy, and of the political “outs” 
who saw a chance to gain power at a moment when a large influx of money 
from the outside was obviously on the way. The PRI doesn’t lose many elec­
tions, and they didn't lose this one* Convinced that the ballot boxes had 
been stuffed, the FARM candidates occupied the town hall. Their claim was 
recognized by the State with remarkable speed, and they took office.
The CNC was founded under Cardenas’ administration, and represents 
the overwhelming majority of the ejldatarios in Mexico. Along with the 
industrial labor and civil service sectors, it is one of the three con­
stituent elements of the PRI party. It does not represent the campesinos 
as an independent bargaining unit, but serves as the medium through which 
they are integrated into the monolithic structure of national political 
power. In Ojitlan, an overwhelmingly ejidal municipio, the local chapter 
amalgamated the interests of the mestizo and Chinantec elites. They now 
found their position challenged by a small, much more radically oriented 
campesino organization which had been founded only ten years before, the 
Union of Independent Campesinos (CCI) (66). The serious divisions which 
have developed in the ejidos as a result of the dam project have been 
polarized into a conflict between these two groups.
An emotional religious movement swept through the Chinantec communi­
ties in 1972. The Virgin of Guadalupe, Mexico’s patron, appeared in a 
cave to a campesino who was walking by himself in the hills (130):
My son, do not be afraid! I am the Virgin of Guadalupe,
Mother of all the Mexicans and Queen of America. I have 
come to protect you all against the Cerro de Oro project, 
because I do not want you to suffer as my children the 
Mazatecs have suffered.
The story follows the original 16th Century miracle very closely. The 
Virgin asked the man to bring the Municipal President to speak with her, 
but he refused to come. In spite of a long standing taboo against enter­
ing caves, hundreds of pilgrims made their way to the site, to light can­
dles and offer their prayers. A few months later, an angel who identified 
himself as God’s personal engineer came to assure them that the dam was a 
technical impossibility (14, p. 6).
The government was faced with what was very obviously a difficult 
situation. A path through the different factions had to be chosen with 
great care. The project received the unqualified support of the Governor 
of Oaxaca and the Minister of Hydraulic Resources. INI was largely ex­
cluded from the process because of a variety of conflicts with the Papa- 
loapan Commission which had arisen in the course of the Temazcal resettle­
ment program. A group of social scientists was hired by a specially created
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Human Relations Commission to bridge the gap between the government and 
the Chlnantecs.
The years 1972 and 1973 were confused and difficult. The future was 
uncertain, the people were divided into a number of antagonistic groups, 
and emotions were running very high. Many of the social scientists who 
were in constant contact with the campesinos were shocked both by the 
degree of local exploitation and by what they saw as the heavy hand of 
the government. Many of their reports were critical both of the dam 
project itself and of the means which the Federal authorities were using 
to impose it on the Indian people. One of the very strongest statements 
was written by a pair of anthropologists and published in Europe (14, p.3)
The aim of this report is to call attention to a program of 
ethnocide which is being applied to ethnic minorities in 
Mexico as part of a program of capitalist development being 
carried out ... through regional development agencies. The 
aim is the incorporation of the Indians into the national 
capitalist system of production and consumption [through] 
the elimination of their economic semi-independence and 
cultural identity ... to incorporate the Indian into a 
rural proletariat.
Other reports were more moderate, but they did try to open up a 
dialogue in the cities of Oaxaca and Mexico over the appropriate balance 
between national, development goals and the rights of the Indian minorities 
The Papaloapan Commission became very defensive, and increasingly central­
ized the administration of the project into the hands of its own technical 
staff. Gonzalo Aguirre Beltran, an anthropologist and distinguished elder 
statesman of Indian affairs in Mexico, was outraged by what he sax-7 as a 
rising tide of irresponsible radicalism (4).
The reaction is understandable given the background of the people 
involved, but it marks the beginning of a fortress mentality which has 
characterized the program. Although a great deal of information on the 
economic, social,and cultural structure of the Chlnantecs was gathered 
in this period, there has been almost no input by anyone trained in the 
social sciences since. Almost all the energy has been put into the phys­
ical construction of the visible elements of the project. The program is 
set up to give a very large number of real benefits to the Indians. These 
benefits are conceived, designed, and administered by technically trained 
people organized in a rigid hierarchy. As we shall see, the lack of 
emphasis on the more subtle social processes and the lack of consultation 
with the Chlnantecs themselves have resulted in increasingly serious 
problems.
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The Selection of Uxpanapa
The public works program for the upper basin effectively divided 
the broad coalition of regional interests which had opposed the dam. 
Nevertheless, various groups and factions of Chinantecs continued to 
send petitions to Mexico City, demanding that their rights be respected.
They were personally assured by Echeverria that each family would be 
provided with twenty hectares of good land served by an extensive in­
frastructure. A resettlement committee was organized in Ojitlan in 1973 
to coordinate the program. The problems involved in finding 80,000 hec­
tares suitable for agriculture which were not already in use were even 
more complex than they had been when the Papaloapan Commission faced ex­
actly the same problem in 1953. Most of the frontier had been settled.
Some of the area immediately surrounding the new reservoir was available. 
Although it formed part of the traditional homeland, most of the good ag­
ricultural land was to be flooded. Only a small portion of the affected 
population would be able to make a living there with cattle, tree crops, 
and fishing cooperatives.
Delegations of Chinantecs were chosen to visit potential sites in 
other areas. Several zones in Oaxaca on the eastern slope of the moun­
tains were considered, particularly an area near the old resettlement 
zone of Cihualtepec. These lands were only appropriate for extensive 
ranching, and the people expressed a very strong preference for continuing 
as farmers. The search moved outside of the Commission's jurisdiction, tc 
the wild and isolated mountains in the municipio of Santa Maria Chiraalapa 
in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. This area is the home of 700 Zoque fami­
lies , who have maintained continuous communal ownership of an area of
400,000 hectares since before the Spanish conquest. Most of the land is 
too steep even for cattle, but the exploratory investigations led to what 
looked like a very good area immediately across the Veracruz state line 
to the north —  Uxpanapa.
The government had intended to respect the Chinantecs' desire to stay 
in Oaxaca and use the resettlement project as an opportunity to develop 
another area of the state. Uxpanapa, however, was by far the best alter­
native which they found. The climate is similar to that of Ojitlan. The 
area was almost entirely covered with virgin tropical rain forest. It had 
been divided into ejidos in the 1960's , but very few campesinos had actu­
ally taken possession, so the land was already under Federal jurisdiction. 
The population living in an area of 260,000 hectares was under 2,000 at 
the time. There were no access roads, but the road from Tuxtepec to Pal- 
omares, directly linking Ojitlan and the entrance to Uxpanapa, was already 
under construction.
The Commission could not justify the enormous investments involved 
in developing such an isolated virgin area only to give several thousand 
families a place to live. They formulated plans to open up Uxpanapa for 
intensive agricultural production to meet the Increasing needs of the nation
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and to serve as a model for developing over six million hectares of 
tropical rain forest in the Southeast. After several months of study, 
the area was officially designated as a Drainage District for resettle­
ment under the administration of the Papaloapan Commission (143).
Of the 51 ejidos in the future Cerro de Oro reservoir, 36 will be 
completely flooded and 14 will be compensated for part of their land. 
Although Uxpanapa was strongly favored, the Chinantecs were presented 
with three other options. Part of the same Los Naranjos district which 
had been unsuccessfully promoted in the 1950fs was to be provided with 
irrigation, housing and other infrastructure. A small number of vacan­
cies in the ejidos on the periphery of the reservoir were available. The 
region near Cihaultepec was also offered, but given the experience of the 
earlier colony and the inferior quality of the soils, it is not surprising 
that it was not accepted by anyone. Each family was offered ten irrigated 
hectares or twenty hectares in the rain-fed zones. The Commission pro­
vided transportation for all of the. household heads to visit the areas 
and make their own decisions.
Some were taken to Uxpanapa by helicopter. The vegetation was so 
dense that in many cases a man was lowered on a rope to cut out a landing 
space with his machete. The majority were taken up the rivers in launches
Camps were set up at the existing settlement of Hermanos Cedillo and 
on the Uxpanapa River. Groups would spend a week or more exploring, hunt­
ing, and evaluating the land as best they could. Many men were hired by 
the Commission to work on the clearing and the construction. Both the 
topography and the climate of the zone are highly variable, and the dense 
forest cover allowed only a superficial analysis (129).
Meetings were held in each of the ejidos, and the resettlement zones 
were chosen by majority vote. Almost all of them were bitterly divided. 
The members of the CNC were still basically opposed to the project. They 
argued that Uxpanapa was far away in another state and completely unde­
veloped. The people would be totally at the mercy of the government, 
which they did not trust. It is not easy to generalize about the social 
composition of this faction, but it tended to include the people who had , 
been relatively powerful under the old system and their dependent groups, 
as well as conservative Indians who did not want the Chinantec traditions 
and customs to be lost. If they could not stop the project, they insisted 
on the Los Naranjos zone because it was closer to civilization. Given 
the earlier history of that project, its future prosperity seems doubtful, 
but they felt that it would give the settlers greater flexibility. For a 
variety of reasons which will be discussed at length, the Commission in­
sisted that Uxpanapa be organized into collective ejidos, or cooperative 
production units. Although each family was given rights to 20 hectares, 
the land in each ejido was in fact combined Into a single unit. Almost 
everybody would have preferred the individual'assignment of parcels, and 
this became a key point in the c[position.
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The ,CCI has worked very closely with the Commission, The national 
organization is strongly committed to the concept of collective ejidos. 
This group organized the people who liked Uxpanapa and who felt that by 
supporting the government program they would be able to insist on all 
of the services which they had been promised.
It should be remembered that the majority of the population was 
illiterate and that many could not speak Spanish. The Commission made 
a tremendous effort to observe democratic procedures, but the politics 
of the situation were dominated by a limited number of leaders in the 
various factions. Most of the Chinantecs accepted the reality of gov­
ernment power and sought to make the best of it.
When the votes were taken, the results were as follows (129) : 
Resettlement Zone Number of Ejidos Number of Families
Uxpanapa 28 2,796
Los Naranjos 9 946
Peripheral Area 14 N.D.
Choapan (near Cihualtepec) 0 0
These figures include all men over 16 years old at the time of the special 
census, whether or not they had previously held ejidal rights. The future 
status of the minorities in each ejido is still unclear. Many of them 
will probably eventually accept what they are being offered. At least 
one group has independently organized a move into an area in the state of 
Chiapas. Some individuals have taken their indemnification and have moved 
into Tuxtepec or to other areas.
The agrarian authorities assigned the people into the vacant places in 
the existing ejidos in Uxpanapa (Appendix Table 6). The move was organized 
in stages, to allow time for the construction of the new towns.and other 
facilities in the resettlement zones. The campesinos retained the right 
to continue to live in the lakebed and cultivate their lands until they 
were actually flooded. Private land-owners were indemnified in cash after 
all the ejidatarios were paid. Most of the mestizo merchants lived In the 
town of Ojitlan, which will not be flooded. The comprehensive plan for 
Uxpanapa discourages them from moving into the new area and re-establish­
ing their control over the economy of the Chinantecs.
Indemnification
Both the Chinantecs and the Commission were very aware of the in­
equities and problems which had accompanied the indemnification process 
in the Temazcal program. The government undertook a careful and expensive 
program to insure that the evaluations would be complete and fair, even 
if it meant paying more .dan the market value of many items. One hundred
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bilingual inspectors were hired. They worked in the ejidos in pairs.
One would write down the value of each house, fruit tree, coffee bush, 
meter of wire, and so forth, while the other would mark each object 
with red paint, A chief inspector would later verify the evaluations, 
and any discrepancy was carefully checked. An individual inventory was 
drawn up for each campesino, which he would sign or mark in the presence 
of witnesses. Communal property of the ejidos, such as schools, basket­
ball courts, and assembly buildings, were evaluated in the presence of 
the local authorities. Along with the indemnification for the land, 
which was valued with standard tables according to quality, these funds 
were credited to the ejidos* accounts in a national financial agency 
(FONAFE). This money'was to be drawn out for capital improvements and 
community services in the resettlement zones once certain criteria were 
met. A check for the amount of his personal property was given to each 
campesino.
Twelve of the ejidos were paid in 1975, three more in 1977, and 
the balance in 1978. The payments were distributed as follows (118):
Category 3/Amount—  (pesos)
Land
Common Ejidal Property 
School Property 
Personal Property
87,056,500
2,954,300
5,305,600
133,062,600
Total 228,378,000
These figures have been adjusted somewhat since the original evaluations 
were made. The indemnification has reflected the distribution of wealth 
in the community, and was skewed to the high end. Richer campesinos have 
had their assets liquidated for them, and have bought trucks or gone into 
business. As in the Temazcal program, individuals with extensive coffee 
plantations have received the highest payments. All bushes were valued 
at a flat 80 pesos, regardless of their quality.
Free transportation to the resettlement zones was provided for the 
people and for their movable personal property such as household goods 
and domestic animals. It is remarkable how little most of them owned.
A typical inventory consisted of two sheets of corrugated zinc, two dozen 
boards, a table, three chairs, two cots, a picture of the Virgin, four 
pigs, two turkeys, twenty chickens, a dog, and three bundles of clothes 
and cooking utensils. Since they are only allowed one trip and many of 
them are maintaining two households during the transitional period, many 
families have transported their goods at their own expense.
3/The average price paid for land was 3,600 pesos per hectare, or between 
65 and 115 dollars per acre depending on whether one uses the pre- or 
post-1976 exchange rate. The average payment for personal property was
33,000 pesos, or between 1500 and 2600 dollars.
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The employees of the Commission who have worked in 0jitlan deserve 
credit for having administered a fair and orderly procedure. They moved 
into a chaotic situation and earned the respect of most of the Chinantecs. 
Their daily work consisted of an endless series of petty details; the or­
ganization of trips to Uxpanapa, a pig left behind, rumors that the in­
demnification would never be paid, and conflicts over wages. At least in 
its early stages, the program had an ample budget. The delay in the con­
struction of the dam gave them much more time than was available in Tem- 
azcal. This stage of the project was pretty well over by 1976; the center 
of gravity had shifted to Uxpanapa itself.
CHAPTER VI
UXPANAPA: THE NEW LAND
The Isthmus of Tehuantepec
Uxpanapa is located squarely in the middle of the Isthmus of 
Tehuantepec, a 125 mile wide neck of land which marks the natural tran- 
sition between North and Central America. The great spine of mountains 
which runs the length of the continent breaks into lower hills and nar­
row passes which, since the days of Cortes, have excited interest as a 
means of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Its 
northern half lies in the state of Veracruz, and is a rolling tropical 
plain of dense forests and extensive swamps. The Chimalapa mountains 
in the center, whose highest ridges rise 1,000 meters above sea level, 
are so wild and inhospitable that no one has ever challenged the rights 
of the native Zoque Indians since Colonial times. On the leeward side, 
the lowlands of the Pacific plain in Oaxaca are arid, covered with thorny 
bushes, and buffeted by winds of such force that they sometimes blow 
trailer trucks off the Pan American Highway. The towns of Tehuantepec 
and Juchitan are the cultural centers of the enterprising Zapotecs. A 
series of lagoons along the coast are the home of the Huaves, one of the 
poorest and most isolated native peoples in the country. The Mixes live 
in the mountains to the West.
Until recently, the Isthmus was more of a barrier than a connection, 
dividing the two seas and the southern states of Chiapas, Tabasco, and 
the Yucatan Peninsula from the rest of Mexico. The Uxpanapa resettlement 
zone occupies the same relative position along the foothills of the upper 
Gulf slope as Ojitlan, but it has never supported a permanent Indian pop­
ulation and has long been one of the most isolated areas in the region.
History —
The history of the Isthmus has been closely linked with a bewildering 
variety of plans and projects to build a permanent link between the oceans. 
Within a year of the conquest, Cortes sent Gonzalo de Sandoval, the con­
queror of Tuxtepec, to explore the Coatzacoalcos River. He hoped to find 
a navigable strait which, as he wrote to his king, "is the thing I wish 
to meet with more than anything else in the world, for the great service 
which Your Majesty would derive" (quoted in 44, p. 163). A direct water
1/ The next two sections are drawn from the follov?ing sources: Brissot 
(24), Carrasco (26), Casteneda (28), Covarrubias (44), Del Corral (46), 
Glick (65), Von Humboldt (85), Iglesias (86), McBride (98), Ortiz de 
Ayala (148), Ortiz Wadgymar (149), Pepper (154), Revel-Mouroz (166), 
and Siemans (185).
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MAP 5. THE ISTHMUS OF TEHUANTEPEC IN THE 18th CENTURY
This map, by Alexander von Humboldt, is based on a survey which was 
made in 1774. The Uxpanapa project is located in the white area in the 
center, which is indicated as "mountains and forests with abundant 
stands of Cedrela odarata (tropical cedar), which were formerly cut 
for the shipyards of the Royal Navy in Havana."
Source: Alexander von Humboldt, Political Essay on the Kingdom
of New Spain (London, 1811).
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route does not exist, of course, but a port was established at Espiritu 
Santo across the river from the modern city of Hinatitlan. Goods were 
shipped up the river to Utlatepec, near Serabia, from whence they were 
taken overland to Tehuantepec. Materials to build the fleet in which 
Cortes explored California were transported in this way. The route did 
not last long. Diseases and attacks by English pirates drove out the 
Spanish, and the Crown restricted all trade to the more easily defended 
ports of Acapulco and Veracruz.
In the 18th Century, the Tarifa Valley, as the Uxpanapa region was 
then called, was used as a source of timber for the Royal Shipyards in 
Cuba. This trade awakened new interest in a transcontinental route.
The Isthmus was carefully surveyed in 1774 (Map 5). In 1808, Alexander 
von Humboldt suggested that a canal, or at least a permanent road, would 
provide tremendous benefits to the country, but nothing was done (85, vol. 
4, pp. 19-27).
After independence, various attempts were made to get a project 
underway and to encourage the colonization of the region. In 1823, a 
separate province of Tehuantepec was established. A general issue of 
free lands in ten-acre plots to war veterans was ordered, but there were 
few takers (98, p. 90). In 1825 an official named Tadeo Ortiz explored 
the Isthmus. As the rivers on the Pacific slope are not large enough to 
carry boats of any size, he suggested that a permanent road be built from 
Tehuantepec through the Tarifa pass to a port on the upper Coatzacoalcos, 
He was impressed by the potential of the Uxpanapa area (148, p. 131);
The interior plains are covered with dense forest and 
are infested with fevers and diseases, as are all unpop­
ulated regions. Once cleared, however, this area would 
be suitable for the establishment of colonies. Their 
produce could easily he transported to market over the 
several rivers which feed the Coatzacoalcos.
He organized a group of French families in 1829 to open the jungle 
to foreign settlement. They established coffee plantations on the banks 
of both the Coatzacoalcos and the Uxpanapa Rivers which were still there 
65 years later (178, p. 366), but the experiment did not last long. Their 
numbers decimated by accidents on the rivers, diseases, and suicide, the 
unfortunate Europeans returned home after only 3 years. Attempts to col­
onize the upper portions of the basin have continued sporadically for one 
hundred and fifty years.
In 1842, President Santa Ana granted a band 300 miles wide from sea 
to sea to an adventurer named Jose de Garay as a personal concession. He 
used the generous government subsidies to visit European capitals and pro­
moted the idea of a sea-level canal. During the Mexican Mar, the United 
States government attempted to acquire the concession for itself, but 
eventually dropped the claim. This initiated a series of speculative, 
diplomatic, and political manoeuvers which prevented organized development
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and put a constant drain on the national treasury for 65 years. Projects 
ranged from a fantastic canal which would run through a tunnel to an ab­
surd triple-tracked railroad on which fully loaded steamers would be 
carrie^ on giant wheeled dry-docks. As ships grew larger, it became 
clear that it would be impossible to build a canal at reasonable cost.
No fewer, than eight different concessions were granted to foreign 
contractors to build a railroad and port facilities at either end. The 
job was finally completed in 1907 by Sir Weetman Pearson, a British engi­
neer who had previously overseen the drainage of the Valley of Mexico and 
who founded the first oil company in Mexico. A total of over 40 million 
dollars was spent on the project, most of which went into the pockets of 
speculators and corrupt government officials. The line was very success­
ful for several years. The combined sea-land route was cheaper than the 
transcontinental railroad between San Francisco and New York, and carried 
large quantities of sugar between Hawaii and the eastern seaboard of the 
United States. As many as 20 trains a day ran in each direction.. The 
opening of the Panama Canal in 1914 and the disturbances of the revo­
lutionary period caused a precipitous decline in traffic, and the rail­
road has never made money since. The highway which runs parallel to the 
line was built in 1946.
Most of the tropical forest in the northern Isthmus including 
Uxpanapa, was divided up into corporate holdings as railroad grants,
1883 law survey companies (companias deslindadores), and timber con­
cessions in the late 19th Century. Sir Weetman Pearson, the railroad 
contractor, and Jose Yves Limantour, President Diaz's Minister of the 
Treasury, controlled thousands of hectares each. Other Important grants 
were awarded to the Mexico City merchant house of Sanborn's and to vari­
ous American corporations including William R. Hearst & Co. In theory, 
these grantees were supposed to survey the land and encourage settlement 
by smallholders. The experience of the American West in the past cen­
tury might suggest that the construction of the railroad would have led 
to the clearing and colonization of the surrounding territory. In fact, 
however, the corporations held onto f.heir land, both to exploit the re­
serves of mahogany and other precious woods, and on the unfounded expec­
tation that the commercial success of the line would greatly increase the 
value of their holdings (166).
The expansion of working haciendas was confined to the already 
settled zones near the coast of Veracruz and In Oaxaca. Before and during 
the revolutionary period, there were serious outbreaks of violence be­
tween the cattlemen and the Indian communities in the area between Aca'- 
yucan and Santiago Tuxtla. The local mestizo elite has been powerful 
enough to maintain much of the good land In private hands down to the 
present day (186).
The holdings of the absentee corporations in frontier regions re­
verted to the Federal government during the revolutionary period. Uxpanapa 
was so isolated from population and commercial centers that not until the
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late 1960’s was the land formally redistributed to prevent a new wave 
of private speculation*, Even then, most of the campesinos who were grant­
ed rights in the new ejidos were unable to take possession of their iso­
lated grants.
Patterns of Recent Development
Even though large areas have remained almost entirely uninhabited, 
the northern half of the Isthmus has experienced rapid economic growth 
in the past 40 years. The band of oil fields and petrochemical plants 
between Minatitlan, Veracruz and Ciudad Peraex, Chiapas is the center of 
the Mexican petroleum industry, and produces oil, gas, and a variety of 
chemical products including fertilizers. Pipelines cross the Isthmus 
and link it with the rest of the country. Including facilities still under 
construction, the hydroelectric and thermal generating capacity of the re­
gion is over two million kilowatts (106, p. 29). Crude oil reserves were 
estimated at between 50 and 300 billion barrels in 1978 (94). This re­
source, in addition to sulphur, phosphate, and other mineral deposits, 
guarantees continued industrial expansion.
This enclave of highly specialized, high-technology industry has 
not encouraged the balanced development of the Isthmus as a whole. Most 
of the jobs that have been created have been filled by professionals and 
skilled workers from other parts of the country. An estimated 87,000 
people moved into the region In the 1960’s, 75 percent of them to the 
industrial centers. The average annual population increase of seven per­
cent was one of the highest in Mexico (134). These immigrants receive 
good wages and enjoy a comfortable standard of living. They consume high- 
value foods and goods from other regions and from abroad, as Coatzacoalcos 
is a free port. Local agricultural production has not been stimulated.
The Illiterate, unskilled campesinos cannot find work in industry, and 
inflation is constantly pushing up their cost of living.
Over a third of the Coatzacoalcos basin Is still virgin rain forest. 
Productive commercial agriculture is limited to a few modern cattle ranches 
and specialized enterprises in the Acayucan area. The transition between 
the most developed and one of the least developed areas of the Southeast 
is abrupt. Hidalgotitlan, the seat of a 1700 square kilometer municipio, 
is only 30 kilometers up river from the modern boom town of Minatitlan.
It has a population of 2000, no running water, few other services, and 
is not accessible by road in the rainy season (204). The forests to the 
south, including Uxpanapa, have been coming under increasing pressure.
The construction of new roads, the distribution of land in ejidos, the 
eradication of malaria, and colonization projects of several kinds are 
extending the area under cultivation. Poor transportation, the lack of 
well-organized markets, conflicts over tenure rights, and a variety of 
other problems have prevented orderly development. Subsistence-oriented 
agriculture based on slash-and-burn techniques and extensive, poorly 
managed cattle operations are expanding rapidly.
The Rain Forest
The 2.5 billion hectares of rain forest which remain in the world 
are rapidly being cleared (49). The FAO has estimated that two million 
hectares are deforested each year in Latin America alone (146, p. 9). 
Unlike temperate forests, which are composed of a relatively small number 
of broadly adapted species, a single hectare of rain forest supports be­
tween 50 and 200 different species of trees, plus hundreds of smaller 
plants, animals, and insects, each one of which is adapted to a very 
specific ecological niche. Many cannbt survive or reproduce themselves 
once large areas have been cleared and the delicate natural balance has 
been altered (69). Many species will inevitably become extinct as the 
pressures of development push back the frontier all over the tropical 
world. Concern over the future of the global environment has become 
increasingly focused on this issue in the past decade,2/ Some scientists 
have predicted devastating climatic changes, the disruption of the Earth's 
oxygen cycle, and a serious reduction in the gene pool on which future 
evolution depends if this process is not stopped (170, p. 59):
... the rain forest is retreating. The destruction in modern 
times of a forest that is millions of years old is a major 
event in the Earth's history. It is larger in scale than the 
clearing of the forests of temperate Eurasia and America, and 
will be accomplished in a much shorter time.
Uxpanapa is part of one of the largest remaining rain forests in 
Mexico. The resettlement program has excited a public controversy be­
tween the Papaloapan Commission and a group of ecologists over how this 
resource should be managed. The Commission, Its critics, and the Chin- 
antecs themselves are all very aware that many colonization projects in 
similar regions have wasted irreplaceable resources without achieving 
their economic or social goals. The government is committed to the 
policies of increasing agricultural production in rain-fed areas, creating 
sources of rural, employment to stem the tide of migration to the cities, 
and promoting regional development. The Uxpanapa project 13 an attempt 
to use the resources of the tropical environment to meet these goals. It 
will have lasting effects, not only on the Chinantec people, but also on 
the future-development of the forest frontier in the Southeast.
Geology and Climate
The Federal Drainage District of Uxpanapa is located just north of 
the 17th parallel in a depression which runs from west to east along the 
foothills of the Chimalapa mountains. Separated from the plains to the
2/ Some recent publications are: Dasman, Milton, and Freeman (45), IUCNNR 
(89), and Pearson and Pryor (153).
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north by a low range of hills, it is 75 kilometers long by 35 wide, and 
covers an area of 260,000 hectares. The bed rock consists of marine 
sediments and is predominantly dolomitic limestone. This material wea­
thers rapidly and is highly permeable. Apart from the six rivers which 
cross the zone on their way from the mountains to the Coatzacoalcos and 
a few brooks, surface water is limited to natural cisterns, called cenotes. 
Recent deposits of gravel and silt have built up along the margins of the 
rivers.
The topography is irregular, ranging from a nearly level central 
strip to steep hills and frequent limestone outcroppings. Altitude 
varies between 100 and 150 meters above sea level. Sixty percent of 
the land is on a slope greater than 15 percent, which is too steep for 
agricultural use without serious danger of erosion.
Precipitation varies considerably over short distances, depending 
on the elevation and the orientation of the hills to the prevailing winds, 
and is greatest at the eastern end. Annual rainfall varies between 3,000 
and 4,000 millimeters (120-160 inches). There is a four-month relatively 
dry season between February and Hay when 10-15 percent of the rain falls 
(Chart 11).
Average monthly temperatures range between 21 and 29 degrees centi­
grade, with highs of 40° in the dry season and lows of 10° in the winter.
Relative humidity is very high during the entire year, averaging 
70 percent in May and over 90 percent in November. Over two-thirds of 
the days are cloudy. The Isthmus of Tehuantepec is subject to complex 
wind patterns. The prevailing northeasterly tradewinds bring moist air 
in from the Gulf during the rainy season. Strong, cool winds from the 
north, called nortes, blow in the winter months.
Weather stations have been established too recently to provide de­
tailed information on the long-term climatic patterns. Data from three 
of the new stations are summarized in Appendices 7, 8, and 9. According 
to the Koeppen system as modified by Garcia for Mexico, most of the region 
can be classified as Af (i') g. 3/
Vegetation
Uxpanapa supports a tremendous variety of plants. In a preliminary 
study, nearly 500 species were counted in a randomly chosen circle with
3/ This is a hot, humid climate, where the mean temperature in the coldest 
month is above 18° C., more than 10% of the annual rain falls in the 
winter, more than 60 mm of rain falls in the driest month, variation 
between mean monthly temperatures is between five and seven, and the 
hottest month of the year comes before June. Portions can be classi­
fied as AM(f)(i') g, which means that there is less rain in the rainy 
season. According to the Thornwaite system, most of the area can be 
classified as ArA’ a.
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a radius of 15 kilometers (25). The variations in climate and soil type 
are reflected in the composition of the forest. Portions of the area 
have been cleared over the years, some of.them repeatedly, so the exist­
ing jungle is a mixture of climax and secpndary associations. The vege-, 
tation has been classified into five broad groups (52, 69).
Tall Evergreen Forest
The most common association is the classic three-tiered hardwood 
forest which is found on deep, well-drained soils, both in flat areas and 
on hills. The highest trees are 25 to 40 meters tall, the middle level 12 
to 25, and the lowest 5 to 10. Because, the nutrients are concentrated in 
the top layer of the soil, even very large trees put out most of their 
roots horizontally, and many, have developed braces and buttresses to sup-; 
port themselves. A wide variety of vines, epiphytes, and other small 
plants find niches at various levels within the system where they can 
compete for air, light, and water.
Tall, Semi-deciduous Forest
This association shares many species with the first and is similar 
in its structure, but 20 to 50 percent of the trees shed their leaves 
during the dry season to prevent excessive transpiration and dehydration. 
It is found on the limestone out-croppings and in other areas with shal­
lower, less fertile soils with £ lower water-holding capacity, or where 
the local climate is drier.
Riparian Forest
Along the banks of the rivers on the better alluvial soils which .are 
periodically disturbed by flooding, the forest is more diverse and is not. 
divided into distinct levels. These areas are suitable for crop production 
during the dry season.
Bamboo Groves
This is a very interesting association from an ecological point of 
view. It is found in areas which were cleared in the last century during 
the foreign lumbering operations, or perhaps even earlier, Bamboo is.an 
aggressive plant with a very dense root system which has maintained itself 
in almost pure stands on soils with a high clay content, very little or­
ganic matter, and low fertility.
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Secondary Associations
When the forest is cleared and then left to fallow, fast growing and 
aggressive plants, which are collectively called acahual in Mexico, quick­
ly invade. Within a year, the land is "completely covered with a dense 
stand of light-loving bushes, grasses, vines, and legumes two or three 
meters tall. These plants are much better adapted than any. economic crop ■ 
to depleted soils and high rainfall. ■ The development of the secondary 
sequence is very complex. Over one Hundred years would be required to 
reach the climax, and many species will inevitably become extinct as the 
forest recedes.
Fauna
Uxpanapa, like all tropical forests, supports a limited variety of 
species of large mammals and birds. As the area is settled, the tigers, 
tapirs, deer, armadillos, monkeys, and other animals are being hunted 
down by the campesinos and workers. The bird population is increasing 
in both number and diversity with the changing ecological balance and 
the introduction of crops. The effects of this process on the insect 
and micro-organism population have not been studied.
Soils
A comprehensive soil survey has not yet been made. The basic plan- , 
ning decisions which determined which areas would be cleared by machine, 
where the roads would be built, and where the new towns would be located 
were made on the basis of a preliminary survey made in 1975 from aerial 
photographs taken before the forest was cleared (125). The zone was di­
vided into seven broad categories on the basis of topography, which are 
summarized in Chart 12. Ground checks and chemical tests were few, large 
areas of stony ground did not show up, and the area suitable for mechanized 
agriculture was overestimated by over 100 percent. In 1977, after 10,000 
hectares had been cleared by machine, a more detailed study was made of 
a much smaller area (115). The results are also summarized in Chart 12.
Both reports emphasized the preliminary nature of their results and 
concluded that Uxpanapa was more suitable for perennial tree crops and 
pastures than for annual grains.
Over the centuries, the consistently hot, rainy conditions have pro­
duced highly weathered soils with an average depth of between two or three 
meters. Samples have been classified as Ferrasols and Rhodic Ferrasols 
according to the fao system. These correspond roughly to Oxisols and 
Alfisols in the USDA system. Although the parent material is primarily 
limestone, which provides calcium and other bases, high leaching rates 
have produced acid soils with pH values between 4 and 6. Higher values
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have been found in areas immediately surrounding the limestone outcrop­
pings. The soils are 40 to 60 percent Kaolinite and Hallosyte clays, 
which lock together in a stable, permeable structure through which water 
drains very easily. Iron and aluminum, which weather much more slowly 
than silica and other minerals, have accumulated to produce a character­
istic yellowish-red color. Most of the available water and plant nutri­
ents are stored in the top 30 centimeters, where organic matter has accum­
ulated. A series of tests were made in 1977 in two pilot areas about 15 
kilometers apart, the results of which are summarized in Appendix Table 12.
Broadly similar types of these Ferrasols cover large areas of the 
zone, but their specific properties vary considerably depending on the 
parent materials, topography, drainage patterns, and other factors. The 
soils on even gentle slopes of five to seven percent are noticeably thinner, 
less fertile, and more prone to erosion than the flat lands. Some of the 
alluvial soils near the rivers are gravelly and poor, but a few highly pro­
ductive plots have been identified and cultivated by slash-and-burn culti­
vators over the past ten years. Field drainage will be necessary only in 
a few small areas.
The soils* most obvious advantage in a high-rainfall area is their 
strong, highly permeable structure. Heavy machinery can move over the 
fields within hours of a torrential downpour without getting bogged down 
in mud. This rapid and efficient drainage is a mixed blessing. As little 
as a week without rain during the growing season can cause a mini-draught 
and put the crops under stress. Applied fertilizer, especially nitrogen, 
leaches out very quickly and must be re-applied. The water-holding capa­
city will decrease even further should the organic matter content be allowed 
to decline.
The high clay content means that compaction can be a problem, even 
though the soils are very strong and a laterite layer cannot form. The 
surface is very delicate when it is first uncovered. Splash, sheet, and 
gully erosion can develop very quickly if the land is not immediately re­
planted.
The complex changes in soil fertility and structure which inevitably 
accompany the clearing of a forested area have not been monitored. Once 
the land is exposed to the sun, higher soil temperatures increase the rate 
of microbial decomposition of the organic matter into soluble forms. If 
it is not replaced, the high rainfall leaches the nitrogen and other nut­
rients down through the porous soil out of reach of the roots of the crops, 
The crystalline structure of the clays fixes phosphorus very tightly, so 
that it is not available to the plants. The status of the micronutrients 
which are necessary in small amounts requires investigation. Isolated 
samples taken under different conditions and analyzed by different lab­
oratories can produce very misleading results. So few surveys have been 
made in tropical Mexico that there is no reliable basis for comparison.
There is an urgent need to carefully analyze and map the soil resources 
of Uxpanapa.
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Spontaneous Colonization
Uxpanapa has not supported an indigenous population for many hun­
dreds of years. Pieces of pottery and other artifacts were turned up 
in the clearing process, but there is no evidence that the zone was ever 
more than a sparsely settled frontier. Nevertheless, there were about 
200 families living in some 40 scattered settlements when the Commission 
arrived. Almost all of them had moved into the region in the previous 
five or ten years as part of a very loosely organized government coloni­
zation program. Poor and uneducated campesinos from various parts of 
Veracruz and Oaxaca, they were farming with the hand tools and seeds 
which they had brought with them.
These people are an example of how an isolated tropical area is 
spontaneously colonized in the absence of the kinds of infrastructure 
and services which the resettlement program is providing to the Chinan- 
tecs. They did not have any draft animals, much less chain saws, trac­
tors, or other mechanized implements. Communication with the outside 
world was by river and forest trail. They cultivated very small plots, 
and were not able to meet their needs from agriculture alone. Their 
incomes and the returns to their labor were extremely small by any 
standard. Nevertheless, on the basis of only a few years of experience, 
they were able to produce maize, rice, and other crops. They chose their 
plots, varieties, and practices with care. Although the yields were low, 
they were higher than the average which the expensive, mechanized systems 
which are being introduced by the government were able to achieve in the 
first years of the new project. Their experience provides a valuable 
perspective on the challenge of introducing intensive agricultural tech­
nology into the rainy tropics.
The Formation of the Ejidos
From the air, areas of secondary vegetation along the margins of 
the rivers stand out clearly from the surrounding forest. This implies 
that Uxpanapa has been intermittently inhabited over a long period of 
time. Since the end of the timber boom in the early 20th Century, it 
has been one of the most isolated regions of the Southeast. A few air­
strips were built to bring in wealthy hunters and to ship out marijuana, 
but permanent settlements were not formed until the mid-1960's. At that 
time, the Agrarian Affairs Department (DAAC) divided the zone into over 
one hundred ejidos and granted rights to several thousand names from 
their lists of petitioners for land (108). The government was anxious 
to create ejidos at least on paper as quickly as possible to prevent un­
authorized settlement and land speculation.^ Field surveys were mini­
mal and little more than the cost of transportation was provided to the 
colonists.
4/ Only one small area, in the valley of the Uxpanapa River., was privately 
owned. It belonged to a consortium of ranchers from Chiapas, who hired 
peons to clear and prepare the land for the introduction of cattle. It 
was expropriated for division into ejidos in 1976.
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The agrarian issues of land tenure and ejidal rights are always 
complicated in Mexico,, Many petitioners were hot legitimate farmers and 
had no intention of moving into the wilderness. Others were granted par­
cels in .totally inaccessible areas. According to the law, each ejidatario 
must clear some of his land and occupy it within two years to validate his 
claim. Migrant cane cutters, petroleum workers, and others without legal 
rights were either hired by the grantees to.establish residency, or came 
on their own account. The resulting legal confusion complicated the de­
velopment of orderly communities^ The settlers who had the greatest suc­
cess moved in together as an organized.group under the direction of a re­
cognized leader. By 1974, only those ejidos in the most accessible and 
fertile areas were occupied. The Chinantecs are being moved into.the 
vacancies in this structure.
Patterns of Settlement
The colonists looked for flat areas near the rivers with access to 
fresh water for their settlements. Most of them embarked on the Solo- 
suchil River at Jesus Carranza, an old railroad town and regional center. 
The water level in this and the other two rivers which provide access to 
the zone fluctuates widely depending on the rainfall in the mountains. A 
trip which took seven or eight hours between July and January could re­
quire several days in the dry season, when the boats had to be dragged 
over innumerable shallows. In some years, the villages were completely 
cut off from the outside world for two or three months.-' Private merchants 
moved up and down in launches at irregular intervals to trade tools, cloth­
ing, and other1basic goods for agricultural produce. They paid 20 to 50 
centavos per kilo of maize, less than a quarter of the support price paid 
by CONASUPO, the government buying agency. Fumigation teams from the 
malaria eradication campaign came through from time to time, but there 
was no other health care, no schools, and no agricultural credit or ex­
tension.
The small communities of two or three dozen families were entirely 
dependent on what they could extract from their environment for,their 
survival. They hunted for meat, and for tiger skins and exotic feathers 
which they could sell. They fished and gathered barbasco. They cleared 
small areas of forest to meet their immediate needs and to begin the 
development of permanent settlements.
Slash-and-Burn Systems
The most productive plots were located in low-lying areas along the 
rivers, which were convenient to the settlements and which were relatively 
easy to clear because periodic flooding kept the trees from growing tall. 
Except in gravelly areas, the alluvial soils which have been formed from 
sediment brought down by the rivers are fertile, although they become
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seriously water-logged during the rainy season. During the dry winter 
cycle these areas produced the highest yields in Uxpanapa of maize, beans, 
and chile.
'After the trees were cut down, the following system was established: 
leguminous weeds and grasses were allowed to grow through the wet summer 
months and were cut in late October and November. The trash was not 
burned, but was spread evenly over the plot as a layer of mulch which both 
fertilized the soil and protected it from drying out. Maize was planted 
directly through this mat in December with a planting stick. The heavy 
rains last into January, which allowed the plants to get a good start. 
During the rest of the growing season, the crop depended on the residual 
moisture held in the soil pores and conserved by the mulch, supplemented 
by an occasional shower. Between 1.5 and 3.5 tons per hectare were har­
vested from small plots using this system.
These alluvial areas are small and can only produce one crop a year. 
The ejidatarios also cleared the high forest which grows on deep Ferra- 
sols, where much more work produces less return. It is really too wet 
to grow maize profitably in Uxpanapa during the rainy season. The plant 
suffers from excess moisture and the lack of direct sun, and is attacked 
by a great variety of pests and diseases. The soil structure promotes 
very efficient drainage, so that a week without rain puts the crop under 
stress. The farmers spread their plots out over different kinds of soil 
and planted different native varieties at different times to minimize 
their risks. Yields averaged between 900 and 1500 kilos per hectare.
Upland rice was the single most important crop grown primarily 
for sale. The alluvial soils are too wet to work in the rainy season, 
so the crop was put in the first year after clearing a plot of high 
forest. Residual soil fertility was high. Weed, insect, and disease 
damage generally fell within acceptable levels until the second or third 
season. Relatively tall native varieties such as Lira and Morada Criolla 
were vigorous enough to out-compete weeds in the early stages of growth. 
Yields varied between 600 and 1800 kilos per hectare, which was not enough 
to justify the use of fertilizers or chemical pest control.
Chile peppers, beans, sesame, and a few other crops were also grown 
for sale in small quantities, but both yields and markets were very un­
certain. Cattle, bananas, pineapples, fruit trees, and other crops are 
being introduced as the area is opened up by new roads.
The Returns to Labor
By almost any measure, the colonists made very little from the 
extremely hard work required to clear virgin forest and grow enough food 
to survive. The middle range of labor requirements and yields for the 
principal crops were as follows:
Ferrasols Alluvial SoilsCrop
Summer Maize (Temporal) 
Yields 
Man-days/ha
150-1500 kgs/ha 
50-60
Winter Maize (Tonalmil) 
Yields 
Man-days/ha
900-3500 kgs/ha 
44-55
Rice
Man-days/ha
Yields 600-1800 kgs/ha 
65-75
Beans
Man-days/ha
Yields 200-1400 kgs/ha 
65-75
Chile
Man-days/ha
Yields 1000-5000 kgs/ha 
90-125
According to purely economic criteria, both the average and the 
marginal returns to labor were extremely low. Even in Mexico, where it 
is estimated that half of the population is either unemployed or under­
employed, the settlers probably could have earned more in the first years 
by migrating to the city rather than into the forest. Energy flow studies, 
which balance the number of kilocalories expended in agricultural labor 
against the food energy value of the product, have been suggested as a 
better way to measure the efficiency of labor in societies which operate 
outside of a. market structure. An elaborate study of a Neolithic people 
in an isolated valley in New Guinea traced complex inter-relationships 
bett-reen the fertility of the soil, the labor requirements of a slash-and- 
burn system, and the human and livestock populations (162).
A biologist used this method to measure the ecological efficiency of 
the cropping systems used in an ejido in Uxpanapa (25). He observed the 
tasks involved in cultivating the principal crops, and estimated the human 
energy requirements. Using laboratory techniques, he measured the energy 
content of a kilogram of each crop, and multiplied this figure by the 
average yield. He was then able to derive energy input-output ratios, 
which he correlated with three major ecological sub-zones. The results 
are summarized in Table 4.
Soils which supported small trees such as bamboo were relatively 
easy to clear, but were highly acidic, and produced low yields. The better 
soils were heavily forested, and required so much energy to clear that 
the .energy ratios were not significantly better. The ejidatarios were 
not entirely isolated from the market and did sell some of their harvest.
A reasonable economic return depended on the intensive production of
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relatively high value crops such as chile and sesame, which faced fluctu­
ating prices and uncertain markets . The biologist concluded that tradi­
tional crops and agricultural methods were neither an efficient use of 
labor nor an appropriate use of the resources of the tropical forest.
There are several conceptual problems with this approach, even as­
suming that the data are reliable. Even in an isolated, primitive so­
ciety, the efficiency of human effort is not an easy parameter to tie 
down. The issues are much more complex in a rapidly changing pioneer 
settlement. Kilocalories measure values which are not evident to a Mexi­
can campesino. Sesame, which is an oil seed, has a very high energy con­
tent, even though its market price is low, Chile peppers are mostly water, 
but they bring a high economic return if a market can be found. It is 
difficult to argue that a man chooses crops, soils, and cultural systems 
to produce the most food energy with the least effort.
The empirical knowledge on which slash-and-burn systems are based 
has been accumulated over thousands of years. The spontaneous settlers 
in Uxpanapa drew upon this tradition to support themselves in the wild­
erness, but they did not expect the hardships of the first few years to 
last forever. They had no intention of establishing stable agricultural 
systems in isolation from the rest of the country. Once they had justi­
fied their claim to the land by clearing it, they had every reason to 
believe that a road would be built and that they would 'be able to evolve 
more profitable enterprises. If the area had not been chosen to resettle 
the Chinantecs, it probably would have developed along the same lines as 
other regions of the Southeast, Experience would suggest that many of 
the original colonists would have been pushed out by cattle ranchers as 
communications improved and the fertility of the soil declined.
The spontaneously settled ejidos have benefited significantly from 
the activities of the Papaloapan Commission, particularly from the roads 
and the availability of wage labor. Nevertheless, there have been many 
conflicts with the complex bureaucratic structure. Many of the colonists 
believe that the system of credit and mechanized agriculture which is 
being introduced provides them with a lower return than they could achieve 
by improving their traditional methods. They also feel that their hard- 
earned independence is threatened by a program set up to meet the needs 
of the Chinantecs and of the national economy, rather than their own.
Plate VI-1
In 1974, Uxpanapa was a 
tropical rainforest. The sparse 
population subsisted by mak­
ing small clearings by hand, 
as seen on the right. The 
resettlement project is at­
tempting to introduce mod­
ern, mechanized agriculture 
and to transform the rainy 
tropics into a net surplus 
producer of food and other 
products. The motto above 
the gate reads: “We will be 
realists and do the impos­
sible” .
Plate VI-2
The spontaneous colonists depended primarily on maize, 
although it grows well only in very limited areas. Most of the 
settlements are located along the banks of the rivers, which 
provided the only practical means of access before the road was built.
Plate VI-3
Upland rice was also grown using traditional slash-and-burn methods.
Wild animals and their skins provided an important source of income to the 
spontaneous settlers.
Plate VI-4
CHAPTER VII
"WE WILL EE REALISTS AND DO THE IMPOSSIBLE"
This motto is inscribed on the arch which the Papaloapan Commission 
has built at the entrance to Uxpanapa. The explicit purpose of the pro­
ject is to conquer a hostile environment to meet national goals. Over 
the past forty years, the Mexican government has undertaken many agri­
cultural development projects. Almost all of them have involved the 
Irrigation of arid lands in the North. They have been administered by 
engineers, and have emphasized the construction of dams, canals, roads, 
and other infrastructure. The country has become a leader in this field, 
and exports the technology.
The same basic priorities were applied in Uxpanapa. By concentrating 
capital, machinery, population, and services, the managers hoped to simp­
lify the natural and social factors involved in tropical development so 
that they could be effectively coordinated within a single, centralized 
framework. This emphasis was supported by powerful groups, including 
construction companies and other contractors. It fit the criteria which 
until recently dominated the lending policies of the international agen­
cies, although this project has been funded entirely from Mexican sources,
Although the technology involved in bringing a large area in the 
rainy tropics into Intensive production had not been tested, the Papa­
loapan Commission was under heavy pressure to organize the project as 
rapidly as possible. The Cerro de Oro dam was due to be completed in 
1978, and the Chinantecs had been promised that a complete infrastructure 
would be ready for them to move into before their lands were flooded. At 
the same time, the national production crisis required all agencies of 
the Federal government involved in agriculture to Increase the production 
of basic food grains on a crash basis. Preliminary studies of the natural 
environment were made, but there was not time to organize a careful ex­
perimental program before construction and clearing began.
The Basic Plan
Work got underway as soon as President Echeverria approved the 
proposals xjhich the Commission presented to him in 1974, and which can 
be summarized as follows:
1. Each resettled family will receive rights to 20 hectares, but 
the land will not be Individually assigned. The people will 
be organized into collective ejidos, each one of which will 
plant a combination of annual and perennial crops in compact 
blocks.
-Ill-
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2. A main road running the length of the zone will be fed by a 
regular grid of secondary roads, providing rapid communications 
between the fields, the population centers, and the markets for 
inputs and products. The road will eventually be connected 
with the interstate system, at which time Uxpanapa will be well 
located as a regional center.
3. As much marketable timber as possible will be extracted before 
the land is cleared for agriculture.
4. The land suitable for mechanized agriculture will be cleared 
rapidly by machine, permitting large areas to be brought under 
cultivation immediately. Areas with a slope of greater than 
ten percent, or with other limitations, will be cleared by hand 
for pastures, rubber plantations, and other perennial crops.
5. The population will be concentrated in 12 new towns located at 
regular intervals on soils which are not suitable for agricul­
ture. The people will build their own houses with a 20,000 peso 
subsidy from the government. Services such as electricity, 
running water, sewage, schools, and health clinics will be 
provided.
6. Tractors and other large, indivisible capital units can be used 
efficiently on the large, contiguous fields. Mechanization will 
allow the campesinos to farm a much larger area than they pos­
sibly could using traditional methods. Rapid land preparation 
will allow two crops a year to be grown, reducing seasonal un­
employment. As each family will not be dependent on one small 
area, crop rotations and other conservation methods can be in­
troduced.
7. Central planning under the authority of the Papaloapan Commission 
will allow the efficient allocation of machinery, seed, ferti­
lizer and other inputs among the ejidos. Technical assistance 
can be provided much more effectively to organized groups than
to individuals working alone. The choice of crops can be coordi­
nated with national needs, available markets, and the results of 
experimentation.
8. Credit will be administered by a central office, of the offical 
Bank. Each ejido will receive credit as a unit through its 
elected President, who will be responsible for the distribution 
of the work and the income among the members of the community.
The procedures of the Crop Insurance Company will be simplified 
in these large units.
9. A Union of Ejidos will combine resources from all of the ejidos, 
including the indemnification from the expropriation of the land 
and common property in the Cerro de Oro lakebed and the income
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from the timber operation. It will use this'equity to obtain 
. credit to Invest the profit-making enterprises on a scale which 
?wili benefit;the sone as a whole.. These will include a central 
machinery station, trucks, busses, a gasoline station, and so on. 
As the region develops, the Union will invest in secondary In­
dustries linked to the agricultural production of the ejidos. 
These may include a rice mill, lumber mills, and rubber process­
ing plants. As much of the economic activity In Uxpanapa as 
possible will be owned by the ejidatarios through this structure, 
limiting the appropriation of surplus value by outsiders.
i r
10. Each family will be given a 1600 square meter plot of land be­
hind. their house. The Commission will encourage women and chil­
dren to participate in a program of intensive food production 
for local consumption in these gardens. Central breeding sta­
tions will provide pigs, chickens, and rabbits to be fattened at 
home. Wastes from the gardens and the commercial fields will be 
processed into feed. A direct marketing system will be set up 
to avoid the establishment of intermediaries.
The basic infrastructure and the relocation of the Chinantecs will 
cost approximately 120 million dollars by the time the project is com­
pleted. A preliminary break-down is outlined in Chart 13. By simple 
calculation, this amounts to 40,000 dollars per family. It is important 
to note, however, that.the 3,000 families for which the Commission is 
directly responsible will require only 60,000 of the 260,000 hectares in 
the zone. Once these people are fully installed and their legal position 
is secure., the remaining, area will be opened up to colonization by campe- 
slnos from other parts of Veracruz, at a much lower per-unit cost. In­
demnification for the land and property flooded by the Cerro de Oro pro­
ject will be charged as a cost of the dam. The infrastructure in Uxpan­
apa is considered as a long-term, investment in the productive capacity 
of the tropics, and its cost will not be recovered from' the project it­
self. Large,M centrally organized,: and well-funded, Uxpanapa has avoided 
many of the problems of the,Temazcal resettlement program. The direct 
benefits to the Chinantecs have been substantial. They have been paid 
generous indemnification. Their communities are being moved intact into 
a new area with a much higher level of services than they enjoyed in their 
homeland. Most of the mestizo class which exploited them has been left 
behind. Credit, technical assistance, and machinery have been provided.
In the 19501 s, the government met. its-’legal obligation to the Mazatecs by 
giving them land, a few basic but generally inadequate services, and leav­
ing them to subsist using their traditional technology. The agricultural 
programs were experimental at best. In the 1970*s, the priorities have 
been reversed. The resettlement program is being used as an opportunity 
to develop modern agricultural enterprises under the direct control of 
the state, organized through collective ejidos.
CHART 13. UXPANAPA: DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL EXPENDITURES THROUGH 1976
Source: Mexico, Secretaria de Recursos Hldraulicos, Comision del
Papaloapan, "Memoria de la Construecion de la Obra en Uxpanapa" (mimeo, 
1976).
NOTE: This distribution is based on a total expenditure of 630 million
pesos through November, 1976. For obvious reasons, road construction was 
by far the largest single cost in the first stage. When the project was 
first planned in 1974, it was estimated that the total cost of the infra­
structure would be 1.5 billion pesos, or 120 million dollars at the old 
exchange rate of 12.50 pesos per dollar. Both the cost of clearing and 
the projected cost of the Cerro de Oro dam nearly doubled immediately 
after the* devaluation in September, 1976. As of 1978, the Commission had 
not publicly released a revised, comprehensive budget.
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The Ecological Controversy
A group of biologists from the National University of Mexico and 
the Field Museum of Chicago, under the direction of Dr. Arturo Gomez- 
Pompa, made a study of the Uxpanapa forest in 1974. They have been very 
critical of the project’s emphasis on rapid development and of what they 
see as the poor quality of its scientific basis. They form part of an 
influential group of scientists who are trying to reorient tropical ag­
riculture development policy away from large, capital-intensive projects 
in favor of flexible, small-scale, locally controlled systems based on 
ecological principles.2/
As botanists, they were very concerned that the diversity and the 
equilibrium of the tropical environment not. be destroyed. They were 
worried about erosion, down-stream silting of the rivers, and the more 
subtle effects on the region as a whole if the natural systems were 
thrown out of balance. They saw many examples from all over the tropics 
of lands which had been opened up to agriculture and ranching, using tech­
nology imported from temperate regions. The introduction of monocultures 
resulted in the deterioration of the soils. After a few years, the areas 
were only capable of supporting very small populations at the subsistence 
level, and did not produce surplus commodities in any quantity (52, p. 11)
It is obvious that the country must produce more food, 
and that the tropics should provide part of it. Never­
theless, we feel that it is neither sensible nor practi­
cal to attempt to "dominate" or "conquer" nature. Man 
is a living being who is himself part of the ecosystem, 
and his actions should be directed toward the mainte­
nance of the natural equilibrium at the same time as he 
derives resources from it.
Both the Papaloapan Commission’s engineers and the ecologists were 
very excited by the opportunity which Uxpanapa presented. The resettle­
ment program provided both a reason and a budget to move into an empty 
area and develop it according to a single, integrated plan. Both groups 
had been frustrated in other projects by the complexities of local power 
structures, land tenancy arrangements, corruption, and limited funds.
The construction schedule of the dam meant that something had to be done 
quickly, before experimentation and experience provided clear guidelines 
for action. Both were strongly committed to finding a way to improve the 
living conditions of the Chinantecs and to ensure their participation in 
a program of economic development. Both saw the project as an opportunity 
to develop a model which would allow the productive use of large areas in 
the Southeast. Nevertheless, their priorities were diametrically opposed.
1/ The most important organizations dedicated to this goal are the Biology 
Institute of the National University, INDIRE3 in Xalapa, Veracruz, and 
the Eco-Development Center in Mexico City. The Uxpanapa study, among 
others, was funded by CONACYT, Mexico's equivalent of the National 
Academy of Sciences.
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The Ecologists* 2/Proposals— 1'
The ecologists looked to traditional agricultural systems as a 
place from which to start. On the basis of a study in an ejido in 
Uxpanapa, they constructed Table 5 as a rough indication of the untapped 
potential of the tropical environment. Traditional agriculture is almost 
by definition well-adapted to the local ecological conditions , and takes 
advantage of a wide variety of resources. Nevertheless, the campesinos 
produce significant marketable surpluses of only a handful of crops. The 
biologists identified hundreds of species with potential value as food, 
fiber, oil, wood, and other useful products in Uxpanapa. They suggested 
that the forest be cleared in a patchwork pattern, so that each resettled 
family could grow enough to eat while an intensive program of research 
and development into new products was undertaken.
They gave several examples of how campesinos and scientists could 
work together to create economically viable technology. The ojite tree 
(Brosimum alicastrum sw.) is common in the zone and has been used by the 
Mayas for centuries for a variety of purposes. The wood is of very high 
quality and is similar in its properties to maple, which Mexico imports 
in large quantities. Its prolific fruit is 13 to 15 percent protein and 
is high in Vitamin C. The leaves are also high in protein and would make 
an excellent cattle feed component if economical harvesting, processing, 
and feeding methods could be developed. The sap and seeds have long been 
used as herbal medicines.
Bamboo is one of the few plants which is found in dense, pure stands 
in the area. The National University investigated its possible use as a 
source of cellulose for paper, which is also imported into Mexico. They 
developed a prototype for a clean, non-polluting, thermo-mechanical pro­
cess which used the lignin from the stalks themselves as fuel. Each small 
plant would require an initial investment of three million pesos, would 
employ 35 permanent workers, and could produce about 3,000 tons of cellu­
lose a year. Bamboo grows very quickly, and methods could almost cer­
tainly be found to propogate it artificially.
The biologists were confident that with enough time, energy, and 
financial support, a great many viable enterprises based on the natural 
resources of Uxpanapa could be developed. Crops and techniques from 
other parts of the tropics could be introduced after careful testing.
The natural ecosystem would be adjusted and altered to meet human needs, 
but it would not be Irreparably destroyed.
Each ejido could develop a variety of enterprises including crops, 
livestock, and one or more specialized small industries as a rate deter­
mined by the interests and capabilities of its members, and by the
2/ This section is based on the following sources: Caballero (25),
Echenique-Manrique (52), Gomez-Pompa (67), Gomez-Pompa at al. (69), 
FONAFE (112), and Toledo et al. (201).
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technology which became available,  ^As the region as a whole developed, 
the ejidos could move from a subsistence to a commercial orientation and 
could cooperate in larger industries. In addition to the immediate ben­
efits of this process to the Chlnantecs, its scientific value would be 
very great. Uxpanapa cotild become a laboratory'for the development of 
appropriate technology for the rainy tropics.
The biologists felt that the Papaloapan Commission’s program was 
very short-sighted. In their opinion, the technical studies were super­
ficial and were intended as the basis for a rapid and radical transfor­
mation. The possibilities of siistained-yield management of the timber 
and other forest resources were not considered. The area would be cleared 
before anyone could assess the danger of adverse long-term effects.
Valuable timber would be sold at a fraction of its potential value 
before its best use could be determined. The settlers would not parti­
cipate in the forestry program, and would lose the opportunity to learn 
how to manage these resources scientifically and how to operate the 
machinery.
The agricultural program would depend entirely on technology and 
inputs imported not only from outside the area, but from outside of the 
tropics. The mechanized cultivation of basic grains such as rice and 
maize would require the massive application of chemical fertilizers, 
herbicides, and pesticides. These practices have never yet been viable 
in the Mexican tropics on a large scale.
The Chinantecs would have no way to apply their traditional know­
ledge to the program. If the crops failed and the program were to be 
abandoned, the area would probably be planted with pasture. One of the 
most complex ecosystems on earth would be replaced with one of the simp­
lest and there would not be enough work for the resettled population.
The ecologist suggested that mechanized agricultural programs should be 
located in areas which had already been cleared in past years, where 
production had already fallen below profitable levels.
3/The Commission’s Reaction
The directors of the Papaloapan Commission believed that the ecologists’ 
proposals were totally impractical, and felt personally threatened by the 
public opposition to their policy. They were responsible for the Chin­
antecs displaced by the dam and the existing population, or well over
3/ The Papaloapan Commission’s position on the ecological question was 
articulated in its formal plan for Uxpanapa, which was published in 
the Mexico City newspaper El Nacional on October 11, 1974 (196).
Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo, Executive Director of the Commission, spelled 
out his ideas about the potential of the Southeast for capital- 
intensive development at a speech given at the Universidad Veracrtizana 
in Xalapa, Veracruz, cm November 29, 1976 (198).
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20,000 people. The new Agrarian Reform law requires ejidos to be orga­
nized collectively to facilitate financial management, credit, and mecha­
nization. The Commission had just found a way out of a serious conflict 
over the Cerro de Oro project itself, and was well funded for the first 
time in nearly 20 years. To organize a project as large and as expensive 
as Uxpanapa, they had to balance the interests of diverse groups and cen­
ters of political and economic power in Mexico City, Oaxaca, and Veracruz.
The national food production crisis was the principal argument for 
opening up the new land. The construction of an extensive infrastructure 
in a virgin tropical area required capital and heavy machinery, which they 
could not have obtained unless they could promise a return at least as 
high as that of major projects in other parts of the country. The cost 
of developing new agricultural land with irrigation had risen to over 
three thousand dollars a hectare (198). If the capacity to produce the 
basic grains of which Mexico was increasingly short could be developed in 
the tropics at significantly lower cost, the capital which had been in­
vested in the North could be shifted, with multiplying benefits for all 
sectors in the Southeast.
This could only be accomplished if population and resources were 
concentrated, and was incompatible with scattered settlement patterns and 
diverse, small-scale enterprises. The success of this policy depended on 
the development of technology with higher yields and lower costs of pro­
duction than had yet been achieved in the tropics, which required the 
concentration of resources and manpower. In addition, the Commission was 
legally committed to provide housing and a broad range of services to the 
Chinantecs, which would have been prohibitively expensive if the popu­
lation were scattered in small communities.
The Commission saw the ecologists’ proposals as an irresponsible 
attempt to consciously set up a system of subsistence agriculture, which 
might or might not slowly develop into more productive systems if totally 
new and untried avenues of research were successful. Instead of producing 
the specific crops for which there was an immediate and pressing demand, 
they would be experimenting with new products which might not find a 
market. The rain forest, for all its enormous biomass, species variety 
and scientific interest, had not provided economic benefits to anyone 
except the Americans who took out the best trees at the beginning of the 
century. Large volumes of timber had been wasted in other areas in the 
process of agricultural development. The Commission believed that an or­
ganized program of commercialization would minimize the waste of the tim­
ber resources, even if it could not realize the theoretical value of each 
cubic meter of wood.
The environmental Issues which the Commission did take seriously 
were erosion and silting, problems with which they were very familiar in 
the Papaloapan basin. Its official response to its critics was as follows 
(196):
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The utilization of the tropical jungle has been much dis­
cussed, both in Mexico and in other tropical countries. In 
general, experience has been negative, primarily because the 
methods by which erosion can be avoided and controlled have 
not been considered, and the areas to be cleared have been 
poorly chosen. To avoid these errors, an aerial photography 
study has been made. On this basis, we have decided to clear 
only lands on a slope of less than ten percent which are ap­
propriate for [mechanized] agriculture. Thirty-three percent 
of the zone will be cleared; the agricultural areas will be 
interspersed with forest cover which will protect the soil. 
Strips of the original forest 20 meters wide will be left 
every 200 meters, and fast-growing species will be planted in 
these windbreaks to replace the trees which will be harvested.
We have been in constant consultation with many ecologists, 
with the National University, and particularly with Dr. Gomez- 
Pompa, so that they may help us to avoid conditions which favor 
erosion. We have prepared a detailed plan for the clearing 
operation.
We have set up an,experiment station to study the environmental 
conditions, to test the crops which will be introduced into 
the zone, and to try to find new or complementary techniques 
to improve the tradtional crops of the area.
In the clearing operations which have been undertaken in other 
areas in the past, the trees have been burned because their 
commercial value did not justify their utilization. Because 
of the large volumes Involved in Uxpanapa, we plan to sell as 
much wood as possible to meet the shortages of commercial timber 
in Mexico, and especially the railroad tie deficit which the 
national system is experiencing. The benefits of this operation 
will be shared with the ejidatarios.
The ecologists took their point of view to President Echeverria and 
to the Governor of Veracruz, but were overridden. They were not invited 
to return to Uxpanapa and have been able to publish only a few prelimi­
nary reports. They made a film for television which was sharply criti­
cal of the Commission. Ever since, the project has been administered by 
civil engineers and agronomists. No one trained in tropical biology has 
been studying the effects of the clearing or has been able to participate 
in the program on any level. Dr. Gomez-Pompa commented as follows 
(70, p. 11):
Uxpanapa ... will sadly pass Into history as a region which 
could have been incorporated into the national development 
process in an orderly fashion. Unfortunately, the basic de­
cisions have been made without taking into account the possi­
bility of using the natural resources which exist, or rather 
existed, in the region.
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The project has been severely criticized in the press, both, in Vera­
cruz and in Mexico City. Ap article which appeared in the national news­
magazine Proceso in 1977 was entitled J’Ethnocide and Ecocide" and summar­
ized the positions of the anthropologists in Ojitlan and the ecologists 
in Uxpanapa. In reaction to such opposition,the Commission came to dis­
trust outside expertise and to depend almost entirely on its technical 
staff and that of a limited number of other government agencies. This 
simplified administration and allowed the Uxpanapa project to proceed ac­
cording to its original plan. Nevertheless, the isolation from the ideas 
and experience of others has been unfortunate.
Roads
The first and most important construction was a temporary access 
road four to six meters wide running 140 kilometers through the zone from 
the Trans-Isthmian highway to the valley of the Uxpanapa River. It was 
started in August, 1973 and was completed in a little less than* two years. 
Lateral roads are of two types: ungraded tracks for the lumber companies 
at one kilometer intervals, and graded all-weather roads at five kilometer 
intervals. A permanent road nine meters wide is being built parallel to 
the original and will be paved as soon as construction is completed and 
the heavy machinery pulled out. This will eventually connect with a new 
Federal highway which will traverse the Isthmus from Cintalapa, Chiapas, 
to Sayula, Veracruz. This route will greatly reduce the distance between 
Mexico City and Central America, and will put Uxpanapa at an important 
crossroads.
The construction of the access road was pushed forward under great 
time pressure so that the lumbering, clearing, and other activities could 
begin as rapidly as possible. A 120-meter Bailey bridge was built across 
the largest of the rivers in a few months. Including a large airstrip, 
the costs of the basic communications system took up nearly half of the 
budget in the first stage.
Eight camps were built to house the engineers, the construction 
workers, and those Chinantecs who came to build their houses and work 
their fields before the towns were completed. One of them, La Laguna, 
is the headquarters and is being expanded into a permanent administrative 
center for the zone. The agro-industrial complex will be located nearby.
The Timber Operation
When the forestry surveys were made, the government was already 
committed to a policy of clearing large areas of the forest and opening 
up the land to agriculture. Tropical forestry is a complex business, be­
cause the density of any particular species is very low. Lumber, paper, 
and other technology for the elaboration of wood products.first developed
. -1 2 3 -
in temperate regions around a relatively small number of species with 
specific and well understood properties. For many years, commercial 
activities in tropical Mexico were limited to the extraction of mahog­
any, cedar, and certain other valuable woods. In isolated areas, the 
costs of building roads and getting the logs to the nearest river or 
railhead has meant that selective, sustained-yield timbering has not 
been an economic proposition. Enormous quantities of valuable timber 
have been wasted as lands have been cleared for agriculture, both by 
slash-and-burn cultivators and by planned colonization projects.
There are 20.6 million hectares of tropical forest in the Southeast 
and along the Pacific coast. The national annual harvest of six million 
cubic meters of logs falls short of demand by 25 percent (52, p. 12). 
Inadequate research and marketing systems have prevented the use of many 
valuable tropical species. For example, the Mexico City Metro mass trans­
portation system was built In the 1960*s by a French company. The line 
carries thousands of people every day, and exacting safety specifications 
were set for the wooden ties so that they would not need to be replaced 
for at least 30 years. Tropical hardwoods are extremely durable, so the 
French used the azobe tree from one of their colonies in Africa when they 
built the Metro in Paris. When bids were offered in Mexico, no company 
was capable of providing ties of the necessary quality within the speci­
fied time. Wood was imported from Africa, although six suitable species 
have since been Identified in the Mexican tropics (53). The National 
Railroad has used ties imported from the United States and Canada for 
many years. Balance of payments problems led to cutbacks which resulted 
In a net deficit, of .ten million ties, in spite of large national forest 
reserves (198).
Timber operations under government auspices are expanding rapidly. 
Recent developments in paper, plywood, and particle-board technology 
allow the use of mixed tropical hardwoods, if the economic return is 
great enough. In many areas of the world, the pendulum has swung from 
limited high-grading to the opposite extreme of extensive clear-cutting.
In Southeast Asia, for example, expanding demand in developed countries 
has led to the denudation of thousands of hectares without adequate con­
servation, management, or reforestation programs (57, 203). Tropical 
hardwoods do not propagate easily and grow very slowly. In some parts 
of the Mexican Southeast, plantations of fast-growing softwoods such as 
Caribbean Pine have been established to produce paper pulp (195). These 
factors add to the pressures on the remaining virgin areas, which may 
disappear before effective, sustained-yield management systems which 
take advantage of a wide variety of species can be developed.
In Uxpanapa, the government decided to sell as much timber as possible 
before clearing the land. The lumber operation would both use and help 
pay for the road network which would be necessary for the successful de­
velopment of intensive agriculture. A special Federal authority was set 
up to finance and coordinate the activities of fifteen private lumber 
companies. Skidaers, trucks, and other heavy machinery were provided on
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credit to the contractors, and 17 sawmills were installed, *The govern­
ment's initial investment was about 80 million pesos (111).
The companies have been free to cut whatever trees they want, with 
preference for the areas on a slope of less than ten percent, which will 
be cleared for agriculture* Two hundred and sitfty thousand hectares is 
a large area, and the national demand for specific types of wood was 
quickly saturated. The initial studies identified over 100 species of 
trees, only a few of which have ever been sold commercially or studied 
in any detail. Of the 325,000 cubic meters which were sold up to 1977, 
three quarters went out as undifferentiated tropical hardwoods for uses 
where the specific properties of the wood did not matter. The best single 
market has been the National Railroad, which took delivery of about 800,000 
ties. Only a few mahogany, cedar and other valuable trees were missed by 
the Americans 75 years before* It was originally estimated that 50 cubic 
meters of wood could be sold off each hectare, but pressures of time and 
problems both in the forest and in the market have kept the actual extrac­
tion rate well below this figure (111).
The private contractors have made good profits, and the government 
is recuperating its capital investment. The ejidos have received an ave­
rage of 48 pesos, or between two and three 'U.S. dollars per cubic meter 
as their share. This is approximately equivalent to .6 U.S. cents per 
board foot. A table of the types of wood harvested and the payments made 
by the contractors through October, 1976, is found in Appendix Table 13.
Clearing
According to the original plan based on the initial photo survey,
85,000 of the 260,000 hectares in the zone were to be cleared for agri­
culture. To minimize the danger of erosion, only those areas on a slope 
of less than ten percent were to be cleared, by machine. Steeper slopes 
that were suitable for pastures, rubber, and other perennial crops would 
gradually be cleared by hand. On the maps, the entire zone was divided 
into a perfectly regular grid of fields) one kilometer by 200 meters, sep­
arated by windbreaks oriented perpendicular to the prevailing winds.
These rows of trees were intended both to preserve some of the original 
vegetation and to protect the crops.
As soon as the lumber companies had taken out the valuable timber, 
the work began. In a tropical forest, most of the nutrients are concen­
trated in the top layer of the soil. Even very large trees have shallow, 
horizontal root systems. Two bulldozers dragging a heavy chain between 
them, assisted by a third machine pushing behind, can mow down the forest 
with astonishing speed. Only the very largest trees must be cut with a 
chain saw. . Bulldozers equipped with,special rake blades dig out the roots 
and stumps and push the fallen mass into piles. The.heaps are doused with 
kerosene and burned, pushed into new piles, and burned again. Two passes
-1 2 5 -
with very heavy disks break up the trash and work it into the soil.
Although some sticks and trash remain, the land is ready immediately 
for the mechanized production of annual erops.
During the first stage of the program, between 1974 and 1976, a 
little under 10,000 hectares were prepared in this way (Appendix Table 14). 
This was more than the agricultural program was organized to handle at 
the time, and the rhythm slowed nearly to a halt during the next two years. 
The goal for the remaining forest was modified on the basis of a more ac­
curate evaluation of soil quality. Nine percent of the soils which were 
cleared in the first stage proved extremely rocky and unsuitable for mech­
anized agriculture. Thin soils, poor drainage, and other problems limited 
fertility over large areas. By 1978, it was thought that between 28 and 
30 thousand hectares would be cleared by machine by the time the program 
was completed in the early 1980’s, or about a third of the original esti­
mate. This will average about five hectares per family, and will be sup­
plemented by whatever is cleared by hand for pastures and perennial crops.
The clearing process requires specialized heavy equipment, and is 
very expensive. The cost rose from a first estimate of 5,000 pesos per 
hectare in 1974 to over 12,000 pesos by 1976. \ After the peso was devalued 
in that year, the figure went up to over 23,000,.maintaining an exchange 
value of about 1,000 dollars per hectare.
The timber operation has been organized and financed separately, and 
the income from sales has not been reported on a per-hectare basis. The 
gross payments of the lumber contractors have been approximately 30 per­
cent of the cost of the subsequent clearing, only a small fraction of 
which has been received directly by the Commission. These funds have 
been credited against the cost of the road system, not the clearing.
Gaps left by the harvesting of the large trees and the irregularities 
of the forest have prevented the windbreaks from functioning effectively. 
Starting in 1977, the land was completely cleared and the residue was 
piled up in windrows around the perimeter of the fields. Fast-growing 
trees such as Melina arborea were planted in them to establish effective 
windbreaks as quickly as possible. The Commission hoped that this pro­
cedure would reduce costs to 20,000 pesos per hectare and result in 
better land preparation.
The land in ejidos belongs to the state and cannot be bought or sold. 
The market value of similar land in privately held areas in Veracruz varies 
between three and five thousand pesos per hectare in isolated areas to 12 
to 15 thousand for superior soils near all-weather roads (137). The Papa- 
loapan Commission paid a very high price on the expectation that the in­
vestment in mechanized clearing would pay off in the production of annual 
food crops. Land preparation for pasture, rubber, and other perennials 
is perfectly adequate if done by hand, which costs less than ten percent 
as much —  between 1,700 and 2,300 pesos per hectare depending on the 
density of the forest cover and the average size of the trees. This work
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provides employment to the ejidatarios rather than to outside contractors. 
Another choice would have. been to clear, by hand;,.' grow subsistence crops 
for a few years using traditional slashr-and-bum technology, and mechanize 
as the roots and stumps decomposed. The decision to grow annual crops on 
a large scale immediately implied further investments in tractors, imple­
ments, storage facilities, and so on.
The soils of Uxpanapa are more fertile than those found in many areas 
of the tropics, but they, present complex management challenges. In spite 
of efforts to minimize this problem, mechanized clearing does destroy part 
of the layer of organic matter. The heavy equipment does compact the soil 
to some extent, in spite of its strong structure1. Maize yields have been 
highest in areas cleared by hand, lower where the machines did the work, 
and lowest where the bulldozers passed often or turned around. The size 
of the project and the speed with which it has been brought into production 
have not allowed important differences in soil quality over short dis­
tances to be taken into account.
In 1975, when the operation was in full swing, hundreds of fires were 
burning at once in clearings all over the forest. It was a. very dry year 
and some of them escaped, causing a serious forest fire which burned for 
several months and damaged thousands of hectares of valuable timber,. This 
caused some political embarrassment when President Echeverria and Jose 
Lopez Portillo, then Minister of the Treasury and currently President, 
visited the zone that May.
The New Towns
One of the most striking differences between Ojitlan and Uxpanapa 
Is the appearance of the towns. The traditional villages are typically 
clustered around a single main street. The houses, which are scattered 
irregularly among the garden plots and fruit trees, are built of bamboo 
with steeply pitched, thatched roofs. They are often built as double 
structures, one for living and sleeping; the other for cooking. This 
basic design is universal in the Mexican tropics. In Uxpanapa, the pop­
ulation is being concentrated in twelve new - towns to facilitate the in­
stallation of drinking water, sewage, and electricity.
The Commission contracted several studies to investigate the atti­
tudes of the Chinantecs toward housing (123). Architects built models 
which were exhibited in Ojitlan so that the people could choose what they 
liked. In what is really the only example of direct Chinantec partici­
pation in the Uxpanapa project, the people are building their own houses 
with a 20,000 peso subsidy, which is provided in the form of building 
materials and as a daily wage. Architects and engineers have worked along 
side of them to help with design and structural problems (27, 55).
In the early 1950*s, m§ny of the Mazatecs in the Temazcal resettle­
ment zones refused to modify their traditional housing, even when the
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government built concrete floors and frames for them. Over the past 20 
years, the values of the larger society have penetrated deeply into the 
Chinantec communities. Modern houses have become a mark of social status. 
Almost all of the settlers are building nearly identical structures —  
simple one-room blocks built out of locally produced concrete bricks 
roofed with corrugated asbestos or zinc sheets. One reason is that the 
coyol palm which is used for thatch is not found in the primary forest 
of Uxpanapa. Another is that the subsidy is distributed in the form of 
building materials which cannot be substituted for cash. Although a few 
Chinantecs have spent extra money on larger and more impressive struc­
tures, most have tried to keep costs to an absolute minimum.
There have been two important points of difference between the 
Indians and their technical advisors. The architects have felt very 
strongly that the houses should be divided into several rooms, primarily 
so that the parents would be separated from the children at night. This 
idea has been almost universally rejected. The other has been the lo­
cation of the bathrooms. The Chinantecs have been pleased to have plumb­
ing, but the idea of installing it inside the house has seemed very un­
sanitary. They have insisted on a separate structure, or at least a sep­
arate entrance from the outside.
The towns are laid out on a network of streets radiating off a cen­
tral avenue. Each house is provided with piped water and sewage. The 
Commission contracted with the Federal Electricity Commission to install 
distribution lines to each house. A civic center consists of a primary 
school, a health clinic, a post office, and a meeting hall.
Sixteen settlements were projected and sited according to the origi­
nal aerial photo survey. On the maps, it seemed logical to place them 
strategically at points equidistant from the fields on soils which could 
not be used for agriculture. This put them in hilly, rocky areas where 
the costs of construction were very high. In one case, work was begun In 
the dry season in an area which was seriously flooded a few months later 
by the discharge from an underground river. A diversion canal had to be 
built. Many of the garden plots behind the houses are filled with large 
boulders and cannot be used for trees, vegetables, or crops.
Six of the eight settlements of the first stage are located far from 
any river or stream. The Chinantecs have always lived very close to the 
rivers in their homeland, where they spend a great deal of time swimming, 
washing, and travelling In their canoes. They found these inland locations 
an unnecessary hardship, especially in the first years before the water 
systems were completed. In 1977, the Commission modified the plan and 
decided to build four large towns rather than eight small ones to complete 
the program. These will be located on the banks of rivers on better soils.
Plate VII-1
A skidder drags a log out a forest trail to the nearest road. As much valuable timber as 
possible has been sold before the land is cleared for agriculture. The density of any 
particular species is very low, so most of it has been sold as undifferenciated hardwood.
Logs are piled up at the sawmill, one of sixteen in the zone operated by 
private contractors.
Plate V I1-2
Plate VII-3
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Plate V I1-4
Each settler is building his own house with a 20,000 peso subsidy in the form of building materials 
and labor from the government.
The Papaloapan Commission is building a civic center in each of the 12 new towns, consisting of a 
primary school, a meeting hall, a health clinic, and a post office.
Plate VI1-5
Temporary housing built by the settlers to live in while the new towns are under construction.
Although the Commission has hired young architects to help the Chinantecs build according to 
their wishes, the structures are very simple concrete blocks.
Plate V I1-6
A few settlers have built traditional structures adjoining their “ official” houses. Others 
have^sent relatives to build the house and receive the subsidy, but continue to live in 
Ojitlan.
CHAPTER VIII
THE(FIRST YEARS OF THE AGRICULTURAL PROGRAM
The Papaloapan Commission is introducing modern, highly mechanized 
technology into Uxpanapa as rapidly as possible. Over the past ten years, 
the Federal government has initiated similar projects in the Chontalpa 
and Balancan-Tenosique regions in the state of Tabasco, and in other areas 
of the Southeast (33,107). Nevertheless, there is very little experi­
mental or practical experience to guide the development of intensive ag­
riculture in the Mexican rainy tropics. A former director of the agri­
cultural development bureau of the Commission has stated the problem 
succinctly (176):
... agricultural systems and development patterns from the 
temperate regions should not be used to develop the rainy 
tropics. This error continues to be repeated over and over 
again in all of the tropical regions of the country. We must 
develop new technologies, new ways of thinking, and new agro­
systems to be able to use the great potential cf these areas 
for the benefit of the local population and the national economy.
Basic and applied research in tropical agriculture has been very 
limited in Mexico. As in most parts of the world, money has been avail­
able to study profitable commercial crops in areas where they are grown 
intensively. Most of the research facilities and trained personnel are 
located in the irrigation districts in the Northwest and in Mexico City.
In recent years, the government has established new research centers in 
the tropics, Including an agricultural college in Cardenas, Tabasco, but 
technology applicable to a broad range of natural conditions takes a long 
time to develop. Several years of careful study before the Uxpanapa pro­
ject was started would have been ideal, but the schedule of the resettle­
ment program in particular, and the pressures on the resources of the 
Southeast in general, have forced the Commission to move rapidly.
Early Emphasis on Annual Grain Crops
From the day the project got underway, the managers have been faced 
with a dilemma. The national production crisis created political pressures 
which required them to grow annual grain crops, specifically rice and maize, 
for which there was a pressing neeid. This forced them to use the tech­
nology which was available, even though it had not been tested in the rainy 
tropics on a large scale. At the same time, the long-term success of 
Uxpanapa depends on the development of economically viable, sustainable 
systems In which the area will have a relative advantage. Cattle operations 
and perennial crops, especially natural rubber, are intended to provide the
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ejidatarios with an improved standard of living and to transform the 
forest into a center for regional growth *
Test plots of maize, rice, $nd a few other annuals were set out when 
the program first began to determine very basic information, such as fer­
tilizer response. As soon as field operations got underway on a large 
scale, the Commission’s small staff put most of its emphasis on the day-to 
day problems. INIA, the national research institute, ran a few simple ex­
periments as part of a series of regional variety trials. The results 
were processed so slowly that they were not available in Uxpanapa in time 
to affect the plan for subsequent seasons. The agronomists chose the va­
rieties and practices which they thought held the best probability of suc­
cess, and have been modifying the systems on the basis of experience.
The principal goal of the program in the first years was to plant 
the entire cleared area with annual crops in both seasons. This land, 
which totaled about 1 0 ,0 0 0 hectares, was located in an irregular strip 
along 100 kilometers of dirt road, which complicated the efficient allo­
cation of the agricultural machinery and other inputs. The movement of 
the Chinantecs into the zone was slow, so that the area which had been 
cleared in each ejido did not correspond to the number of people who were 
available to work. These problems were compounded by unpredictable wea­
ther conditions.
In the first four years, between 30 and 80 percent of the cleared 
area was left unsown. Secondary growth is extremely rapid, and requires 
expensive re-clearing within a few years. The Papaloapan Commission was 
unwilling to bring in workers from the outside, for fear that they would 
not leave when the Chinantecs arrived. The spontaneous settlers were 
offered short-term credit contracts to work the cleared areas, but most 
of them preferred to grow crops on their own land using traditional slash- 
and-burn technology. In 1978, It was estimated that 3,060 man-days of 
labor would be required to cultivate all of the cleared land in the summer 
season, of which only 1,750 or 57 percent, were even theoretically avail­
able from the resident population (117).
In the first seven seasons, credit was granted primarily to ejidos 
working with the newly introduced mechanized systems on land cleared by 
machine, but some slash-and-bum cultivators also received assistance.
The results are summarized in Table 6.
The yields were extremely low. The averages include large areas 
which were never harvested at all. Some fields of rice produced over 
four tons per hectare;- maize yields of two and a half to .three tons were 
reported. During this same period, the spontaneous settlers Increased 
the area under cultivation using traditional methods without credit in 
response to improved communications with the market. They chose their 
plots with care and did not plant more than they could harvest. Their 
yields were significantly better.
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TABLE 6 . UXPANAPA: ANNUAL CROP PRODUCTION WITH CREDIT, 1974-1978
(area in hectares; yield in kilograms per hectare)
Season (Number of 
Ejidos Participating) Crops Area Average Yield
(hectares) (kgs/hectare)
Winter 1974-75 (5) Maize— Hybrid (H-503)
and Native 340 200
Beans— Black 180 180
TOTAL 520
Summer 1975 (5) Maize-— Hybrid (H-507)
and Native 700 700
Rice-- Dwarf (Sinaloa
A-6 8) 810 negligible
TOTAL 1,510
Winter 1975-76 (11) Maize— Hybrid (H-507) 2,400 800
Summer 1976 (23) Maize— Hybrid (H-507)
and Native 2,420 700
Rice— Bluebonnet-50 2 ,0 0 0 1 ,0 0 0
Rice-— CICA-4 1 ,2 0 0 negligible
TOTAL 5,620
Winter 1976-77 (23) Maize— All Native
Varieties 1,500 600
Chile 140 5,000
TOTAL 1,640
Summer 1977 (39) Maize— All Native
Varieties 3,200 485
Rice-— Bluebonnet-50 1,050 475
TOTAL 4,250
Winter 1977-78 (31) Maize— All Native
Varieties 2 ,0 0 0 Not Available
Source: Areas planted as reported by the Banco de Credito Rural del
Golfo. The average yields were calculated by the author from unofficial 
estimates of total sales in each season.
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With the exception of one small area of chile, the average yields 
of all of the annual crops grown with the newly introduced mechanized 
systems were too low to recover the costs of production. The ejidos har­
vested part of their crops, but none of them made any profit. The actual 
cash losses recovered from crop insurance, absorbed by the Commission, or 
charged against the ejidos as bad debts, have never been officially tabu­
lated and released. The accounting system of the Bank is tied to credit 
allowances issued at the beginning of each season, so that the actual 
costs can only be imputed indirectly. The following credit balances, 
based on unofficial data, give some idea of the short-term losses which 
the Federal government was willing to absorb in its attempt to introduce 
annual crops into Uxpanapa (105) i
Season
Summer 1976 
Summer 1977
Area
Contracted
(hectares)
5,620
4,250
Credit 
Allowances 
(millions 
of pesos)
23.7
16.0
Value 
of Sales 
(millions 
of pesos)
5,2
5.9
Recuperation
Rate
(percent)
22
30
Although the recuperation rates were very low, they were higher 
than the average for official credit in tropical lowland areas (176). 
Production has been limited by a complex combination of climatic, bio­
logical, institutional, and organizational factors. The systems which 
are being introduced, and the nature of the problems, will be explained 
in detail in the following sections.
The Institutional Structure
Both the Echeverria (1970-1976) and the Lopez Portillo (1976-1982) 
administrations placed a great deal of emphasis on the reorganization of 
the bureaucracy which serves the agricultural sector. The institutional 
structure which is being set up in Uxpanapa reflects new laws and pro­
cedures which are intended to revitalize the ejidos and give them a key 
role in the modernization of the rain-fed areas of Mexico. This means 
that both a new technology and a newly reorganized type of economic and 
social organization are being introduced into Uxpanapa at the same time.
The Collective Ejidos
The ejidos in Ojitlan were rural communities of families, each one 
of which worked a small parcel individually. The elected authorities 
took care of issues which affected the group as a whole and provided a 
link with the local political structure. Each campesino decided which 
crops he would plant, arranged with the local merchant for credit, and
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drew upon his relatives and friends for labor in peak periods. Official 
credit was provided sporadically to some of the Chinantecs, who were usu­
ally organized into "Solidarity Groups" of three to fifteen members who 
pooled their responsibility to repay the loans. Except for coordinating 
the use of the common woodlots, pastures, and the plot which supported 
the school, the ejido as such had no direct economic function.
The division of the ejidos into tiny minifundia has become a serious 
barrier to agricultural modernization throughout the country. During the 
Echeverria administration, the government rewrote the basic laws in an 
attempt to establish the ejido itself as the fundamental economic unit 
in the reformed sector. The history of the collective ejidos which were 
created in the 1930's has been outlined in Chapter II, After many years 
of neglect, this type of production cooperative was revived as a way to 
combine Individual plots into units large enough to use tractors and other 
modern inputs efficiently. Economic and personal interests in established 
communities have frustrated the attempt to collectivize existing ejidos. 
The official Bank has organized many new credit associations, but it has 
not been able to change the patterns of control over productive resources 
which have evolved over several generations.
As Uxpanapa was opened up for the first time under direct Federal 
jurisdiction, the new agrarian reform and credit laws required the organi­
zation of collective ejidos. The theoretical advantage of the system Is 
that it combines democratic participation by the campesinos with the cen­
tralized technical direction which the development of efficient, large- 
scale agriculture requires. All of the land is held In common and each 
ejido is organized as a kind of corporation which manages the various 
enterprises it is engaged in. Its operations are supervised by the Min­
istry of Agrarian Reform, which is responsible for its legal structure, 
and by the official Bank, which provides the working capital.
The ultimate authority is the General Assembly of legal ejidatarios: 
all men over 16 years old on the day the organization Is formed, and 
women who hold rights which they have inherited. The body is responsible 
for approving all technical plans and credit contracts, electing official 
representatives, and any other business which may be proposed. At the 
end of each cropping cycle, a special planning and evaluation meeting is 
held at which the Bank and other government institutions are represented. 
The profits from the harvest are distributed, usually according to the 
following formula: 30 percent in equal parts to all of the ejidatarios, 
and 70 percent in proportion to the number of days which each member has 
worked, at a uniform daily rate which is independent of productivity.
At the same time, the technical plar. for the next season is approved 
according to the government's plan for the region, the availability of 
credit, and the wishes of the members.
The executive body, or Comisariado Ejidal, is composed of a President, 
a Secretary, and a Treasurer. Its term runs for three years. The Presi­
dent has very wide powers. He presides at the assembly and draws up the
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agenda. He represents the' ej ido ih all of its relationships with outside 
authorities, particularly the official Bank, and directs the day-to-day 
operations of the farm. Credit is not received in a lump sum, but rather 
in the actual inputs; he must sign a receipt for each bag of seed, ferti­
lizer, and so; on, as they are delivered. He organizes the daily work 
schedule and distributes the advance payments which are made to the mem­
bers. He writes an endless series of petitions to various government 
agencies to resolve conflicts and receive services. His work involves 
frequent trips to local offices, the state capital, and even to Mexico 
City. Although it is a full-time job, he does not usually receive pay^ - 
ment for his work. He delegates a member of his family or hires someone 
to do his share of the agricultural labor. Presidents are sometimes 
accused of appropriating funds for their own use. For obvious reasons, 
they must be literate in Spanish, and come from the stratum of Chinantec 
society which is the most fully acculturated into the larger society.
A second executive body, the Vigilance Committee, or Consejo de 
Vigilancia, is headed by the man who comes in second in the election.
He is responsible for keeping an eye on the President, keeping track of 
the accounts, and counter-signing the credit receipts. His actual auth­
ority varies considerably from ejido to ejido.
The Union of Ejidos
Following the terms of the decree which authorized the construction 
of the Cerro de Oro dam, each individual in the lakebed was paid indemni­
fication for the value of his personal property. The value of the land 
and the other common assets of the communities was paid into a fund to 
be invested in Uxpanapa for works of mutual benefit. This was supple­
mented by the income from the lumber operation, and totaled 150 million 
pesos. Rather than pay the money to each new ejido, a Union of Ejidos 
was organized to administer it. As the name implies, this is an associ­
ation of ejidos, each one of which elects representatives. Its first 
investment was a central machinery station, which was set up in 1978 
under the direction of a professional manager. Twenty percent of the 83 
million peso cost came from the fund; 80 percent was provided as credit 
Irqm the official Bank. .
Future plans for an agro-industrial center include warehouses, a 
gasoline station, a rice mill, and a bread factory. In general, the 
Union will assume the functions which are usually performed by private 
merchants and entrepreneurs. It is hoped that the surplus generated by 
the primary activities in the zone will be re-invested locally. This is 
meant to provide employment for the sons and daughters of the ej idatarios 
and to provide the basis for balanced regional growth.
Many of the Chinantecs, qnd nearly all of the spontaneous settlers, 
have been suspicious of this Institution. Believing that the common funds 
belong to them, they have been frustrated that the Union has not allowed
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them to Invest in trucks, tractors, cattle, fencing, and other needs 
in their own ejidos. They fear that the Union will be, in effect, another 
agency of the government, over which they will have little effective 
control.
The Agrarian Reform Ministry
1/The Agrarian Reform Ministry^— has very broad responsibilities over 
the legal titles and formal organization of the ejidos. It is plagued 
by byzantine bureaucratic procedures, and simple business Is often dragged 
out over many years. All of the employees of the local office were fired 
in 1975, when they were charged with drawing the ejidal boundaries so as 
to exclude a large area of good land which they planned to sell for pro­
fit. For three years after this incident, while the agricultural program 
was first being organized, the Ministry had no direct representatives in 
Uxpanapa at all. They are supposed td explain the cooperatives, the laws, 
and the credit system to the ejidatarlos and work out the details of their 
organization with them. This vital function was taken over by the Com- 
mision and the Bank, whose overriding interest was to get the cleared land 
planted as quickly as possible.
When Uxpanapa was first designated for resettlement, a census was 
taken of the spontaneously settled ejidos to determine the number of 
vacancies which were available for the Chinantecs, and the area was sur­
veyed. A variety of conflicts with the spontaneous settlers arose over 
the prior documentation of their boundaries. Another problem was that 
campesinos who were not counted in the census for one reason or another 
presented evidence that they had legal rights to live in the area. The 
Ministry and the Commission looked at these petitions on a case-by-case 
basis, and accepted some of them. By 1976, they had recognized the prior 
rights of over 1500 ejidatarlos, considerably more than the number of 
Chinantecs who had moved in by that time. To protect the land for the re­
settlement program, the government has guarded the zone against invasion 
from other areas. The perimeter has been patrolled by a special police 
force and a symbolic detachment of the army, and a pass has been required 
to enter.
The Rural Credit Bank
The Banco de Credito Rural del Golfo was formed in 1975 by the 
merger of the Ejidal Bank with two other official credit institutions. 
The local office has played an important and difficult role in Uxpanapa. 
Not only does it finance and supervise the inputs and labor used In each
1/ The Department of Agrarian Affairs and Colonization (DAAC) was given 
ministerial status during the Echeverria administration.
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ejIdo; It is responsible for organizing the flow of tractors 9 crop-spraying 
planes, seeds, chemical products, and other'1 factors of production into the 
zone and their efficient allocation,, It markets the harvests, distributes 
the profits, and is the only source of income for most of the ejidatarios. 
Credit can only be granted on a collective basis, so the Bank’s Inspectors
must deal with the complex problems of ejidal' 'organization every day. Its
staff is small and it must process an enormous quantity of paperwork.
There are two types of credit. Production credit, or credito de
ayio, covers the costs of production of annual crops and is closely super­
vised on a hectare-by-hectare basis. The inputs and the cash advances 
which the ejidatarios receive for their labor- are paid as each task is 
completed. The Bank sells the product;, deducts all costs plus interest 
.at: an annual rate of 12 percent, and distributes the residual among the 
ej idatarios. .
Investments in cattle ranches, rubber plantations, and other enter­
prises with a large initial cost and a slow rate of recuperation are fi­
nanced through long-term credit, or credito refaccionario. The capital 
is provided by the central Bank of Mexico through an organization called 
FXRA, but the local office of the Bank is responsible for day-to-day ope­
rations . The funding agencies require very careful technical and finan­
cial studies, so the approval process is slow. The repayment period is 
between 12 and 15 years and the interest rate, after a two-year grace 
period, is nine percent.
The first step in each agricultural cycle is the choice of crops. 
Acreage targets are set at a meeting of the regional rain-fed agriculture 
district in Coatzacoaicos by representatives from the Bank, the Papaloapan 
Commission, and other regional and national agencies. Lines of credit are 
approved for several crops, according to national priorities, the availa­
bility of markets, and local conditions. In cooperation with the crop 
insurance company, whose functions are outlined in the next section, the 
regional office of the Bank decides how much credit will be allowed for 
each crop on a per hectare basis, on several levels of technology from 
slash-and-burn to fully mechanized systems. The total is then divided 
up into separate operations tied to a fixed calendar. Samples of these 
credit allowances appear in Appendix Tables 15 and 16.
!These estimates of the cost of production are important documents 
for several reasons. The cash advances which the ejidatarios receive In 
the course of the season are not a.Salary; they are part of the credit 
and are deducted from the final profits. If, for example, the seeding 
operation is allocated 250 pesos per hectare, each ejidatario receives 
250 divided by the number of people required to do the work. A highly 
mechanized system is being introduced into Uxpanapaj the labor allowed 
by the credit varies between crops and levels of .technology, but it is 
relatively little.. If the advance payments are averaged over the number 
of working days in a cycle, they come out to as little as ten or twenty 
pesos a day per person. This is less than the Chinantecs received in
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Ojitlan for working in their neighbors’ fields, and is well below the 
Federal minimum wage which the Papaloapan Commission is required to pay 
the people it hires in the zone*.?/
The allowances also detail the costs of the various inputs. These 
are supplied directly by the Bank, so the values listed would simply be 
an internal accounting measure if the needs could'be accurately estimated 
in advance. In fact, serious attacks by pests and diseases have required 
heavy and repeated applications of expensive chemicals. The Bank must 
maintain the appearance of staying within the predetermined costs to meet 
the requirements of the insurance company and for other accounting pur­
poses, To prevent the loss of the crop, it ’’borrows" from one operation 
to pay unexpected over-runs in another. If this is not enough, the local 
branch requests permission from the regional office for an overdraft. 
Although the ejidal Presidents must approve this, the theoretical costs 
of production rapidly become a fiction, and the ejidatarios lose control 
over what is spent on their land.
Meetings are held in each of the ejidos at the beginning of each 
cropping cycle. The members are told what is available and are asked to 
decide how many hectares of each crop they would like to grow. The gov­
ernment is under a great deal of pressure to plant as.much of the cleared 
land as possible, and the ejidatarios have little effective choice. A 
credit contract is prepared for each crop, which must be approved by the 
majority if the operation is to proceed. In some cases, agents of the 
Bank have been sent to 0jitlan to collect signatures from the people who 
have not yet moved.
Inspectors from the Bank share responsibility for the supervision 
of daily operations during the season with the Presidents of the ejidos 
and the agents of the Papaloapan Commission. They are not agronomists, 
and their job is to make sure that the work is performed according to 
the.contracts. Although they do not formally provide technical assis­
tance, they are in the field every day and play a key role in the intro­
duction of the new technology. They make the process as flexible as they 
can, but they must meet the rigid requirements of the system, at least on 
paper. The Bank retains ownership of the product until it is sold.
The Crop Insurance Company
In the 1940’s, growers of crops with very high costs of production, 
such as cotton, formed mutual insurance associations in the irrigation 
districts in northern Mexico. Each member paid a fixed quota per hec­
tare and the money was distributed among those farmers affected by some 
natural disaster. In 1961, all such associations were consolidated into
2/ The minimum wage is tied to the cost of living in each area of the 
country. In Uxpanapa, it inflated from 56 to 101 pesos per day between 
1976 and 1978.
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a nation-wide Federal agency, the National Crop and Cattle Insurance Comp­
any (ANAGSA). The organization is designed to complement the services 
provided by the official Bank by insuring its capital stock against the 
inability of the farmers to repay their loans in bad years, and is a pre­
requisite for credit (138). In Uxpanapa it plays a very Important role 
by protecting the investments of the Bank*, but it does not guarantee a 
profit to the ejtdatarios.
A complex set of requirements and procedures, which are intended to 
minimize the company9s risks and to avoid fraud, introduce irrational 
rigidities into the management of the crops in each ejido. The uniform 
credit allowances for the region are set jointly by the insurance company 
and the Bank. In addition to the allowable expenses in each category, 
they specify seed varieties, planting densities, fertilization levels, 
and a calendar which sets the dates by which key operations such as plant­
ing and harvesting must be accomplished. Premiums are collected on a per 
hectare basis and the rates, as a percentage of the credit contracts, are 
high (Appendix Tables 15 and 16)s
Year Maize Maize Rice Rice
(mechanized) (siash-and-b urn) (mechanized) (siash-and-b urn)
1976 5.5% 4.6% —
1977 12.6% 8.0% ■ 6.3%
1978 14.5% 14.5% 9.2% 9.2%
Three separate inspections of each field are necessary to validate a 
claim. The first is made just after the plants emerge to certify that 
the crop has been planted and that the population density is adequate.
Any damage must be reported within 72 hours and must be personally certi­
fied by an agent. The probable production and the amount of indemnification 
are set at a third visit just before the harvest begins. Although these 
procedures are much simpler in the compact fields of a collective ejido 
than in scattered individual plots, there have been many problems getting 
the inspections made on time.
SESA
Until March, 1978, when the Union of Ejidos bought 100 tractors, 
all of the agricultural machinery in Uxpanapa was contracted directly by 
the Bank. Apart from a few private operators with a few tractors each 
and the crop-spraying planes, this service has been provided by SESA 
(Servicios Ejldales, S.A.), a subsidiary of the official Bank. Uniform 
charges per hectare cover the direct operating costs, but amortization, 
transportation, and maintenance are subsidized. The contract system al­
lows the accumulation of experience before the capital is committed to 
buy. Each ejido pays only for the services it receives, and is not
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responsible for the risks. Nevertheless, SESA has been blamed for many 
of the problems which have limited yields in the annual crops program.
The regional office is located in Tierra Blanca, over 300 kilometers 
away, and its equipment is spread over a four-state area. Most of it is 
Allis-Chalmers, which is not widely distributed in Mexico. It has been 
difficult to maintain a large enough inventory of spare parts to meet 
every contingency under climatic conditions which are very hard on mach­
inery. Many of the operators are not well! trained, especially in the 
operation of complex equipment such as combine harvesters. They are 
neither capable nor equipped to make even the simplest repairs. One cen­
tral shop and a few repair trucks have not been able to stay ahead of 
maintenance requirements, and a large proportion of the machinery is 
down at any given time.
There has never been enough equipment in the right place at the 
right time, and it has not been possible to prepare all of the cleared land 
before the planting deadlines for the crops. The operators are under con­
stant pressure to work quickly and are paid a bonus for each hectare they 
complete. The quality of the land preparation — ■ which is critical for 
the effective control of erosion, weeds, pests, and diseases —  has been 
very poor. Mechanical harvesting has run into very serious problems, 
both because of unsuitable machinery and because there have not been 
enough combines in \<rork.ing condition to cover the area which has been 
planted.
The permanent central machinery station which has been established 
under the auspices of the Union of Ejidos should be able to profit from 
past experience. It is relatively easy to get parts for the John Deere 
and Caterpillar equipment they have purchased. Nevertheless, the coope­
rative management of a new enterprise is almost certain to create new 
tensions and problems.
The Papaloapan Commission
The agricultural office of the Commission provides the overall 
planning framework, coordinates the activities of the various institutions, 
and administers the experimental programs. It has divided the area into 
five zones. In each, an agronomist and several assistants oversee the 
daily progress of the work and cultivate a demonstration plot. A team 
of social workers visits with the women in the towns to discuss health, 
nutrition, and child care. A pilot program has been set up to demon­
strate how the 1600 square meter garden plots can be used for intensive 
food production.
Production Systems in Mexico
The rice program in Uxpanapa illustrates the problems involved in 
transferring technology into the rainy tropics« As part of its program 
to develop the capacity of the {Southeast, the Federal government is in­
troducing mechanized upland rice on a large scale. Mexico is self- 
sufficent in this grain, vhich is a relatively minor component of the 
national diet. Per capita consumption is only nine kilograms per year, 
compared to nearly 20 in Colombia and as much as 150 in parts of the 
Far East (31, pp. 10-13; 75.9 P* 498). Approximately 750,000 tons have 
been produced in recent years, most of it under irrigation (Table 7).
About half of the national crop is grown on 50,000 irrigated hec­
tares in the northern state of Sinaloa. Experienced farmers,, an active 
program of experimentation and extension, and an established infrastruc­
ture, including 45 percent of Mexicofs milling capacity, have concentrated 
rice in this area. Although experimental plots routinely produce the 
equivalent of six to seven tons per hectare (78, Chart 3), commercial 
yields average just over four, This compares unfavorably with irrigated 
yields of over five tons per hectare in Peru and Colombia (31, pp. 13-16). 
Relative to soybeans, safflower, and the other crops which are grown in 
the same region, rice brings a relatively low price and requires, a great 
deal of water. The investments necessary to; intensify production have 
not been made.
Faced with chronic water shortages in the Northwest, the government 
hopes to reduce the rice allotments in the irrigation districts and trans­
fer as much production as possible into the tropics, where there is suf­
ficient natural rainfall. Although these areas already account for well 
over half of the national area planted with rice, most of it is in small 
plots grown using traditional technology and varieties, and the yields 
are low. Uxpanapa is one of several projects in the Southeast where mech­
anized upland rice is being introduced on a major scale. The others in­
clude the Chontalpa in Tabasco, the Edzna Valley in Campeche, Tierra 
Blanca in Veracruz, and various parts of Chiapas. This policy runs coun­
ter to that of most countries in Latin America, which are increasing pro­
duction through intensive irrigation and the introduction of high-yielding 
varieties (31, 184). ; :
Improved Varieties '
Among important grain crops, rice is uniquely suited to irrigated 
production because it does not take up oxygen from the soil and actually 
grows best in standing water. The flooded field, or "paddy," system has 
developed over many centuries in Asia to take advantage of this fact.
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TABLE 7. MEXICO: SYSTEMS OF RICE PRODUCTION, 1976
(area in hectares; yield in tons per hectare)
System Area
Percent of 
Total Area Average Yield
(hectares) (tons/hectare)
Irrigated and Transplanted 
Modified Asian system, in 
Morelos and other parts of 
central Mexico
25,000 10 4-5
Direct Seeded with Irri-
gation
Mechanized production in 
Sinaloa and other irriga­
tion districts
62,500 25 3-4.5
Upland
Primarily in the tropics, 
including the Southeast—  
both mechanized and slash- 
and-burn
162,500 65 1-2.5
TOTAL 250,000 100 2.9
Source: Leonardo Hernandez Aragon, "Arroz" (Mexico, Secretarla de 
Agricultura y Ganaderia, INIA, Programa de Mejoramiento de Arroz, mimeo, 
1976).
142-
In the past 20 years, there has been an intensive international research 
effort to increase world production by improving the rice plant. Dwarf 
varieties have been developed which can be heavily fertilized with nitro­
gen without lodging, or falling over into the water. In part because 
most of the world's rice is produced under Irrigation in Asia, and in 
part because the package of inputs which is necessary for high yields is 
more easily managed where water can be carefully controlled, very little 
emphasis has been placed on the breeding of varieties which are suitable 
for upland conditions (88).
High-yielding varieties have been brought Into Mexico from the 
Philippines, Colombia, and the United States. INIA, the national research 
institute, has used this genetic material as the basis for a series of 
dwarf rices. These are now used almost exclusively in the irrigated areas 
and are exported to Cuba and Central America. They have not replaced tall 
varieties under upland conditions, because they do not compete well with 
weeds, because they are difficult to harvest by hand, and because they 
are susceptible to short periods of draught and to a variety of pests and 
diseases, particularly the Blast fungus (93). A few Improved varieties 
of intermediate stature have been released, but they are adapted only to 
a narrow range of upland conditions (101). Native varieties, which con­
sistently produce modest yields at low cost, are planted In most areas of 
the Mexican rainy tropics.
The traditional rice farmers in the Southeast work on a small scale. 
They look for heavy, alluvial soils and plant vigorous, tall, fast-growing 
varieties which are able to out-compete the weeds and survive drought and 
other stresses in most years. The seed is planted by hand in widely 
spaced, compact clumps, which facilitates both weeding and harvesting.
The plants in each clump support each other against lodging, and the cir­
culation of air in the spaces in between reduces the humidity of the 
microclimate. Blast and other diseases are a problem, but the campesinos 
are willing to accept yields below two tons per hectare.
1976 —  Three Thousand Hectares
The first commercial planting In Uxpanapa was made in 1975, when 
810 hectares of a dwarf variety from Sinaloa (Sinaloa A-6 8) were sown.
The rice was seriously affected by Blast, key inputs did not arrive on 
time, there were not enough combine harvesters, and the crop was entirely 
lost. The next year, both the Papaloapan Commission and the Bank made 
a tremendous effort to bring all of the necessary elements of their sys­
tem together. With some crucial exceptions, they did remarkably well 
organizing a complex operation for the first time in an isolated area. 
Neverthe?.ess, the average yield was extremely low.
Two varieties were planted: the Colombian dwarf C1CA-4 on 1,200 
hectares and the tall American Bluebormet-50 on 2,000 hectares, in a 
total of 23 ejidos. The former was developed by an international team
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of breeders at CIAT-ICA,—  primarily for use under irrigation. Although 
an attempt was made to incorporate resistance, to Blast into its genetic 
structure, it has proved highly susceptible under a vhriety of experiment­
al and field conditions (29, p. F-ll; 114). It has a short cycle of less 
. than 110 days and must be harvested immediately or it ^shatters," that is, 
.spontaneously drops its grain. It competes very unfavorably with weeds 
under upland conditions, and its growth characteristics make it very dif­
ficult to harvest. The fact that it was chosen at all was the result of 
a breakdown in communications between the Commission, INIA, and the nat­
ional seed company (PRONASE). Bluebonnet-50 has been grown under both 
irrigated and upland conditions in various parts of the world for many 
years.. It is tall and vigorous.
In spite of numerous organizational problems, the fields were planted 
successfully. Virgin soil is relatively free from pathogens which affect 
crops imported from other areas. Most of the fields had been cleared for 
■ the first time only a few months before, so there were few weeds even 
though the seedbeds were prepared hurriedly. Between 90 and 115 kilos of 
seed per hectare were broadcast from both tractors and airplanes, produc- 
. ing a dense stand which increased the humidity in the microclimate under 
the canopy, favoring the spread of Blast.
.A few isolated tests and field trials revealed a phosphorus deficiency 
in the soil, so 90 kilos of P2O5 were applied per hectare. ; Nitrogen prob­
ably would have been released in sufficient quantity from the freshly 
cleared land, but the Commission decided to apply' 60 kilos of N per hectare 
to speed decomposition and to insure an adequate' supply to the crop. The 
nearly constant cloud cover shaded the rice from direct sunlight, which 
reinforced the effect of the nitrogen to encourage luxuriant vegetative 
growth. The Bluebonnet variety which normally reaches a height of 155-165 
centimeters, grew as tall as two meters.
3/
Rice Blast
The most serious single problem was Rice Blast (Fyricularia orzae). 
Although this fungus attacks rice grown under all systems, it is a serious 
limiting factor in upland production all over the world. Consistently 
high temperatures, high stand density, high humidity in the microclimate 
immediately surrounding the plant, and light, well-drained soils favor its 
propagation. The rapid uptake of nitrogen by the plant produces succulent 
growth which reduces the silica concentration in.the cell walls and reduces 
their resistance to the disease. There is a high correlation between nitro­
gen fertilizer application and Blast infestation. The management problems
3J CIAT (Centro Internacional de Agricultura Tropical) *.ls an international 
agricultural research center in Cali, Colombia. ICA (Instituto Colom- 
biano Agropecuario) is the Colombian national research institute. The 
two institutions have worked together to adapt improved genetic material 
from Asia to Latin American conditions, and have released a series of new 
varieties. Their impact ha3 been analyzed by Scobie and Posada (184),
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are complex, because the same practices which lead to vigorous plants 
and high yield potential are also favorable to the disease (30, 35, 81,
8 8, 151, 200).
In Uxpanapa, the Commission relied heavily on the application of 
fungicides. Chemical control need not be one hundred percent effective 
to maintain adequate yields, but the sprays are very expensive. The 
value of the grain which would have been lost must exceed the cost of 
treatment by a significant margin if the economic threshold is to fall 
within an acceptable range, Fumigation should be combined with accurate 
weather forecasting and careful monitoring of the microclimatic conditions. 
Blast is chemically controlled in large areas of Japan, a developed coun­
try with a well-established extension system, high average yields, and a 
very high support price for rice (87). It is very difficult to keep costs 
within reasonable limits when introducing the crop into a frontier area.
Uxpanapa is far from the nearest important rice producing area, and 
the fields were distributed in a strip along 70 kilometers of road. Nev­
ertheless, Blast spores found the plants and attacked them very seriously. 
The combination of daily rainfall, high humidity, night-time fog, a con­
tinuous plant canopy, very permeable soils, and high levels of available 
nitrogen created almost ideal conditions for the propagation of the fun­
gus. The technical staff was small and over-worked. It was simply not 
possible for the agronomists to find each infestation immediately, much 
less predict them by monitoring the microclimate in 3,400 hectares. When­
ever they located an attack, they treated it with aerial applications of 
the fungicide Benlate, mixed with Sevin to control Fall Army Worms and 
other pests. Benlate is primarily a protective chemical, and its cura­
tive effects are limited. As many as six applications, at a cost of 310 
pesos per hectare each, were necessary in many areas.
It soon became apparent that the credit contracts had grossly under­
estimated the costs of pest and disease control. The staff was under a 
great deal of pressure to make Uxpanapa produce rice. They were unwilling 
to consider writing the crop off to the Insurance, even after it had be­
come clear that the value of production was not going to be able to pay 
back the credit. They saw themselves fighting a skirmish in the conquest 
of the jungle, which they were determined to win.
A common example of their dilemma would involve a field which had 
been sprayed three times and for which the credit allowance had been ex­
hausted. If one of the field agronomists reported a new infestation, the 
Bank manager had to decide on the spot whether he would let it go and col­
lect on the insurance, or spray again and try to save the crop. It might 
be possible to average the extra cost over all the ejido*s fields and stay 
within the limit, or it might be possible to arrange for an insured over­
draft. Given the pressure on all sides to produce rice, he usually gave 
his authorization. The presidents of the ejidos, afraid that there would 
be no more cash advances to their people and no chance of a profit if the 
fields were abandoned, signed the forms.
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The CICA-4 variety was almost entirely destroyed by Blast; the little 
that survived could not be harvested before it shattered. The more vig­
orous Bluebonnet-50 did respond to chemical control, but the disease 
caused severe damage. Helminthisporium. insects, rats, birds, and other 
pests all took their toll. The crop went into the harvest with a very 
high level of cost already expended, and with its yield potential signi­
ficantly reduced.
Relatively few ejidatarios had moved into Uxpanapa at this time, 
and this was their first experience with mechanized agriculture. Twenty 
hectares had been planted per person, but nobody was given responsibility 
for a particular area, and they were not trained to detect Blast or insect 
attacks scientifically. They were intimidated by the airplanes and the 
other expensive factors of production over which they had no control.
Aside from helping to mix the highly toxic chemicals, they had very 
little to do and made very little in cash advances.
The Harvest —  Combines and Hired Labor
Just as the harvest was about to begin in late September, between 
30 and 40 percent of the surviving crop was blown down by high winds.
It lodged irregularly, so that almost every field was a patchwork of 
standing and fallen rice which was impossible to harvest efficiently by 
machine. Bluebonnet-50 does not shatter easily; the grain from fallen 
panicles could be gathered in if it did not lie on the ground for so 
long that it sprouted.
SESA brought 35 small Allis-Chalmers combines into the zone in the 
expectation that they would be able to harvest 50 hectares a day. They 
were very poorly maintained; they had not been greased, their belts and 
chains were loose, their mechanisms were clogged with rotten sorghum left 
over from the previous season. They broke down constantly. Even if they 
were in perfect condition, these machines were not suited to the very 
difficult conditions in Uxpanapa. Rice is routinely combined when it is 
grown under irrigation. The fields are drained a month before the har­
vest, which gives the plants time to dry out. A chemical dessicant is 
often applied to further reduce the straw to absolutely dry chaff. Gangs 
of combines work down the leveled fields, separating the grain by a sys­
tem of shakers and fans, unloading into the waiting trucks every few passes
In Uxpanapa, most of the fields were hilly and uneven. It rained 
almost every day throughout the harvest season. The plants had grown 
very tall and had put out a thick mass of watery vegetation. On any 
given day, the machines had to wait several hours after the rain let up 
to enter the fields. They had to manoeuvre around the lodged patches and 
cut what amounted to thick, wet grass as much as six feet high. Much of 
the grain stuck to the straw, did not fall down through the separators, 
and was thrown out the back as trash. A stick left over from the clear­
ing operation would shut a combine down for half a day or more.
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The harvest lasted for two months. Between 11 arid 23 machines were. 
in working condition on those days when it was dry enough to enter the 
fields. They concentrated on the easiest areas and left a very high pro­
portion of the grain in the fields. Time was lost as the scattered com­
bines drove back to the reception centers to unload. The Bank could not 
find enough trucks to ship the rice in bulk to its own mill in Acayucan.
The private merchant who was contracted to buy the grain in the field re­
quired that it be bagged by hand. Cutting an average of 500 kilos per day, 
the machines were able to harvest just under a thousand tons.
Once it became clear that the combines were not going to be able to 
do more than salvage a small proportion of the rice, the Commission attemp­
ted to bring in hired labor to cut" the lodged patches by hand. There are 
millions of campesinos in Mexico who work off their own farms or who are 
entirely landless. The sugar mills in the tropics contract thousands of 
cutters every year for extremely hard and unpleasant labor. Nevertheless, 
it is almost impossible to organize a group of workers on a short-term 
basis without paying them very well.
The Chinantec ejidatarios were in a rebellious mood. They had been 
promised high incomes from a system of modern agriculture in which they 
had no effective participation and which had provided them with very little 
work. They had signed millions of pesos worth of credit receipts which 
the reduced production could not possibly pay. If they had known that 
they were going to have to cut the grain b y ,hand, they would have planted 
small areas using their traditional system, which they knew how to manage. 
Rice which has been broadcast and then lodges falls into a thick, tangled 
mat which is almost impossible to cut with a machete, and is extremely 
slow work with a sickle. A man might possibly harvest a hectare, but 
certainly not 20,
A total of 575 workers were found; a third of them from Ojitlan and 
the rest from surrounding areas. The Commission paid 58,000 pesos to 
bring them in, but they harvested very little rice (129). The Bank faced 
a difficult dilemma: beyond a certain point, the more it paid the more it 
lost. It first offered 50 centavos for each kilo cut and threshed into 
barrels by hand. The insurance company modified its standard procedure 
and agreed to pay indemnification for everything which was not actually 
harvested, which took the burden of increasing costs off the ejidatarios. 
The Commission agreed to make some payments in lieu of profits. The im­
ported campesinos refused to work for less than the minimum wage, 56 pesos 
a day, which they could not make at the rate they were offered. They were 
dissatisfied with the high cost of food, which absorbed most of their 
earnings, the poor accommodations, and the general disorganization of the 
program. Most of them left within a week. New recruits were trucked di­
rectly to isolated camps before they had a chance to talk to anyone, but 
they still left.
Increasingly desperate as the rice rotted and sprouted on the ground, 
the Bank raised the rate in stages and finally paid 1.25 per.kilo, nearly
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half of the value of the grain, but to no avail. The season’s losses 
were distributed among the insurance company, the Bank, the Commission, 
and SESA, and certainly ran well above the 11 million pesos reflected in 
the Bank’s figures. General confidence in the program was badly shaken. 
Reports went back to 0jitlan of a big failure in Uxpanapa, strengthening 
the hand of the opposition faction. The director of the agricultural 
program resigned.
1977 —  The Problems Persist
The next year, the Commission reduced the area to be planted by 50 
percent, hoping to be able to organize the same basic system more effi­
ciently on a smaller scale. As every siash-and-burn farmer knows very 
well, the longer tropical forest soils are cultivated, the more weeds, 
pests, and diseases threaten the crops. Costs inevitably go up unless a 
stable and efficient agricultural system can be found. The devaluation 
of the peso in 1976 increased the costs of inputs, but the prices for 
basic grains were.kept low to control the inflationary spiral in the 
cities. The 1977 rice program in Uxpanapa was affected by all of the 
elements in this squeeze.
Once again, the land preparation was hurried. In theory, this oper­
ation should be performed at the beginning of the dry season,, to expose 
the soil to the sterilizing effects of the sun (117). Time did not per­
mit this, and the fields were not sprayed for soil pests, an increasingly 
serious problem. The disks did not break up the surface well enough to 
kill the weeds and the volunteers from the previous years’ crops. John­
son Grass, an especially tough weed which is resistant to most herbicides, 
was accidentally introduced with the rice seed. Blast attacked again and 
caused significant damage, although a better mixture of fungicides was 
applied. Other diseases, insects, and pests including birds, were even 
more concentrated than the year before. There was a short drought in 
August which seriously affected the plants. Again, there were not enough 
functioning combines to harvest the grain which did mature. The average 
yield was half what the same variety, Bluebonnet-50, produced in 1976.
1978 —  With or Without the Ejidatarios
Neither the ejidatarios, the insurance company, nor the Bank were 
willing to try again in 1973. The Pspaloapan Commission agreed that large 
scale rice production would have to wait until more resistant varieties 
were found and a more easily controlled system was developed. Credit was 
approved for less than 400 hectares of rice planted by hand on land pre­
pared by machine. Although the fields were to be located in compact blocks, 
each ejidatario was to be responsible for one or two hectares, or whatever 
he thought that he could cultivate and harvest by himself. Bluebonnet-50 
was to be planted at the much lower density of 60 kilos per hectare in rows,
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bo th to avoid Blast by decreasing the humidity of the microclimate, and 
to facilitate harvesting if the crop lodge*}. It wa$ hoped that a modest 
program of this kind would give both the ejidatarios and the technical 
personnel a chance to learn and develop the most appropriate method for 
growing rice in the region.
The large public expenditures have made Uxpanapa very susceptible to 
pressures from other agencies of the government. A serious drought in 
Sinaloa and Oaxaca in 1978, which brought the irrigation reservoirs down 
to dangerously low levels, led to the acceleration of the policy of mov­
ing rice into rain-fed areas. The rain-fed agriculture district in Coat- 
zacoalcos allotted Uxpanapa 4,000 hectares, more than the area planted in 
the disastrous 1976 season. The Commission realized that it could not 
force the ejidatarios to take on that much credit when they all understood 
the risks so well. It decided to plant rice itself on ejidal land with 
hired labor. Any profits would be distributed equally among the members; 
any losses would be absorbed by the Commission. SESA gave assurances that 
150 combines would be available for the harvest.
As of this writing, I do not know how the season went. The ejida­
tarios have not worked well within the system which has been introduced. 
The Idle Lands Law allows the government to cultivate surplus area In 
ejidos. There is a danger that the Commission’s time, energy, and re­
sources will be concentrated on its own operations, that this same for­
mula will be repeated in subsequent seasons, and that the collective 
ejido will no longer be the basic unit of production in Uxpanapa.
Maize
Both the Chinantecs and the spontaneous settlers are fundamentally 
maize farmers. This grain is the basic element In their diet. Their 
traditional systems are designed to provide the best possible growing 
conditions for the crop in a variable,and difficult environment. They 
are capable of producing modest yields on small plots without any capital 
or technical assistance at all. Mexico is experiencing shortages of do­
mestically produced maize, because it yields poorly and receives a lower 
price than alternative crops in most parts of the country. Less than ten 
percent of the eight million hectares planted in recent years are culti­
vated using modern technology. The government has mounted a major cam­
paign to introduce hybrids and modern cultural practices into regions 
where che annual rainfall is greater than 700 millimeters, particularly 
in the Southeast. This policy Is based on the assumption that it should 
be.' possible to triple national production simply by extending Improved 
technologies to these areas (217_j p. 144). Whether this goal is realistic 
or not, it has put the Papxlcapan Commission under a great deal of pressure 
to .grow maize in Uxpanapa.
It: is not an area well suited to naize production. The very high 
rainfall in the summer season, between 2,300 and 2,800 millimeters between
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June and December, affects development, favors the spread of pests and 
diseases, and damages the grain in the ear. The spontaneous colonists 
have had better luck in the winter season. They select plots where the 
soils have a high water-holding capacity, and plant in December before 
the end of the heavy rains. The plants have time to establish the deep 
rooting systems which allow them to survive the droughts of March, April 
and May. Working on a much larger scale, the Commission has not been 
able to choose appropriate soils or get the planting done in time to 
avoid drought stress. In the first four years, yields in both seasons 
in the fields grown with credit have averaged between 200 and 800 kilo- ? 
grams per hectare, less than half of what the traditional farmers are 
able to produce. These figures include areas which were never harvested 
and reflect organizational as well as biological limitations.
Hybrids and Native Varieties
Over the past 35 years, both foreign and Mexican plant breeders 
have been attempting to improve the maize plant, with only limited success. 
Over thousands of years of continuous production* the campesinos have se­
lected open-pollinated native varieties which are well adapted to the 
very specific ecological conditions and the pests and diseases of each 
small region. Hybrids, which revolutionized production in the United 
States, are produced from a deliberately;reduced genetic base to perform 
extremely well under a narrow set of conditions. There is no natural 
corn belt in Mexico; the country,, particularly the tropics, is divided , 
into many distinct ecological zones- This does not permit the widespread . 
adoption of a single hybrid strain. Hybrids cost more to produce than r 
native, varieties, both because high planting densities, fertilizer, and 
chemical pest control are necessary; to create the conditions which are 
favorable for high yields. Improved open-pollinated varieties take many 
years to develop and face similar problems, r
In the first seasons in Uxpanapa, the Bank and the insurance company 
mandated the use of H-503 and H-507, which were;developed in the early 
1950's and are the most commonly used hybrids in the tropics. The first 
is a dwarf which performed very badly and was dropped after one season. . 
H-507 has suffered from excess moisture, drought, Helminthisporium dis­
ease, ear worms, and other pests.; Its major drawback is that the leaves 
of the ear do not; completely;close at the point, allowing moisture and 
insect larvae to enter. Starting in 1976, the Commission decided to buy v 
native varieties of the Tuxpena type from the spontaneous settlers in the 
hope that they would do better adapted to local conditions. The seed was 
selected for uniformity and treated by the national seed company. The 
plants are hardy and completely enclose their ears with tightly wrapped 
leaves. Nevertheless, a large-scale operation does not permit the carefu^L 
plot selection and husbandry practices which the traditional campesinos 
have developed. Although the fields have been planted at high densities, 
fertilized, and sprayed; the yields have been too low to recover the costs 
of production.
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The Labor Shortage
The greatest single problem limiting maize production during the 
first years was a severe shortage of labor. Maize was grown with a semi- 
mechanized system which required between 30 and 50 man-days of labor ir­
regularly distributed through the year —  between two and three times 
that required for the rice (Chart 14). The fields were prepared and fur­
rowed with tractors; field operations from planting through harvesting 
were performed by hand using methods borrowed from the traditional tech­
nology of the tropics. Most of the area was planted by espeque. A fas­
ter method was to drop the seeds directly in a furrow and cover it with 
one's foot, but this only worked if the campesinos walked immediately be­
hind the tractor and planted x h^ile the furrow was still moist. Using the 
traditional system, a skilled man finds moisture at a slightly different 
depth with each push of his stick, which also lightly compacts the soil 
and provides a good micro-environment for germination. The stands planted 
in furrows were very uneven. Fertilizer was applied in a separate oper­
ation.
The resident population was not large enough to take care of the 
fields which had been cleared and prepared. Groups of the Chinantecs 
were brought down from Ojitlan to plant and fertilize. They worked as 
rapidly as possible to maximize their cash advances, which were paid on 
a per-hectare basis, and then went home to tend their old fields. The 
Commission and the Bank were left with insufficient manpower to accom­
plish vital but intermittent tasks such as replanting poorly developed 
patches, weeding, and applying chemicals.
Furthermore, as Chart 14 shows, the maize harvest periods conflicted 
with other, more pressing activities: the Spring planting in May and June, 
the rice harvest in October and November, and the Winter planting in De­
cember and January. When the campesinos finally could get into the fields, 
they frequently found that the crop had deteriorated significantly. If it 
became clear that the value of production would not pay the accumulated 
costs, the last, pre-harvest inspection by the insurance company became 
especially important.
There Is a key yield below which the value of the grain will not pay 
for the cost of harvesting and transportation. If the agent estimated a 
yield slightly above this, the ejidatarios had to turn their entire pro­
duction over to the Bank to meet their Obligations. If he set a slightly 
lower figure and declared a total loss, they could write their indebted­
ness off to the insurance, sell some of the grain to private merchants, 
and keep what they needed for food. It is not surprising that many ejida­
tarios went out at night to pick or even destroy some of the maize before 
the inspector arrived. This was illegal and constituted "stealing” from 
their own fields. Serious conflicts of this kind obliged the Insurance 
company to cancel the policies of some ejidos. The campesinos refused to 
harvest simply to turn the product over to the Bank, grain rotted in the 
fields, debts went unpaid, and further credit was denied.
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The technical staff, which was working non-stop to keep their system 
functioning, blamed these labor problems on the irresponsibility and lazi­
ness of the campesinos. The Chinantecs and other settlers, who of course 
take much better care of their own crops, complained about their small in­
comes and the low yields of the government^ expensive system. At the 
same time, the people needed maize to eat as more and more of them moved 
permanently into Uxpanapa. They insisted on the right to plant small 
plots for their own use without credit, which of course diverted even more 
labor from the commercial operations.
Increased Mechanization
The Papaloapan Commission has tried to solve these problems by In­
creasing the degree of mechanization. Mechanical harvesting would prevent 
the long delays after the grain matures, which would certainly increase 
yields if it could be managed effectively. Combines require perfectly 
straight rows, and the campesinos have been unwilling to plant slowly and 
carefully with string lines at the rate they have been paid per hectare.
The first experimental plantings with machines were unsatisfactory, 
because the uneven terrain and the trash left over from the clearing made 
them skip and place the seed too close to the surface. As the residue 
decomposes, mechanical planters may be able to work effectively on the 
more level fields. This would allow the winter crop to be sown before 
the end of the rainy season, assuming that the land could be prepared on 
time and that the machines could work in a season when the soil is com­
pletely saturated. In 1978, the Union of Ejidos bought 27 planters, 30 
maize heads for SESAfs combines, and three large grain dryers to reduce 
post-harvest losses. CONASUPO, the state buying agency, planned to open 
reception centers in the zone. Nevertheless, it was still uncertain 
whether maize would ever be economically viable in the region on a com­
mercial scale.
Plate VI11-1
The Collective ejidos con­
tract with the bank for 
credit and technical man­
agement. The program has 
concentrated on upland 
rice and maize in the first 
four years. Land prepara­
tion and all stages of rice 
production have been 
highly mechanized, using 
equipment provided by the 
bank. The Union of Ejidos 
is taking over this function.
Plate VIII-2
Mechanized upland rice, grown 
without irrigation or any kind 
of water control, is a risky 
system. Hardy varieties resis­
tant to diseases, especially 
Rice Blast, lodging, and short 
periods of drought have not 
been developed.
Above: Ejidatarios watch the 
mechanical harvest.
Right: The available combines 
have not been able to work 
efficiently on the uneven ter­
rain in Uxpanapa.
Below: Rice which has lodged 
in a patchwork pattern.
Plate VI11-3
Plate VI11-4
20 hectares were planted per ejidatario, much 
more than they could possibly harvest by hand 
when the available combines were incapable of 
completing the job. Hired workers from outside 
of the zone, some of whom are seen negotiating 
with the bank manager, demanded higher pay 
than the value of the harvest could support.
Plate VI11-5
After the land is prepared 
with tractors, maize is 
sown, cared for, and har­
vested by hand.
Above: ejidatarios using 
the traditional planting 
stick, or espeque.
Right: seed being planted 
in furrows opened up by 
tractors. The first system is 
slower, but has resulted in 
better rates of germination 
and more even stands.
* *
Plate VI11-6
Maize has a much higher labor 
requirement than rice. Neverthe­
less, the cash advances have been 
too small and too irregularly 
distributed through the season to 
encourage the Chinantecs to 
move permanently into Uxpan- 
apa. Neither hybrid nor native 
varieties have yielded well 
enough to cover the costs of 
production under the climatic 
conditions in the zone.
PERENNIAL CROPS AND LIVESTOCK
CHAPTER IX .
The agricultural program in Uxpanapa has emphasized annual crops 
in the first years. Nevertheless, all of the technical studies which 
the Papaloapan Commission has made have recommended that the forest be 
replaced with tree crops and pastures. They permit the soil to be kept 
covered at all times, and,their root systems aire a protection against 
erosion. The collective ejidos, which should combine the social advan­
tages of smallholder production with the economies of scale of large 
plantations, were considered particularly appropriate for enterprises 
of this kind. Furthermore, the necessary processing, storage and mar­
keting facilities could be centralized under the auspices of the Union 
of Ej idos.
It was important to choose crops and systems of production with a 
high probability of commercial success, because they require large in­
vestments which do not begin to pay off for several years. Detailed 
knowledge about the common tropical plantation crops has been accumu­
lated in many parts of the world. In addition, the economic potential > 
of many other species which have long been ignored has received increas­
ing attention in recent years (145, 177). In tropical Mexico, the best 
choice in the short run is the production of perennial crops which can, 
be substituted for foods or industrial raw materials which are currently 
either imported or produced at relatively high cost under irrigation. 
Natural rubber fits these criteria very well, and a program to plant
5,000 hectares was initiated in Uxpanapa in 1975. Other possibilities, 
including sugar cane and African oil palm, are being investigated.
Ranching is the most widespread enterprise in the Southeast, but' 
the average efficiency of the operations is very low. Demand for both 
meat and milk is expanding rapidly in Mexico, especially in the mush­
rooming petro-chemical centers along the Gulf Coast, Intensive' livestock 
operations are being developed in Uxpanapa as rapidly as the institutional 
structure will allow.
Rubber
Rubber is produced by a variety of trees and shrubs. It was used 
for balls and other articles by the native peoples of Mexico before the 
Spanish conquest. The Olmecs, the earliest important culture, are known 
by their Nahuatl name, which means "the people of the rubber country." 
Latex was extracted from the Castilla elastica tree, and formed an impor­
tant part of the tribute paid to the Aztec empire by its subjects in the 
tropical lowlands (173, p. 3).
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Almost all of the natural rubber produced in the world today is 
tapped from one kind of tree, Kavea Brasiliensis, which is found wild 
in the Amazon basin. Raw rubber becomes sticky when it is hot, so that 
it was little more than a curiosity until George Firestone patented the 
vulcanization process in 1837. The introduction of rubberized clothing 
at the time of the American Civil War increased demand, but it was the 
rubber tire which made it an important item in world trade. Enormous 
fortunes were made in Brazil at the end of the 19th Century from the 
collection of latex from wild trees.
Almost the entire stock of the modern plantations is descended from 
seeds which Sir Henry Wickham collected in Brazil and sent to the Royal 
Botanical Gardens in ICew, England in 1876. H.N. Ridley, the director of 
the botanical garden in Singapore, almost single-handedly developed the 
basis of the modern cultural system, by grafting high-yielding clones 
onto vigorous root stock and by devising a tapping method which increases 
the flow rather than damaging the trees. Plantations spread very rapidly 
to meet growing industrial demand. Southeast A.sia now produces nearly 
90 percent of the world’s natural rubber (158, Chapter III; 160, pp. 148- 
151).
The establishment of plantations in tropical America has been limited 
by a fungus disease, South American Leaf Blight (Dothidell ulei, or Micro- 
cyclus ulei) which has never spread to Asia. The problem illustrates the 
danger of growing a wild plant in monoculture. Only 12 to 14 Hevea trees 
are found per hectare in their native habitat. This very low density pre­
vents the spread of spores and the disease is rare. When the somewhat 
more susceptible high-yielding varieties are brought together in one area, 
the pathogens are concentrated and the problem becomes very serious. An
8,000 hectare plantation set up in Brazil by the Ford Motor Company, 
Fordlandia, was destroyed in the 1930's, and early attempts to introduce 
intensive cultivation into Mexico failed (173, p. 4; 178; 200, pp. 181- 
186).
History in Mexico
During the Second World Itfar, the Allies were cut off from the major 
producing centers by the Japanese. The U.S. Department of Agriculture 
sponsored an intensive program to establish productive plantations in 
Mexico and Central America, Varieties partially resistant to Leaf Blight 
were found, and valuable information on cultural methods was collected 
and tested experimentally. The same strategic shortage stimulated the 
development of technology for the production of synthetic rubber from 
petroleum. After the war,.Mexico could not compete with the lower costs 
of production of both the Asian plantations and the international oil 
industry. A modest development; program under the auspices of the Papa- 
loapan Commission was promote^ without much enthusiasm in the 1950*s.
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By 1961, national rubber consumption was increasing very rapidly.
To reduce the growing import bill, the government set up a natural rubber 
program financed by a tax on imports. It was administered first by INIA 
and later by the Mexican Coffee Institute, as a complement to its other 
activities in the same areas. New plantations were set up and credit 
and technical assistance were provided to growers during the six years 
of the program (Table 8).
Support was withdrawn at least in part because the small group of 
processing industries, dominated by subsidiaries of the big American 
tire companies, insisted on importing their raw material. Ninety-five 
percent of the natural rubber imported into Mexico comes via the United 
States, which of course is not a producer. National production peaked 
at about 5,000 tons, less than seven percent of demand, in 1974. Two 
synthetic rubber plants were opened in 1967, but natural and synthetic 
rubber are not perfect substitutes for all uses. They are combined in 
the manufacture of tires, which account for 65 percent of demand. Nat­
ural rubber imports are expected to rise to over 60,000 tons by 1980 
(173, pp. 49-56: 185).
After credit for new plantings was discontinued in 1967, the pro­
ducers received erratic prices and very limited technical assistance.
The experiment station at El Palmar, which has worked on rubber since 
the 1940’s, has been funded sporadically and has not kept up with im­
proved varieties and cultural methods. Only small farmers and ejida- 
tarios with less than five hectares of trees and very limited alternate 
opportunities have kept up with the management practices which are neces­
sary to maintain adequate yields. The national average of 625-700 kilos 
of dry rubber per hectare is very low by world standards. Yields in 
Malaysia, the worldrs largest producer, range between 1,000 and 1,500 
kilos on small holdings to over 2,500 kilos on large plantations. The 
costs of production in Mexico are 30 percent higher than the Asian ave­
rage (160, p. 170; 185).
Fresh latex should be transported and processed as quickly as pos­
sible under perfectly sterile conditions, in much the same way as fresh 
milk. There are seven small processing plants in the Southeast with a 
combined capacity of 755 metric tons per month, or about 7,000 tons over 
the nine to ten month tapping season (155). Fluctuating prices, and the 
logistical problems of collecting from scattered plantations, have prevented 
the organization of efficient processing systems. Using very simple equip­
ment, the plants turn out smoked sheets, crepes, and granular rubber from 
latex which has been coagulated and stored for as long as a week in the 
field. Different grades are mixed into a homogeneous product of inferior 
quality. Domestic rubber is used primarily for shoe soles and other sim­
ple items with low specifications (173, p. 32).
The energy crisis of the early 1970*5, which pushed up the price of 
both synthetic and natural rubber in the world market, has led to a new 
program for the development of plantations, spearheaded by the Papaloapan
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TABLE 8 . MEXICO: NATIONAL RUBBER PROGRAM, MEXICAN COFFEE
INSTITUTE PLANTATIONS IN 1967
(hectares)
Region Area
(hectares)
Northern Oaxaca and Southern Veracruz 5,588
Tabasco and the Gulf Coast of Chiapas 818
The Pacific Coast of Chiapas 245
TOTAL 6,651
Source: Jose Rodriguez Vallejo and Hector Duarte Penalosa, "El
Hule Hevea en la Cuenca del Rio Papaloapan: Antecedentes y Bases 
para un Programa de Hule en los Valles de Uxpanapa y Bajo Papaloapan" 
(Mexico, Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulicos, Comision del Papaloapan, 
mimeo, 1975).
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Commission in Uxpanapa (Table 9). A special rubber authority, financed 
through the offical Bank, plans to establish nearly eighteen thousand 
hectares in the Southeast, more than tripling the area in production, and 
to create new processing plants and other services. Host of the world*s 
rubber is grown within 10 degrees of the equator; the natural conditions 
in Mexico are not ideal. The trees mature more slowly and yield less 
than in Africa and Asia. Higher labor and other costs will almost certain­
ly prevent Mexico from competing in the world market. Nevertheless, if 
the new plantations can produce a ton of dry latestr-petf hectare, it is be­
lieved that they could supply as much as a third of domestic demand (198).
The Program in Uxpanapa
The rubber program in Uxpanapa has been organized rapidly under a 
great deal of pressure. The Papaloapan Commission, in cooperation with 
the experiment station at El Palmar, had produced over four million young 
trees ready to be transplanted into permanent plantations in the ejidos 
by 1978. Seeds were germinated in shaded beds, and the seedlings were 
established in densely planted nurseries. After a year, they were bud- 
grafted with high-yielding clones resistant to Leaf Blight. Budstock 
loses its viability after a few days, and was transported from El Palmar, 
over 400 kilometers from Uxpanapa. Grafting is impossible in the rain, 
and it was difficult to insure that enough material and trained person­
nel were available when conditions were favorable. The proportion of 
successful grafts was disappointing, and the nurseries were damaged by 
Leaf Blight, insects, moles and other pests.
Seedlings should be established in plantations within a year of the 
time they are grafted. This pressure built up rapidly, before appropriate 
sites had been identified and prepared, and before the ejidatarios had 
been organized into production teams. A tap root between three and ten 
meters long and an extensive lateral system allow the Hevea tree to tol­
erate infertile soils, if they are deep and well-drained (144, pp. 317- 
318). These conditions were met in the relatively flat areas in Uxpanapa 
which, however, had already been cleared for annual field crops. The soils 
on the steeper slopes, which had been designated for perennial crops in 
the original plan, were too shallow. As more detailed studies were made, 
it was difficult to find suitable areas large enough for efficient plan­
tations —  between one and three hundred hectares.
One of the greatest theoretical advantages of rubber within the 
context of the Uxpanapa resettlement program is that it can provide a 
steady source of year-round employment. The care of the trees from the 
time the stand is planted until it goes into production requires an ave­
rage of 35 man-days per hectare per year. Two people working together 
can tap about 500 trees per morning, nine or ten months a year. The com­
plete care of a mature stand requires between 165 and 200 man-days per hec­
tare per year. An average family can provide 1.7 workers or 530 man 
equivalents; enough to care for two or three hectares with very little
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TABLE 9. MEXICO: NATURAL RUBBER PROGRAM
PROJECTED PLANTINGS THROUGH 1982
(hectares)
Region Area
_  ~ : ' ' (hectares)
Uxpanapa . 5,000
/. - . . ,
Papaloapan Basin
' ' ■
t Oaxaca ' : 4,300
Veracruz : 5,160
Chiapas v 1,720
Tabasco 1,720
TOTAL . - 17,900
■— “ ----- r ~ ----------- 1 ----------------------------  '
Source: Unpublished documents of the Fideicomisp de Hule, 1978.
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surplus time for other activities. If all the work is to be done by the 
ejidatarios themselves, nearly 2 ,0 0 0 families will be required for the
5,000 hectare program which has been planned.
Plantation agriculture will involve a radical change in the lives 
of the Chinantecs, who have always been independent farmers on a small 
scale. During the first years of the Uxpanapa project, the technical 
staff was extremely busy with the annual crops, and was unable to orga­
nize or train the ejidatarios in preparation for the rubber program. In 
1976, not one of the ejidal presidents interviewed for this study knew 
what the program would involve or expressed any interest in growing 
rubber. The previous program in the 1960's was centered in the Tuxtepec 
area, and many of the people had heard stories about low prices and erra­
tic official support.
As the pressure to establish the permanent plantations built up over 
the next few years, meetings were held in the ejidos where suitable, com­
pact areas had been identified. The representatives of the Commission, 
the Bank, and the new rubber authority did little more than promise mil­
lions of pesos in credit advances over the next decade, followed by guar­
anteed high incomes. The Chinantecs were moving into Uxpanapa very slow­
ly, and only a minority of the members of the new ejidos were in residence. 
They had not worked out the details of their organization; who would be 
directly involved in the rubber program, how the labor would be organized 
and paid, and how the plantations would be divided up. The ejidatarios 
were disillusioned by the poor yields and low incomes of the rice and maize 
programs, and accepted long-term credit for rubber if they could meet the 
requirements. Several spontaneously settled ejidos where large areas had 
already been cleared by hand, and which were well organized under cohesive 
leadership, contracted for credit. By 1978, over 1000 hectares had been 
transplanted. The new plantations will take about eight years to come 
into production, so that there will be time to work out the details. Never­
theless, a new crop with complex management requirements is being intro­
duced from the top down, according to:inadequately formulated technical 
criteria, without the effective participation of the ejidatarios.
Livestock
Livestock production will become increasingly important In Uxpanapa 
over the next few years. The Papaloapan Commission is using the project 
as an opportunity to introduce efficient, modern operations, which are 
rare in the Southeast. Since colonial times, more land.in the lowland 
plains has been dedicated to pasture than to any other use (156, pp. 72- 
75). About a third of the approximately 28 million head in Mexico are 
raised on 192 million hectares of pasture in the tropics (15, pp. 28-29). 
Most of the ranches are extensively and inefficiently managed, although 
there are some intensive operations which are integrated with fattening 
and marketing operations in other parts of the country. Cattlemen tend 
to concentrate on either rearing or finishing operations, depending on
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the natural conditions and the level of capital investment. Milk is a 
sideline; there are very few specialized dairies. The principal market 
is in Mexico City, although, the prosperous, rapidly growing petro-chemi- 
cal centers along the Gulf Coast have significant potential.
The most common animal in the tropics is a cross between a native 
criollo type, descendant of the cattle introduced from Europe in the 
16th Century, and Cebu cows from India. In recent years, temperate 
breeds, particularly Brown Swiss., have been introduced to upgrade the 
stock and improve milk production. The many complex factors involved in 
the efficient management of cattle in the .rainy tropics, are beyond the 
scope of this study (99, 220). Constantly high temperatures and humidity 
put the animals under stress and favor the development of diseases and 
both internal and external parasites. The grass is green all year round, 
but its nutritive value declines significantly in the dry season. Native 
breeds are well adapted to these ^ conditions, but their growth, reproduc­
tion, and milk production rates are low. Artificial breeding, improved 
pastures, careful disease and parasite control, and the other practices 
necessary if better animals are to achieve their genetic potential are 
being introduced very slowly. The average stocking rate in the Southeast 
is under one animal unit per hectare, and the average returns are low 
(124, 150).
About 75 percent of the cattle are privately owned, many of them by 
absentee landlords who live in the towns or in other parts of Mexico. Es­
pecially along the forest frontier, the; ranches tend to be large. Most 
ejidatarios are primarily dedicated to crop production. The division of 
the land into small plots, the need to produce much of their own food, and 
very limited capital resources dp not permit livestock operations on a 
large scale. Families keep draught animals -and domestic species such as 
pigs and turkeys, but only rich ejidatarios raise cattle, both as a status 
symbol and as a way to invest surplus capital. The few ejidos which are 
almost: entirely dedicated to livestock are either located on land which 
has become too exhausted for crop production, or are contracted by local 
ranchers to raise their animals (135). Few government development or 
credit programs have been able to overcome the complex economic and social 
problems which hamstring the ejidal sector, and lay a solid groundwork for 
efficient, profitable enterprises.
Cattle Operations in Uxpanapa
In cooperation with FIFA, a specialized agency of the Bank of Mexico 
which finances long-term investments in agriculture, the Commission has 
set up a few intensive operations in Uxpanapa based on improved animals 
and pastures. The basic plan for the first of these, which was established 
in the ejido "Almanza9* in 1977, is outlined in Appendix Table 17. The 
capital investment for the first 10 years of operation is four million 
pesos, financed almost entirely with credit. The enterprise is designed 
as a double-purpose system; live beef animals will be sold to the Mexico
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City market and milk will be produced for local consumption* The animals 
are improved crosses between Cebu, Brown Swiss, and Holstein cattle.
Except for mineral supplements, particularly phosphorus, grazing 
will be the only source of feed throughout the year. African Star Grass 
(Cynadon plectostachyum) has been selected as the principal forage grass 
for the region. Evidence from other parts of Mexico and Puerto Rico (206) 
suggests that this is a good choice. It is established vegetatively and 
rapidly covers the ground by extending its stolons. It does not flower 
and is less subject to rapid changes in nutritive composition than many 
taller species. It responds well to nitrogen fertilizer. It grows back 
readily after grazing and trampling, need not be mown or burned over, and 
is relatively resistant to both drought stress and insect attack. A 
grass-legume mixture will be established In a smaller area to provide 
additional protein to young stock and lactating cows. The pastures will 
be rotated, fertilized, and weeded to prevent the invasion of undesirable 
species and woody shrubs.
When the herd stabilizes after the sixth year of operation, the 
ranch will support over a thousand head of cattle at twice the average 
stocking rate for the Southeast. A permanent work force of four men and 
a part-time veterinarian will be expected to manage a profitable operation.
As was noted in connection with the rubber program, all of the 
agricultural enterprises in Uxpanapa have been competing for the best 
land. According to the original plan, cattle were to graze slopes greater 
than ten percent which would be cleared by hand. The technical repre­
sentatives of FIRA have not been very impressed with the results of the 
rice and maize programs, and have been unwilling to approve large invest­
ments for livestock operations unless they are located on good soils with 
easy access to water. The Commission has been unwilling to write off its
1 ,0 0 0  dollar per hectare investment in mechanized clearing, although the 
''Almanza" ranch is located on land which they cleared. This and other 
institutional conflicts have slowed the establishment of cattle operations 
in other ejidos.
Once again, the government visualizes the introduction of a complex, 
sophisticated, and untested technology into Uxpanapa. The projected per­
formance levels are relatively high, and there may be problems organizing 
the market, especially for milk. If the credit is to be paid back and 
the enterprises profitable, excellent management will be needed. Many 
of the wealthier Chinantecs did keep cattle in the Cerro de Oro lakebed, 
but none of them have any experience in modern husbandry techniques. The 
professional technicians and veterinarians of the government agencies 
will be able to manage one or two pilot operations themselves, but they 
will not be able to keep track of all the details if many ranches of this 
kind are established in the zone.
Very little emphasis has been placed on an alternate policy —  on 
the development of low-cost systems based on sound but less sophisticated
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practiceso In 1973, there were already over 3<>000 head of mixed cattle 
in the zone. Some of them had been brought in by the Chinantecs; the 
others belonged to the spontaneous settlers. The ejidatarios have been 
frustrated that neither credit nor their own funds which are deposited 
in the r01*0 * ho TT«±«n &£ Ejidos have beets available to expand and 
improve these operationsB
They would prefer relatively simple systems based on Cebu-criollo 
crosses and hardy native grasses= The cattle would not grow as quickly 
as the improved breeds under ideal conditions^ they would lose weight 
during the dry season, and they would give less milk* Nevertheless, 
careful management practices such as pasture rotations, supplemental 
feeding of agricultural wastes, and intensive training programs could 
make the operations profitable. Improved animals and forages could be 
introduced when the people were capable of managing them themselves (99, 
193).
Sugar Cane, Oil Palm, and Other Experiments
There is more experience with sugar cane production in the Southeast 
than with any other perennial crop. The Fapaloapan Commission has set: 
out plots to test the performance of a number of Mexican and Cuban vari­
eties in Uxpanapa. As would be expected in a newly cleared area, experi­
mental yields have been highs 105 tons of cane per hectare with a 19 per­
cent sugar content. The crop is a very high consumer of nutrients. In 
other areas with similar soils and environmental conditions,, such as the 
fields associated with the Lopez Mateos mill near Tuxtepec, yields have 
fallen off rapidly after a few yeats , and erosion has become a serious 
problem (175, p. 492). Detailed technical studies have not; yet been made 
in Uxpanapa, but it has been estimated that between two and five thousand 
hectares would have to be planted to justify the construction of a small 
mill, The crop would require the best soils which are available.
When cane is grown on ejidal land in other areas, all of the mechan­
ical field operations are performed directly by the mill on a contract 
basis. The ejidatarios, as owners of the enterprise, are unwilling to 
perform the back-breaking labor of cutting cane. Outside workers are 
brought in, and the ejidatarios live off the rent without taking any risks 
or doing much of any work at all (107).
African Oil Palm (Elaesis guineesis) is a native of the rainy tropics 
and is one of the most productive sources of high-quality oil in the world. 
Mexico is importing increasing quantities of both edible and industrial 
oils. Preliminary studies have concluded that it could be a profitable 
enterprise in Uxpanapa, although a shortage of direct sun may limit yields 
(152). There is almost no experience in its culture in Mexico; it will be 
necessary to train technicians and run field trials before capital is com- 
mited on a large scale. Oil palm is a promising long-term prospect, if
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the organizational problems of operating a complex plantation system 
can be worked out in the rubber program.
An experimental program is planned to test other possibilities, 
including the following:
Annuals Perennials Spices Pastures
Maize Sugar Cane Cloves African Star Grass
Rice African Oil Palm Cinnamon Bermuda Grass
Beans Bananas Pepper Santo Domingo Grass
Soy Beans
Sorghum
Chile
Pineapple
Various Vegetables
Avocados
Mangos
Zapote
Mamay
Coconuts
Coffee
Lemons
Oranges
Grapefruit
Cocoa
Cassava
Vanilla Jaragua
Privelegio
Aleman
Various Legumes
Four hundred hectares for a central experiment station have been 
cleared in the valley of the Uxpanapa River on some of the best soils in 
the area. Planning will be coordinated with INIA to avoid the repetition 
of experiments which have already been done elsewhere. The development 
of an ambitious program of this kind is slow, especially as the young and 
inexperienced staff does not have easy access to library or laboratory 
facilities. Nevertheless, Uxpanapa may become an important research 
center for tropical crop production.
The Intensive Garden Program
All of the commercial enterprises in Uxpanapa are operated on a 
large scale on a collective basis. The 1600 square meter plots behind 
each house in the new towns are the only privately operated land in the 
system which is being introduced. An experimental model for the inten­
sive home production of vegetables, pigs, chickens, and rabbits has been 
established to replace the backyard gardens which played an important 
role in the family economy of the Chinantecs in Ojitlan. The Commission 
would like to integrate both production and marketing through an efficient, 
centralized structure. There have been technical problems with the 
temperate vegetables which have been introduced, and the improved breeds 
of rabbits have not prospered. The ejidatarios have shown very little 
interest in the program so far.
Plate IX-1
5,000 hectares of natural rubber (Hevea 
brasiliensis) will be established in plan­
tations on the ejidos by 1981.
Above: a worker grafts a high-yielding 
clone resistant to South American Leaf 
Blight onto vigorous root stock.
Right: peons weeding the nurseries, where 
over 3 million seedlings were established 
by 1978.
Below: a plantation nearTuxtepec, Oaxaca. 
The program in Uxpanapa is part of a 
national plan to triple the area in 
production.
Cattle enterprises are being 
introduced. The herds, com­
posed of Cebu - Holstein - 
Brown Swiss crosses, will 
produce both meat and milk. 
The construction of the instal­
lations provides work to the 
ejidatarios, but employment 
will be minimal once the ranch­
es are in operation.
Plate IX-3
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Very few settlers have planted gardens in the 1600 square meter plots behind 
their houses, the only privately assigned property under the collective 
system.
A model backyard for an experimental program in intensive food production. The 
Commission hopes that women and children will raise vegetables, pigs, chickens, and 
rabbits. Although the garden plays an important role in the family economy in Ojitlan, 
the Chinantecs have showed little interest in this program in Uxpanapa.
CHAPTER X
COLLECTIVE ORGANIZATION AND MODERN AGRICULTURE
The helicopter hovered low over the treetops, banked sharply, 
shot through a patch of mist, and crossed back over the edge of the 
jungle to the perfectly rectangular cultivated fields. The contrast 
was extraordinary; the brilliant green of the young rice plants looked 
like a golf course improbably laid out in the wilderness. Each field 
was surrounded by the darker color of the ragged windbreaks, and was dot­
ted with eight evenly spaced black piles of trash, some of which were 
still smoking from the recent burn. TJe passed over several areas which 
were not yet planted. In one of them, a bright orange tractor crept along 
at the head of a swath of newly disked, dark red earth. The agronomist, 
who was sitting in the front seat, shouted something into the ear of the 
pilot over the shrill whine of the jet engine and the roar of the blades.
A few moments later, we set down in the-middle of a field, creating a 
small hurricance which whipped at the young maize plants. We got out, 
ducking low, and walked over to a dirt road where a group of Chinantecs 
were resting beside a white dump truck, leaning on their long, hand- 
sharpened planting sticks. They were the group from Paso Limon, who, in 
1976, were held up as a model of collective consciousness and hard work, 
and who symbolized the potential of Uxpanapa.
Me shook hands with everybody, and were introduced to the leader 
of the group, a young man of about thirty. The agronomist asked him 
some questions for our benefit: "How many of you are working here in 
Uxpanapa?" The leader smiled and answered, "thirty-five." "How many 
hectares are you growing this season?" "Seven hundred: six hundred and 
ten of rice and ninety of maize." "How many hectares did you cultivate 
in Ojitlan?” "It’s difficult to say, two or three hectares each, maybe 
eighty between us." The agronomist laughed and slapped him on the back.
Me joked and chatted for a few moments, walked back to the helicopter, 
and continued on our tour.
I visited these people many times in the next few months; nearly 
every day during the rice harvest. Paso Limon is one of the largest and 
most prosperous ejidos in the Cerro de Oro lakebed, and is located near 
the ancient Chinantec center of Tlacuache. It has had a primary school 
since the 1930's, and produces some of the highest yields in the region 
of rice and tobacco on an alluvial plain which is rapidly being eroded 
away by the Usila River. The resettlement program has been very control 
versial in this village, and the community is bitterly divided into 
factions.
In the first stage of the Uxpanapa project, the Papaloapan Commission 
cleared over 150G hectares of good soils at the eastern end of the zone.
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New ejidos had not yet been formally organized in this area, which was 
far from the new towns which were being built first and which had never 
been settled by spontaneous colonists* The Commission and the Bank orga­
nized credit associations of people who would eventually move there to cul­
tivate the crops. The group from Paso Limon were members of a minority in 
the village who had been converted to evangelical Protestantism. They 
were strongly unified already, and were part of the pro-Uxpanapa faction. 
They built temporary dormitories for themselves on the banks of the Uxpan- 
apa River, and moved in without their wives and children. They all looked 
forward to the day when they would confront their adversaries with big 
profits as proof that the Uxpanapa project would benefit all of them if 
they would work together with the government. They signed credit contracts 
for over three and a half million pesos for the first season.
Although more flee was salvaged from their fields than from any other 
part of the zone, the season was a tremendous disappointment. Pest and 
disease control alone cost over a million pesos. The rice lodged, and 
neither the combines nor the hired workers who were brought in were cap­
able of harvesting enough to pay the costs. Maize yields were also very 
low. Nearly a third of the group went home at the end of the season.
When I visited them the next year, their mood was subdued. The 
Bank had given them credit for a new truck of their own, but they were 
losing faith in the project. The replacements who had been convinced to 
come from Paso Limon refused to work for the cash advances which were 
offered in the credit contracts, and had planted small plots of maize 
without credit to subsist. The leader took me out to the fields, which 
were heavily infested with weeds. We had a long conversation about the 
collective system, in which he expressed very serious doubts about the 
possibility of getting the people to work together under these conditions. 
His own personal position in the community was being undermined, and he 
felt that he was losing control of the group.
By the end of 1977, the spirit of the group was entirely broken.
The rice crop was very small once again. Opposition leaders from Ojitlan 
came and convinced the people not to harvest the maize, simply to turn it 
over to the Bank. The insurance company refused to honor the loss, and 
the Bank was unable to offer more credit until the debt was repaid. By 
that time, the Commission had started to work on the new town in which 
the settlers from Paso Limon will live. Those members of the original 
group who did not return home lived on the subsidies which they received 
for building their houses. There was nothing to do except wait until the 
project was completed, and see what the future would bring.
In 1978, on my last, brief visit to Uxpanapa, I was invited to attend 
a meeting held in the dining hall of one of the construction camps. All 
of the tables were pushed together into one long row. The Resident Direc­
tor of the project and representatives of the agricultural program office, 
the Bank, and the Agrarian Reform Ministry came in together and sat at 
the head. This ejido was composed both of spontaneous colonists who were
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living in their original village, and a number of Chinantecs who were 
moving into one of the new towns. There was a delay while a truck was 
sent to fetch some of the Chinantecs who had missed their ride.
When about forty people were settled, the Director stood up. He 
said that he knew that there v?ere problems and misunderstandings in the 
ejido. Several groups had been to see him in his office, and he had 
called this meeting so that everybody could participate in finding solu­
tions. Mexico was having severe economic problems, the Federal budget 
was restricted, but Uxpanapa was high on the list of priorities of the 
President of the Republic. Just that day, he had received a telegram 
from Ing. Jorge Tamayo, Executive Director of the Papaloapan Commission.
It authorized the construction of new houses for the ejidatarios, not all 
at once, but at a steady rate. He had a copy, which he would like to 
take the opportunity to deliver personally to the President.
The President stood up. "How many people think that I should sign 
this receipt?" Only about six people raised their hands, and the ejida­
tarios turned to each other and began to discuss the problem. "Sign it!" 
shouted a few. "No,” said others, “we don’t want to move to the new town, 
we want to stay where we are!" The President turned to the Director, and 
said that the people he represented did not want him to receive the docu­
ment .
The officials were amazed by this rebuff, and consulted among them­
selves. After a few moments, the representative of the Agrarian Reform 
Ministry stood up. "I think that most of you know me, although I have 
been here in Uxpanapa for only a short time. I would like to point a 
few things out to you. The Papaloapan Commission cannot force you to do 
anything. It Is here to develop the potential of resources which are 
very important for Mexico. In return, it is offering you a chance to 
participate, and is providing you with many services. We cannot make 
you live where you do not want to live, but I am sure that at least some 
of you would like to move to the new town. We are in a position to offer
20,000 pesos per household, electricity, and many other things. By ac­
cepting this document, you are being given an opportunity, It is like a 
registered letter, which you must sign for at the door before you can 
read it. The receipt is simply a record that we have done our duty and 
delivered it to you. You are not committing yourselves to anything.”
The ejidatarios discussed the issue heatedly for about fifteen min­
utes and asked many questions, some of them in a hostile tone. At last, 
they decided to get on to more important things. The President signed 
the receipt and put the envelope in his pocket without opening it.
The Director stood up again. He said that at this time of year, in 
the early Spring, the most pressing business was to plan the next cropping 
cycle. The Papaloapan Commission had been entrusted with the development 
of Uxpanapa, and millions of pesos had been spent. Everyone who had been 
given the great opportunity to live and work there, officials and ejida­
tarios alike, had an obligation to make the area produce for the people of
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Mexico as. a whole. They had coitie this evening to offer new lines of 
credit for rice and maize,"
The ejidatarios started speaking all at once, both in Spanish and 
in Chinantec. After a few moments, the President calmed them down. He 
turned to the head of the table arid said that his people did not want to
work with the Bank any more, and did not like the collective system. They
had never made any money, there had been nothing but losses, and many of
the companeros were already preparing small plots to cultivate in their 
own way. They only asked to be left alone.
The Director was expecting this, and spoke at some length. As they 
all.knew, and as was only to be expected in a neW project, there had been 
a variety of problems in the first years. Little by little, solutions 
were being found. For example, the quality of the land preparation had 
been poor, because SESA had used the wrong kind of disk* The new machinery 
station, under the control of the ejidatarios through the Union of Ejidos, 
would do better. In past years, they had relied top heavily on the air­
planes to fumigate, and the costs were going up. This year, they would 
obtain back-pack sprayers to give work to the ej idatarios. Poor communi­
cations had resulted in many problems with the insurance company; an arb- 
tration office was being set up in Uxpanapa to find solutions on a case- 
by-case basis.
In this season, they were asking only those ejidatarios who wished 
to participate to form Production Teams, which would receive credit and 
technical assistance. Each member would decide how much rice or maize 
he felt that he would be able to take care of And harvest. This Way, 
they would not be dependent on the combines. Each group Would plant in 
a compact block of land which would be prepared all at once by the new 
tractors. They would share responsibility for the credit,, but were not 
being asked to take on more than they could handle.
This was a new idea which provoked much discussion in the group.
One man stood up, and said that he did not want to work with the Bank 
under any conditions. He had been working for the past month preparing 
a plot, where he intended to plant his own crops in his own way. The 
Director asked him if he had cleared the land himself, or if he was using 
an area xchich had been cleared by machine. The man hesitated, fearing a 
trap. He said that he had worked very hard clearing thick, secondary 
growth, although the machines had passed that way over two years before.
The Director consulted with the agronomist in charge of the agri­
cultural program. He then said that the machine-cleared areas could be 
planted without credit, as long as all of the ejidatarios who wanted to 
work this way stayed within one compact area of their own choosing. The 
Commission could not allow cleared land to go to;waste, and would use the 
area which the members were not going to cultivate this season itself.
They would bring in tractors and plant crops to meet Uxpanapa*s production 
goals, and could not manoeuvre around scattered small plots. The profits
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of modernization. An anthropologist who has been very influential in 
the formation of national Indian policy commented on the Cerro de Oro 
project as follows (4^  pp. 226-7):
The proponents of total assimilation, by ignoring the 
traditional languages and cultures, will incorporate 
alienated, Inauthentic beings —  mere rags and tatters 
of humanity —  into the general society;, On the other 
hand, the extreme relativists would try to preserve 
these people as exotic museum pieces, which would lead 
to a policy of reservations .... We should not try to 
preserve the vestiges of colonialism which have contrib­
uted to a consciousness of inferiority and subordination.
We must, however, conserve the native languages which are 
the symbolic systems by which the Indians express the values 
which give meaning to their lives.
The employees of the resettlement committee in Ojitlan made a 
tremendous effort to respect the traditional culture of the Chinantecs 
as the first stages of the program were organized. The emphasis in 
Uxpanapa, however, Is on agricultural development. The project has 
been staffed almost exclusively by technicians from the north of Mexico. 
Very few of them had previous experience working with Indian people —  
most of them have never been in the Southeast before — - and none of 
them speak the Chinantec language. The Agrarian Reform Ministry was not 
represented in the zone between 1975 and 1978. The agricultural program 
office of the Commission and the Bank were responsible for organizing the 
ejidos to meet the minimum requirements of the credit system. This pro­
cess involved a great many meetings In each of the ejidos and endless 
paperwork, but both the directors and the small technical staff were under 
a great deal of pressure to produce rice and maize and to get the rubber 
and livestock programs organized. There was not enough time to work 
through the detailed questions and problems of each group. A few Chin­
antecs have learned to drive tractors and work In the rubber nurseries, 
but there have been no formal training programs in the ejidos.
The settlers were promised that they would be able to overcome 
their traditional poverty and become prosperous farmers in Uxpanapa with 
credit and mechanized technology. The low yields and heavy losses of the 
first years were demoralizing for everybody. It was very easy for the 
technical staff, which had been given the impossible job of managing the 
entire program, to fall back on a common racial stereotype and blame the 
problems on the laziness and selfish individualism of the Indians.
Under the very best of conditions, it would not be easy to transform 
the Chinantecs into disciplined members of complex organizations. Even 
if we put the cultural question entirely aside, the Uxpanapa project has 
not yet met the needs of the ejidatarios and has not provided an attrac­
tive alternative to their traditional agricultural economy. Credit has
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only been available within the context of the integrated program, over 
which they have had no control. The land in each .e j Ido has been used ac­
cording to the priorities of the government for the zone as a whole, not 
according to the wishes and needs of the ejIdatarios. The choice of soils, 
varieties, planting dates, and many other technical decisions have been 
made contrary to the detailed empirical experience of the people, who have 
been growing the same crops in the tropics for years. The quality and 
timing of the mechanized field operations have been very poor. There have 
been many conflicts with the Bank, and especially with the insurance company. 
There have been severe shortages of labor in certain months, and yet not 
enough work has been available through the year to provide an adequate 
income. The cash advances which have been paid on a daily basis have been 
very low, and in some cases have been unfairly distributed within the 
ejidos. The harvests must be marketed through the Bank, often at a lower 
price than they would bring from private buyers. The costs of production 
have been very high, the yields have been low, and there have been no 
profits.
The paternalistic aspects of this system are not new to the Ghinantecs; 
private credit in Ojitlan was also provided as a series of advances against 
the harvest, and their previous experience with official programs was un­
favorable. Nevertheless, in Uxpanapa, the ejidatarios do not have the di­
versified crops and supportive social structure of their homeland. They 
have been living fairly well in the first years on their indemnification 
payments, their income from their plots in Ojitlan, and relatively highly 
paid work as peons for the Commission. Although their real incomes are 
certainly higher than ever before, they are entirely dependent on cash for 
the first time in their lives. The agricultural program organized through 
the collective ejidos has not provided them with the big profits they were 
promised, and they feel that they have lost control over their lives.
The Chinantecs are disoriented, frustrated, and unhappy with the 
project in many ways, but they have no direct means of influencing gov­
ernment policy. They are divided politically into two factions. The only 
form of direct action which the Mexican political system normally allows 
to the campesinos is the right to petition. At the time of the conflict 
over the Cerro de Oro dam, the affected population was promised a wide 
range of services by presidential decree (Appendix A). The government 
always promises more, than it can deliver, and distributes its resources 
according to the economic importance of the various regions and the pres­
sure which the carapesino organizations are able to exert. Many of the 
Ghinantecs feel that the only effective form of leverage they have is to 
refuse to move to Uxpanapa until the infrastructure is entirely completed, 
and until the program is better organized. This position, which was ex­
pressed in many interviews, is not supported by the CCI (The Union of In­
dependent Campesinos), the official representatives of the majority. The 
national leadership of this organization is strongly committed to the 
collective ejidos and has worked closely with the Papaloapan Commission,
The CNC (The National Confederation of Campesinos) is the largest campe- 
sino union in the country and is a constituent element of the official
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party. Nevertheless, the local chapter is opposed to the project, and - 
has urged its members to stay in Ojitlan as long as possible. ;
In Uxpanapa, the local office of the CCI processes individual 
grievances and- puts pressure on the.' Commission to expedite services 
which have been promised. It plays an important function, but does not 
represent the interests' of its members in opposition to the government.
It is inconceivable, for example, that it should ever try to organize a 
strike to force the Commission to abandon the rice program, which has 
not benefited the overwhelming majority of the ejidatarios. This leaves 
the people no recourse except passive resistance; they just don’t work 
very hard.
The new towns which are under construction in Uxpanapa are still 
fairly rough, but they already have electricity, running water, and other 
services which are available in only a few of the ejidos in Ojitlan. Ne­
vertheless, many people have refused to move in until they are entirely 
completed; partly because they are unhappy about leaving their old homes, 
partly because their old plots still provide them with a significant 
portion of their income, and partly as a form of resistance to the pro­
gram, which has not yet provided them with the benefits they were promised. 
The lack of an established population greatly complicates both the organi­
zation of the labor force in the agricultural program and the organization 
of the collective ejidos. It is very irritating to the employees of the 
Commission and the Bank, who feel that they are working very hard for an 
ungrateful people who refuse to share the hardships of a newly opened 
frontier area, and expect to be handed everything on a platter.
Tequios, unpaid cooperative work projects, were organised in Ojitlan 
to build and maintain municipal facilities such as paths, ejidal buildings, 
and schools. The custom has not survived the move to Uxpanapa, where the 
people feel very little obligation to take care of their own needs, in 
spite of the collective system. They have been very slow to stucco their 
houses and plant trees and crops in their backyard gardens, and have shown 
very little enthusiasm for the Model Garden Program of the Commission.
Young social workers from the cities have been hired to run a conventional 
home economics extension program with the women. They have quickly become 
frustrated by the lack of interest and "dirty habits" of the Indians.
These are only some of the symptoms of the paternalism which pervades the 
project.
The social structure of the Chinantecs is changing in the new environ­
ment. The power of the traditional leaders 9 caciques, is based on a com­
plex network of personal relationships, both within the community and 
with the local political elite. They are everybody’s compadre, or co­
godfather. Many of. them make a point of being very Indian; they dress 
their women in beautifully woven huipiles, and observe the old customs. 
Although some of them are almost ostentatiously corrupt, they were able 
to take care of the needs and problems of their people in the traditional 
context. Their supremacy is being challenged in Uxpanapa by a very
!
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different kind of leader, who. is able to bridge the gap between the 
ejidatarios and the government agencies. These men are literate and 
understand the complexities o,£ the system which is being introduced.
One of the greatest frustrations which the official, staff has {faced 
in organizing the program is that none of them can speak Chinantec. For 
example, a representative of the Bank would go to a meeting and explain 
some element of the credit system as clearly as possible. The ejidatarios 
would discuss the proposal at length in their own language, and then vote 
against it. The bureaucrat would have no way of knowing what it was that 
they didn1t understand or agree with. A literate Chinantec who, c$n trans­
late and facilitate this process can get better and faster service to his 
people, and is a tremendous help to the over-worked staff. He is rewarded 
by both sides; the ejidatarios vote him into office, and the officials 
help him to get personal credit for a truck, or look the other way as he 
sells liquor out of his house in violation of the prohibition regulations 
in the zone. There are many honest, dedicated, and unselfish leaders 
among the Chinantecs, but personal influence and wealth are being concen­
trated by a new elite.
An interesting sociological study could be made of the evolution 
of this new class structure. It will probably become more pronounced as 
enterprises such as rubber and sugar cane, which require the division of 
labor between skilled and unskilled workers, are introduced on a large 
scale. Chart 15 illustrates the stratification of income levels which 
developed within a few years of the time collective ejidos. were set up 
in the Chontalpa project in Tabasco, which is organized in much the same 
way as Uxpanapa.
The spontaneous colonists who live in the resettlement zone are in 
a somewhat different situation, but they have also come into serious con­
flict with the system which is being introduced. The Commission has‘cleared 
land in some of their ejidos by machine, which was represented•.to them as 
a free service in return for accepting relocated Chinantec families into 
the vacancies which were not filled by the original population. In fact, 
however, there have been strings attached, of which the most- important is 
that the land became part of the official agricultural program. The col­
onists have had the same problems with the annual crop and credit programs 
as the Chinantecs. They feel that the income from the timber operations 
on their land should be paid to them, instead of going into the common 
fund under the control of the Union of Ejidos, of which they would be 
minority members if they joined. They may be allowed to set: up a separate 
union 6£ their own.
They must leave the villages which they built for themselves in the 
wilderness to become eligible for the housing, electricity, and other 
services which they have been offered. There have been a variety of con­
flicts over boundaries, legal membership lists, and other details. The 
construction of the road and,other Infrastructure has opened up many new 
opportunities to them, but they are impatient with the collective system
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and the pervasive government control that comes along with it. Most of 
these ejidatarios would like to increase the area under cultivation and 
go into livestock production independently of the Commission’s program.
Many of these problems, which threaten to undermine the Papaloapan 
Commission's real achievements in Uxpanapa, can be traced back to the 
fact that the zone as a whole, rather than the individual ejido or the 
individual family, has been treated as the basic unit of production. The 
collectives have become identified in the people's minds with a modern 
o8»t«uiturai *5-/atam which has not benefited them. They have become 
numbed by the complexity of the process; the constant meetings and the 
endless documents which they must approve to receive any income at all, 
but which they do not really understand. They feel like poorly paid peons 
on a state farm, and have almost no incentive to work hard. They cannot 
understand why a person who applies himself should be paid the same as 
someone who does very little. They do not see how they can build up any­
thing for themselves, and can see a new privileged elite emerging.
It would have been more logical to organize the cooperatives in 
stages. Teams could have been formed of small groups of people who knew 
and trusted each other and who had already worked together in the old 
ejidos. As credit, machinery, and improved technology provided tangible 
benefits to the members, more and more ejidatarios could have been orga­
nized to cultivate larger and larger areas. This was not done, in part 
because there is a strong prejudice in the country as a whole against the 
formation of privileged groups.
For years, the official banks established "solidarity groups" and 
other ad hoc associations within the ejidos to receive credit. This prac­
tice, by excluding the majority of the ejidatarios, contributed both to 
the development of powerful elites and to the fractionalization of the 
land into small plots (58, 59, 168), When the relevant laws were revised 
in the early 1970's to promote modernization in the reformed sector, the 
ejido itself was made the only legal entity authorized to receive and ad­
minister credit.
The laws do permit some flexibility in the formal structure of the 
ejidos, but the Commission and the banking system decided to introduce a 
uniform, fully collective system into Uxpanapa. There were to be no pri­
vate assets at all except for the backyard gardens; individuals who already 
owned cattle would be forced to sell them to the ejidos. This has led to 
an entirely unnecessary dichotomy in the minds of the ejidatarios between 
the only two systems which they know: the centrally managed program of the 
government, and individual plots cultivated using traditional technology. 
Their experience in the first few years has led them to prefer the latter, 
and a whoJe range of intermediate possibilities has been excluded. Col­
lectivization has not been given a political dimension; it has not been 
presented as a way to combine forces to meet common goals. It is simply 
a prerequisite for credit. A system which is not productive, and x^ hich 
does not meet the needs of the people, will inevitably evolve into some-
*1 7 7 -
thing else; the Commission may well lose control over how the ejidos 
will be organized, precisely because it has tried to exercise too much 
control.
Uxpanapa is a fertile zone; there is no reason why it should not 
become productive using some form of modern technology and some kind of 
cooperative organization. The options available to the Papaloapan Com­
mission are severely circumscribed by a variety of political pressures, 
by the technology which is available, and by the legal and institutional 
structure through which it must implement its policies. The resentment 
and distrust which have built up in the first years will not be overcome 
easily. The history of the ejido as a productive form of organization 
is discouraging, and the record Of the Agrarian Reform Ministry in 
solving these kinds of problems is very poor. Nevertheless, some promis­
ing alternatives are being explored.
Functional cooperatives can only be developed if each ejido is 
organized separately according.to the needs and wishes of its members. 
Although the officials of the Commission and the Bank have been as flex­
ible as they can, a major re-emphasis in the program will be required if 
the system is to work effectively. This would include the appointment 
of a well-trained and motivated advisory staff» active training programs, 
and some kind of moratorium on the unreasonable production targets which 
continue to be set on an annual basis.
The laws allow each family to cultivate two hectares individually; 
they should be permitted to do so. Real incentive should be provided 
to encourage the people to undertake cooperative enterprises on the land 
which is held in common, but they should not be coerced. It is unfair 
to tie the income of the ejidatarios to the residual left over after 
the very high costs of introducing a new and untested technology into 
the tropics have been deducted. It is counterproductive to pay every­
body at the same daily rate, regardless of their skills and productivity.
All of the lines of credit for both annual and perennial crops 
should be consolidated into a single fund, on the assumption that the 
ejido will become a profitable entity within a reasonable period, say 
five years. In the meantime, each family should be paid a regular min­
imum salary according to the terms of Article 115 of the Rural Credit 
haw (141), so that they do not have to worry about meeting their basic 
needs on a week-to-week basis. Separate production teams should be orga­
nized for each enterprise, composed of groups of people with appropriate 
skills and an active willingness to work together. Their incomes should 
depend on their productivity. Intensive training programs should be es­
tablished to give the ejidatarios the skills they will need to manage and 
operate modern agricultural enterprises; literacy classes would be a good, 
place to start. All of the activities In the ejido would be administered 
by the elected officials under the authority of the General Assembly; they 
should be paid an adequate salary.
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All of these ideas have been expressed by various officials who 
have worked in Uxpanapa, and all of them are permitted by law. The point 
is not to replace one rigid system with another; a flexible approach is 
very necessary. The new.cooperatives should start from the immediate 
interests of the ejidatarios and help-them to develop their resources'and 
capabilities in directions which are consistent with regional and national 
priorities. There are no economies of scale; in an unprofitable enterprise 
with a poorly motivated and underproductive labor force* Even if the tech­
nology is. improved, national goals cannot be met through the ejidal struC* 
ture without the participation of the ejidatarios.
Neither the Chinantecs nor the spontaneous.settlers have had any 
formal way of applying their practical experience in tropical agriculture 
to the planning, administration, or evaluation of the project. The tech­
nical personnel, many of whom have had no previous experience in the South­
east, have made all of the technical decisions. They have made many■ mis­
takes of which the ejidatarios were well aware long before the.problems 
became obvious. The people feel so alienated from the experimental pro- : 
grams of the Commission that they steal;from the test plots, invalidating 
the data*
A:program has been developed in Guatemala which brings the campesinos 
into close cooperation with both agronomists and social scientists. Trad­
itional varieties and cultural practices are tested side-by-side with var­
ious modern packages of improved seeds, fertilization, pest control, and 
so forth. Careful records are kept:of. costs, yields, and economic-returns. 
If some change seems promising, the new technology is introduced on a 
limited commercial scale, and the: results are carefully monitored for sev-1^ 
eral years (83). Similar models, have been used in other areas (91). Some 
system of this kind in Uxpanapa would not only avoid costly errors, it 
would involve the ejidatarios in the program so that they would feel a 
personal stake in the results (62).
The creation of collective ejidos does not guarantee equity. It 
would be utopian to expect that everybody will be content with the same 
income, and it will be very difficult to : prevent,the most profitable 
enterprises from coming under the control of a small elite. The impos­
ition of a collective structure in other projects in the Southeast, by­
breaking dcwn the traditional values of community, has accelerated the 
formation of very unequal patterns of income distribution (107, 136,.
205). The fomal structure of the ej idos is similar superficially to .
cooperatives in Socialist societies, such as- the Chinese communes, but. 
they cannot function in the same way in a capitalist economy which syste* 
matically rewards individual accumulation.
It i3 difficult to predict what course the Uxpanapa .project will 
take in the future, but the Mexican government will not. continue to pour 
money into a losing operation indefinitely. By 1978, the Papaloapan 
Commission was already beginning to werk outside of the ejidal structure 
to meet its production targets for the annual crops. In the longer run,
-1 7 9 -
it will almost certainly find crops and technological systems which 
can take advantage of the infrastructure which has been built. Sugar 
cane is a likely possibility. Some of the more aggressive and able 
ejidatarios will find opportunities in the new structure and prosper.
There is a real danger that the majority will slip back into traditional 
slash-and-burn agriculture for a few years, supplemented by daily labor 
in the commercial operations. As the region becomes more fully developed, 
the range of opportunities open to them will narrow, and they will become 
permanently marginalized. If, however, the short-term pressures on the 
project are relaxed, and If a concentrated effort is made, it is still 
possible that the collective ejidos may become a structure through which 
the Chinantec people will be able to participate In the modernization 
of the Southeast, a questionable goal if ever there was one.
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Plate X-2
Above: the general assembly of each ejido meets frequently to discuss the credit contracts and 
other business.
Below: Deputy Garzon, national director of the CCI, addresses the newly elected representatives 
in Uxpanapa. Officials of the Papaloapan Commission stand beside him.
Plate X-3
Above: An ejidatario adds his signature to an official document.
Below: An overgrown field of maize, rice, and weeds. The challenge of Uxpanapa is to bring good 
management and effective participation into a single, viable system.
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APPENDIX A
ABRIDGED TRANSLATION OF THE EXECUTIVE DECREE OF AUGUST 29, 1972, 
WHICH AUTHORIZED THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CERRO DE ORO DAM
Introduction
1) The Federal Government, conscious of the need to resolve the social, 
economic, and technical problems of the watershed basin of the Papaloa- 
pan River by taking advantage of the natural resources, not only through 
the construction of engineering projects, but also by promoting economic 
development through a variety of integrated programs, created the Papa- 
loapan Commission by executive decree on February 26, 1947. This agency 
was empowered to plan and to construct all of the works necessary to 
prevent flooding, develop irrigation systems, build roads, other ser­
vices, and sanitary systems, and to coordinate industrial, agricultural, 
and colonization projects.
2) The future socioeconomic development of the nation must be based on 
a more just and balanced foundation. The distribution of income must be 
improved in favor of the great majority of the population, particularly 
in areas which have previously received very few benefits, as is in the 
case in the upper basin of the Papaloapan. New infrastructure will 
increase both production and the income of the people, and will permit 
this region to be integrated into the national economy.
(3-5) (The purpose of the Special Study Commission—  ^ is explained. The 
importance of initiating projects in the State of Oaxaca as a tribute to 
President Benito Juarez is stressed.)
The Decree
1) The recommendations and conclusions of the Special Study Commission 
are hereby approved.
2) The following works will be constructed:
I. A dam to create a storage reservoir with a capacity of 3.5 
billion cubic meters will be built at Cerro de Oro on the Santo 
Domingo River to control flooding and to generate electricity.
70,000 hectares in the State of Oaxaca will be provided with 
irrigation. A diversion dam will be built on the Valle Nacional
If The Special Study Commission, composed of Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo, 
Ing. Victor Bravo Ahuja, and Antonio Jimenez Puyo, was established in 
May, 1972 at the request of President Echeverria in response to local 
opposition in the State of Oaxaca to the construction of the Cerro de 
Oro Dam. Its report was published later in the same year as: Informe
de la Junta Especial de Estudios Relativo al Desarrollo Socioeconomico 
de la Parte Alta de la Cuenca del Rio Papaloapan.
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River. The capacity of the Temazcal reservoir will be increased 
to 9.9 billion cubic meters.
II. Complementary works, such as permanent levees and artificial 
canals, will be built to increase the capacity of the main bed of 
the Papaloapan River.
III. The soil conservation program in the upper basin will be 
intensified. One million hectares in the Mixtec zone will receive 
special attention, with particular emphasis on natural resources 
such as forests and mineral deposits, roads, and small scale irri­
gation works.
IV. 363 million pesos are hereby authorized for the construction 
of roads in that protion of the Papaloapan Basin which lies in the 
State of Oaxaca.
V. Agricultural experiment stations, animal health centers, and 
demonstration plots will be established to meet the needs of the 
region.
(VI-X) (Schools, post and telegraph offices, hospitals, rural 
health centers, drinking water, sewage, and electrical power will 
be provided to certain towns, as listed in detail.)
(3-4) (The responsibilities of the Papaloapan Commission and other 
government agencies are specified, and the budget is allocated.)
5) The following compensation will be provided to the population 
affected by the construction of the Cerro de Oro Dams
I. Ejidos
a) The ejidos will be relocated by the agrarian authorities, 
either in the district which will be protected by the dam, or 
in whatever resettlement zones may be acquired by the Ministry 
of Hydraulic Resources.
Representatives of each legally constituted ejido or community 
will select the area into which they wish to be relocated.
The Ministry of Hydraulic Resources and the Papaloapan Commis­
sion will immediately construct all of the necessary infra­
structure. As soon as it is completed, the agrarian authori­
ties will help the people move.
As long as the lakebed is not flooded, the ejidatarios may 
continue to farm the areas where they currently live, even if 
they have received land in other areas as compensation.
b) The area which will be granted to each ejidatario or 
comunero as compensation will be set according to the Agrarian 
Reform and Water Laws, and will vary depending on whether or 
not it is provided with irrigation, but in no case will it be
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smaller than indicated in the appropriate decrees.—  In addi­
tion, each ejido or community will receive at least as much 
pasture land as it currently uses collectively.
All individuals presently residing in the ejidos and communi­
ties, whether or not they currently hold rights, will be 
included in the census for the purpose of distributing rights 
in the new areas.
c) The buildings and other assets of the ejidatarios will be 
compensated in cash on the basis of evaluations carried out 
by the government. Each ejido will designate representatives 
to participate in the evaluation process, and their opinions 
must be taken fully into account.
II. Private Property
a) Private property owners will be compensated in cash accord­
ing to an evaluation to be carried out by the government. 
Representatives of the farmers will be selected by the Papa- 
loapan Commission from a list drawn up by the Farmers Associa­
tion, the Cattle Ranchers Association, and the Association of 
Private Property Owners of the affected area.
b) Each individual may choose between indemnification in cash 
or in the form of land in other areas.
6) In accordance with the Federal Waters Law, the parcel provided to 
each private property owner in compensation will not exceed 20 hectares 
or irrigated land, or 250 hectares of pasture land in areas which are 
not suitable for crop production.
7) The official credit institutions of the Federal Government will 
provide all of the campesinos affected by the dam with both long-term 
and short-term credit to help them to cultivate their lands.
2/
8) The appropriate ministries and decentralized agencies are hereby 
directed to allocate the financial resources which will be necessary 
to carry out the provisions of this decree.
[Signed]
Luis Echeverria Alvarez, Constitutional President of the United States
of Mexico
If It was later decided to grant each ejidatario rights to 20 
hectares in Uxpanapa or other rain-fed areas, and ten hectares in irri­
gated areas. Each new ejido is being organized collectively.
Source: Diario Oficial, Vol. 313, No. 52, August 30, 1972.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1. FUTURE RESERVOIR OF THE CERRO DE ORO DAM:
LAND CAPABILITY STUDY
(area in hectares)
Class Area Percent
(hectares)
2 Soils which present some limitations 
on the selection of crops, and/or 
which require special management 
practices 2,225 12
3 Soils which present severe limitations 
on the selection of crops, and which 
require special management and conser­
vation methods. 8,321 43
4 Soils which are severely limited by 
topography, which should be restricted 
to pastures, tree crops, or forest 
products. 2,343 12
5 Soils which are very severely limited 
by topography, and which must be 
restricted to the uses outlined in "4" 
to prevent erosion. 6,095 31
Rivers 457 2
TOTAL 19,471 100
Source: Mexico, Secretarla de Recursos Hidraulicos, Subsecretarxa
de Planeacion, Estudios y Proyectos, S.A., nEstudio Agrologico Especial 
del Vaso de Cerro de Oro y las Areas de Ojitlan y San Felipe Usila, 
Oaxaca," mimeo, 1972.
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APPENDIX TABLE 2. FUTURE RESERVOIR OF THE CERRO DE ORO DAM:
LAND USE STUDY
(area in hectares)
Use Area
Percent 
of Total
(hectares)
Both rainy and dry season crops under
continuous cultivation 516 3
Rainy season crops under continuous 
cultivation 3,040 16
Crops in areas managed with the short 
fallow system 396 2
Areas in short-term fallow 2,063 10
Crops in areas managed with the long 
fallow system 2,086 11
Secondary growth less than two meters 
tall 3,435 18
Secondary growth 2-5 meters tall. 1,803 9
Primary and secondary growth over 5 
meters tall 3,866 20
Pastures 1,467 7
Pastures infested with woody growth 320 2
Other uses 22 1
Rivers 457 2
TOTAL 19,471 100
Total under cultivation 6,060 31
Total in pasture 1,467 8
Total not in production 11,944 61
Source: Mexico, Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulicos, Subsecretarla
de Planeacion, Estudios y Proyectos, S.A., "Estudio Agrologico Especial 
del Vaso de Cerro de Oro y Las Areas de Ojitlan y San Felipe Usila,
► Oaxaca," mimeo, 1972.
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appendix TABLE 6. CERRO DE ORO RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM: 
ASSIGNMENT OF VACANT RIGHTS IN UXPANAPA
Old Ejldos in 
Cerro de Oro Lakebed
Number of 
Ejidatarios New Ejidos in Uxpanapa
Arroyo Grande Privilegio 9 Francisco Javier Mina
10 Carolina Anaya
81 Benito Juarez
Piedra de Amolar 33 Plan de Arroyos
20 Francisco Javier Mina
El Aguacate 16 El Pilon
23 Buenavista
28 Adalberto Tejada
La Laguna del Diablo 46 Almanza
24 Celestino Gasca
El Zapotal 22 Francisco Villa
22 Enrique Rodriguez Cano
La Laguna Escondida 10 Hermanos Cedillo
42 Monterrey
74 Rafael Murillo Vidal
39 Alvaro Obregon
Cafetal Segundo 21 Salto de Eyipantla
28 Josefa Ortiz de Dominguez
82 Alvaro Obregon
El Cantdn ~ “ ir — ■ Benito Juarez
36 Alvaro Obregon
30 Benito Juarez
49 San Antonio
33 Benito Juarez
Mata de Cana 20 Francisco Javier Mina
Raya de las Carolinas 102 Adolfo Lopez Mateos
Paso Limon 195 Helio Garcia Alfaro
El Nanche 83
Potrero Viejo 63
Paso Novillo 47 Valerio Trujano
Arroyo Culebra 38
Arroyo Caracol Ideal 64 Gustavo Diaz Ordaz Huitzizlco Nuevo
Monte Bello
107
Buenavista 
Las Brujas 
Lucio Blanco
Cerro Amarillo
San Jose Ojitlan 33 Candido Aguilar
Las Pochotas 175 reserva sin nombrar
Arroyo Remolino 81
El Malotal 94
La Esperanza 158
Santa Rosa 142 Cesar Borja-Altamira
Loma Alta 50
Arroyo Tambor 92 Mario Paredes
Piedra de Azucar 40
Arroyo Caracol Estrella 110 Chimalapas
TOTAL 27 Ejidos 2,497 39 Ejidos
Source: Mexicos Secretarfa de Recursos Hidr2iulicos, Comisitfn del 
Papaloapan, Cotniti de Reacomodo, Presa Cerro de Oro, "Tercer Informe/' 
mimeo, 1976.
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APPENDIX TABLE 10. UXPANAPA: POTENTIAL LAND USE CLASSIFICATION, 1975
(Area Expropriated for Resettlement)
Class Definition Area Percent
I Few or no limitations on 
agriculture
(hectares)
33,149 21.6
II Require careful management 10,293 6.7
III Severe limitations, require 
soil conservation practices 16,498 10.7
IV Limited to pastures, fruit 
trees, etc. 14,383 9.4
V Very steep slopes, limited 
to a few perennial crops 17,073 11.0
VI Limited to forestry 25,830 16.8
VII Must be left untouched 36,590 23.8
Rivers 810
TOTAL 154,626 100.0
Source: Mexico, Secretaria de Recursos Hidraulicos, Comision del
Papaloapan, Estudios y Proyectos, S.A., f,Reconocimiento Agrologico Para 
el Desarrollo Agropecuario de Uspanapa," mimeo, 1975.
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APPENDIX TABLE 11. UXPANAPA: POTENTIAL LAND USE CLASSIFICATION, 1977
(Area Including and Surrounding Cleared Land)
_
Class Limiting Factors Potential Uses Area Percent
(hectares)
I Vegetables, cane, 
oil palm/pasture
53 .4
II Structural problems
Microrelief
Erodibility
Maize, cane, rubber, 
fruit trees, 
oil palm/pasture
2,007 17.0
III Structural problems 
Steep slopes 
Microrelief 
Erodibility 
Poor drainage
Cane, pasture, 
rubber, fruit, 
oil palm/pasture
6,371 54.0
IV Steep slopes
Microrelief
Rocky outcroppings
Pasture 206 1.7
V Steep slopes 
Microrelief
Forestry
silviculture
833 7.0
VI Steep slopes
Microrelief
Rocky outcroppings
Forest reserve 2,176 18.3
Airstrips, Roads, and Towns 256 3.0
TOTAL 11,900 100.0
Current Use: Forest 
(percent) Regrowth 
Crops
42
21
28
Source: Mexico, Secretaria de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos
Comision del Papaloapan, Agrologia Desarrollo, S.C., "Estudio Agrolo- 
gico Semi-detallado -- Distrito de Drenaje de Uxpanapa," mimeo, 1977.
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APPENDIX TABLE 12. UXPANAPA: CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF SOIL SAMPLES, 1977
Test Characteristic
Percent of Samples 
Area 2 Area 3
PH Strongly acid (4-5) 23.2 7.4
Moderately Acid (5-6) 60.7 74.0
Slightly acid (6-7) 16.7 16.0
O.M. Very poor (less than 1%) 28.6 15.0
Poor (1-2%) 67.9 61.0
Medium (2-3%) 3.6 25.0
Total N Very poor (less than .05%) 28.6 14.8
Poor (.05-.10%) 67.8 61.1
Medium (.10-.15%) 3.5 25.9
Avail­
able P
Poor (less than 11 ppm) -- all samples—
Avail­ Rich (146-222 ppm) 16.0 85.0
able K Very rich (more than 222 ppm) 84.0 15.0
Avail­ Medium (490-1110 ppm) 78.0 85.0
able Ca Rich (1110-1780 ppm) 20.0 9.0
Very rich (more than 1780 ppm) 2.0 6.0
Avail­
able Mg
Very rich (more than 90 ppm) -- all samples—
Methodology: 182 samples of the top 30 centimeters of soil
pH - H90 - water:soil; 2:1 
O.M. - (%)Walbley and Black 
Total N (%) Kjeldahl 
Available P (ppm) Troug
Available K (ppm) Dilution with ammonium acetate, flame photometer 
Available Ca (ppm) Titration with triethenolamine 
Available Mg (ppm) Titration with triethenolamine
Source: Mexico, Secretarla de Agricultura y Recursos Hidraulicos,
Comision del Papaloapan, Agrologia Desarrollo, S.C., "Estudio Agrologico 
Semi-detallado - Distrito de Drenaje de Uxpanapa,” mimeo, 1977.
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APPENDIX TABLE 13. UXPANAPA: TIMBER OPERATIONS
THROUGH OCTOBER 31, 1976
Wood Sold
Percent
Type Cubic Meters of Total
Specific Species
Mahogany 1,152 .4
Cedar 3,656 1.3
Ceiba (Ceiba pentendra) 61,191 22.1
Other specific species 6,021 2.2
Subtotal 72,020 26.0
Mixed Species
Railroad ties 107,692 39.0
Packing crates 3,140 1.0
Undifferentiated hardwoods 94,665 34.0
Subtotal 205,497 74.0
TOTAL 277,517 100.0
Payments by Contractors
Average per
Distribution of Payments Amount Cubic Meter
(pesos) (pesos)
To 82 ejidos for timber rights 13,568,700 48.75
To Timber Authority for rights 4,839,500 17.40
Repayment of loans 16,512,100 59.30
To Papaloapan Commission— tolls 737,347 2.65
Taxes 3,616,552 13.00
Other payments 3,799,387 13.65
TOTAL 43,073,586 154.75
NOTE; A cubic meter of sawn wood is the equivalent of 424 board 
feet. With logs, a factor ranging from 220 to 288 is used to allow for 
the losses involved in sawing an imperfectly round log into rectangular 
sections. Timber has been sold in both forms from Uxpanapa, so these 
figures cannot be converted.
Source: Mexico, Fideicomiso para el Aprovechamiento de la Madera
Utilizable en Uxpanapa.
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APPENDIX TABLE 15. UXPANAPA: UNIFORM CREDIT ALLOWANCES
FOR RICE, 1976-1978
(Summer Seasons)
(pesos per hectare)
Category 1976 1977 1978
I. Mechanized System
Land Preparation 1,000 842 1,450
Seed 960 680 990
Planting 320 340 331
Fertilizer 860 786 960
Application 245 200 240
Insecticide 198 320 220
Application 300 600 240
Herbicide ,285 120 755
Application 150 500 240
Fungicide 378
Application 240
Bird Control 55 34 120
Harvest 630 700 450
Transportation 90 60
Insurance Premium 235 340 606
TOTAL 5,327 5,727 7,220
II. Slash-and-Burn System Without Fertilizer
Land Preparation 750
Seed 594
Planting 420
Insecticide 130
Application 120
Herbicide 755
Application 240
Bird Control 100
Harvest 100
Insurance Premium 294
TOTAL 3,503
Source: Banco de Credito Rural del Golfo
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APPENDIX TABLE 16. UXPANAPA: UNIFORM CREDIT ALLOWANCES
FOR MAIZE, 1976-1978
(Summer Seasons)
(pesos per hectare)
Category 1976 1977 1978
I. Mechanized System
Land Preparation 1,125 1,075 1,500
Seed 135 150 240
Planting 200 243 180
Fertilizer 859 747 880
Application 190 300 240
Insecticide 70 350 332
Application 150 160
Herbicide 270
Application 150
Hand Weeding 350 600
Hilling 240
Dobla 80 250 180
Picking 100 300 368
Shelling 90 80 180
Transportation 120
Insurance Premium 189 332 757
TOTAL 3,608 4,524 5,977
II. Slash-and-Burn System Without Fertilizer
Land Preparation 500 750
Seed 60 100
Planting 125 180
Hand Weeding 400 500
Insecticide 150 183
Application 150 120
Dobla 150 100
Picking 100 200
Shelling 62 100
Insurance Premium 135 315
TOTAL 1,832 2,485
III. Slash-and-Burn System With Fertilizer
Land Preparation 500 711
Seed 150 240
Planting 200 240
Fertilizer 743 880
Application 300 240
Hand Weeding 400 500
Hilling 240
Insecticide 250 183
Application 200 120
Dobla 150 150
Picking 200 260
Shelling 65 180
Transportation 120
Insurance Premium 250 590
TOTAL 3,408 4,654
Source: Banco de Cr£dito Rural del Golfo.
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APPENDIX TABLE 17. UXPANAPA; PILOT CATTLE OPERATION PLAN 
FOR COLLECTIVE EJIDO "ALMANZA," 1977
Capital Investment with Credit
Number Item Unit Cost Total Cost
(pesos in 1977)
320 Has. Establish African Star Grass 1,138 364,000
80 Has. Establish Santo Domingo Grass 2,200 176,000
and Glicine (legume) Misture 2,200 176,000
433 Brown Swiss X Cebu Pregnant
Heifers 5,700 2,468,100
8 Brown Swiss X Holstein Bulls 17,780 142,240
22 Kins, Fence 7,980 175,560
1 Corral 48,900 48,900
1 Tick Bath 48,000 48,000
1 Milking Shed 21,400 21,400
1 Calf Barn 21,400 21,400
1 Pond 18,000 18,000
2 Drinking Stations 6,800 13,600
1 130 HP Tractor 414,580 414,580
5 Horses 3,500 17,500
5 sets Tack 1,900 9,500
Subtotal 3,938,780
Other Investments from Ejidal Funds 70,000
TOTAL 4,008,780
Credit Terms; Ten years at 9 percent after two-year grace period
Average Annual Interest Payment; 281,420 pesos 
Average Annual Principal Payment; 392,880 pesos
Herd Composition After Sixth Year of Operation
283 Adult Cows 
118 Pregnant Heifers 
121 Unbred Heifers 
124 Male Calves
Total; Maximum number of head-
124 Female Calves 
121 Males 1-2 years old 
118 Males 2-3 years old 
8 Bulls
■1,088; 750 animal units.
Mortality; 7 adults per year
12 weaned calves per year 
14 percent calf mortality
continued
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(APPENDIX TABLE 17 continued)
Projected Annual Operating Costs After Sixth Year of Operation
Item Unit Cost Total Cost
( p e s o s  i n 1 9 7 7 )
Mineral Supplement 15 per adult animal 15,000
Labor* 60 per man per day 198,000
Vaccination and Medicine 100 per adult animal 75,000
Artificial Insemination 120 per breeding unit 28,300
Miscellaneous Equipment 5,000
Insurance Premium By value of animal 30,000
Building and Equipment
Maintenance 10 percent of value 34,700
Pasture Maintenance 100 per hectare 40,000
Replacement Bulls 17,500 each 35,000
Taxes 27,200
TOTAL 448,200
Projected Gross Annual Income After Sixth Year of Operation
Item Number Unit Value Total Value
(pesos in 1977)
Cull Cows 64 4,000 256,000
Heifers 47 5,700 267,900
Fattened Males 118 5,600 660,800
Cull Bulls 2 10,000 20,000
Milk 134, 000 Its. 3.40/liter 455,300
Insurance Indemnifi-
cation 21,000
Custom Machinery Work 45,000
TOTAL 1,726,000
Average Annual Cash Flow in First Ten Years of Operation
(pesos in 1977)
Average Gross Income 
Average Operating Costs** 
Average Interest Payment 
Average Principal Payment 
Average Annual Total Cost
851,190
281,420
392,880
1,525,490
1,821,640
Average Annual Net Income 296,150 = 7.5 percent 
of investment
*Four permanent workers plus seasonal labor.
**Includes further capital investments financed with short-term credit 
at 12 percent in first four years of operation.
Source: Technical and Financial Evaluation by FIRA, Banco de Mexico.
